informed-decision/workplans/ADHOC-2026-10-03.md
tegwick 2d2161bc64 Request fresh KeyCape login for timed reviews with narrow image candidate
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6.1-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a1029c-c003-7283-acc9-930b434e6cae
2026-10-03 20:33:34 +02:00

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Markdown

---
id: INFD-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-03
type: workplan
title: "Provisioning-window sitting draft for hub decision D1"
domain: infotech
repo: informed-decision
status: blocked
owner: claude
created: "2026-10-03"
updated: "2026-10-03"
related:
- CUST-WP-0075
state_hub_workstream_id: "e7923574-d226-53db-befb-dd7dcba817bb"
---
## Draft the provisioning-window sitting
```task
id: INFD-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-03-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "8aa74d26-6a65-5881-8572-c5bde1069b96"
```
Dispatched by the-custodian under CUST-WP-0075. The founder wants hub decision
`62aa95e4-3ccc-4867-8806-5e3db005b483` (D1, attended OpenBao provisioning
window) approved through informed-decision. Batch:
`docs/batches/2026-10-03-provisioning-window/` (generator
`tools/prepare_provisioning_window_batch.py`, operator steps in its
`OPERATOR.md`). Five candidate lanes were read against owner source. One memo,
`infd-20261003-p01` (RPF-WP-0035-T06, acceptance of the CCR-2026-0019 scoped
delivery proof), was drafted. MASON-WP-0007-T05, RPF-WP-0035-T02,
RPF-WP-0035-T08 and RAPPCOREHUB-WP-0003-T04 were excluded with reasons in the
batch index. Unsigned; no approval created, nothing submitted.
## Circulate and bind the sitting
```task
id: INFD-WP-ADHOC-2026-10-03-T02
status: wait
needs_human: true
decision_id: 62aa95e4-3ccc-4867-8806-5e3db005b483
blocking_reason: "p01 is loaded, but repeated browser read attempts retain KeyCape MFA time 17:08:08 UTC and fail the 900-second policy limit. Obtain genuinely fresh password/OTP authentication; if fresh OTP still emits the old time, KeyCape owns the correction (INFD-IN-0005). Then founder reviews, acknowledges and chooses a disposition."
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "ffbc2e30-7a6a-5fb4-86c9-3db1e4a0bacf"
```
Agents do not create the approval, admit the record, or bind. After the human
disposition, record the receipt under `docs/evidence/` and update `sitting.json`.
## Coaching progress — 2026-10-03
A1 dry run passed. Founder completed A3 at 17:08 UTC. Receipt
`docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-approval-create.json` records one
requested human-control approval with no entries:
`706f4205-aaa7-44f6-be30-d0f57664d69c`, carrying the native digest
`sha256:c8a1a9c8fb22616e3aacfb877ba7974feb5eedaed491f856a6c90719c502ebe4`.
Binding fields match the reviewed intent. Validity ends 2026-10-04 17:08 UTC.
A4 preparation: `docs/batches/2026-10-03-provisioning-window/access-engine-v7.patch`
adds only p01 to the policy and record manifest, advances v6 to v7, and preserves
all 16 existing act records. It is a candidate for access-engine; no owner files
or live policy were changed. Policy publication/deployment, load and human
answer remain outstanding. This memo alone does not resolve hub decision D1.
Offline candidate validation: 795 actual-evaluator checks passed, including
p01 and all existing records. The harness's 12-hour-boundary timestamp was
refreshed per list record in the temporary validation copy to avoid wall-clock
aging during the run; the policy MFA limits were unchanged. Embedded policy
validation/tests also passed. Candidate package digest:
`sha256:2490955f175c52574543e210be06f468a01e56c778d38d4fdcad731875e37cc7`.
Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-policy-candidate-checks.json`
and `docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-admission-candidate.json`.
A4 publication: founder applied the tested patch. Access-engine committed and
synced it as `f946c7b`; CI published image
`sha256:f6fa2062f7095e66c7a91f20cd130914b5481d46d9d909339e028f7ecdf0065d`.
Published-image evaluation confirms v7 and the expected package digest.
Deployment values are pinned in access-engine commit `20ea612`.
`docs/batches/2026-10-03-provisioning-window/DEPLOY-v7.md` records the concrete
policy/review rollout candidate, namespace-scoped preflight and rollback.
Live rollout awaits founder approval. Load and human disposition remain open.
A4 live rollout completed on founder instruction "deploy v7":
ADMINISTER @ realm:kubernetes/railiance01, activation=APPROVED.
Helm revision 8 is deployed; authenticated workload live checks permit exact
p01 and refuse wrong group, unknown memo, changed digest and absent caller
token. Review Deployment references `informed-decision-runtime-b800648bd80b`;
public health/readiness return 200 and sign-in redirects to KeyCape (303).
`deploy/sitting-admission.json` now declares the deployed v7 pin.
Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-live-policy-checks.json`
and `docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-review-readiness.json`.
A5 load and A6 human disposition remain outstanding; no presentation or
human act was performed by the rollout or probes.
A5 preparation: the existing live presentation records identify one historical
KeyCape reviewer subject, `uid=platform-root,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local`.
Pinned memo/packet copies for this recipient are prepared under the sitting's
`bound/` directory. A temporary offline-store load passed with no presentations
or dispositions. Live store inspection confirms p01 is not yet loaded. The
approved rollout covered policy and review configuration; live memo loading
remains a separate pending step.
A5 live load completed on founder instruction "load p01":
ADMINISTER @ realm:kubernetes/railiance01, activation=APPROVED.
The loaded memo and packet match the prepared copies, including native approval
pin and packet digest. It is addressed to the verified historical KeyCape
subject. Load verification found zero p01 presentations/dispositions; the
loader performed no human act. Public health/readiness remain 200.
Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-p01-load.json`.
Only A6 remains: founder signs in with fresh MFA, reads the full packet,
acknowledges the required highlight, and chooses a disposition. Plan remains
blocked on that human act; hub decision D1 remains unresolved.
A6 refusal diagnosis: read at 18:27:49 UTC still carried exactly the same
KeyCape `assurance.at=1791047288` (17:08:08 UTC), age 4,781 seconds. Exact
identity, group, memo and native approval pins match v7; the 900-second MFA
limit refuses this request. The latest attempt has not supplied fresh evidence;
the founder confirms account-portal logout followed by password and OTP login
in the same browser. That did not propagate fresh assurance into this review
request. Do not infer a new review authentication from portal login.
KeyCape's `/account/logout` confirmation clears its session and routes through
upstream Authelia sign-out; informed-decision sign-out alone is local. Complete
that browser flow, then start a new review login with password and OTP.
If the verified timestamp remains old after that, KeyCape must correct the
authentication-time contract under existing intake `INFD-IN-0005` and prove
it with a completed browser journey. Retain all policy freshness limits.
Evidence: `docs/evidence/2026-10-03-provisioning-window-review-refusal.json`.
`INFD-WP-0006` implements an explicit fresh-authentication request from review
sign-in; its narrow image rollout and native browser proof remain blocked.