informed-decision/deploy/lifecycle/README.md

# INFD-WP-0007 production candidate

Prepared 2026-10-04 for the founder-selected initial audience: net-kingdom-admins
humans and system:serviceaccount:state-hub:state-hub. **Not deployed.**

| Artifact | Immutable reference |
| --- | --- |
| Service | forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/informed-decision@sha256:2768bd1da3e651cc0be2d0f1ae6eea1af4eb057b31ef63ebb03b004c2ed76c3d |
| Access Engine | forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/flex-auth@sha256:f6ed8af69af766d7e9498465a23c292d91185b79352065736a2132216aac1d37 |
| Lifecycle package | informed-decision.lifecycle v1, sha256:cee6a79f74e81d0d389a2c2e2451a92be3434ea9dfcee4986e8c7e6cfdbb1827 |
| Human review package | informed-decision.compact-sitting v12, sha256:c5387f7d198dc39ab5967e0c218ce05cc779693565c8875e3035e45ec002a2db |

`admission.candidate.json` renders `service.candidate.json` using
`tools/render_deployment.py`. `registries.candidate.json` projects the three
sibling JSON registries. The policy YAML is Helm-rendered from Access Engine's
FLEX-WP-0033 candidate values; it is a review artifact, not a second deployment
owner. Existing Helm releases must be updated through their owning workflow.
All 25 proposed objects passed Kubernetes server dry-run against railiance01.
No Secret is included. Dry-run does not test reachability, credential delivery,
policy caller identity, backup restoration or a human disposition.

## Proposed live changes

- Replace the service's image and immutable runtime ConfigMap, retaining its
  public Service/Ingress, single writer, Recreate strategy and existing PVC.
- Enable `/decisions` and lifecycle audit delivery; keep private API on 8081.
- Add the exact State Hub peer, API-server egress, CA/token projection and only
  create-tokenreviews RBAC for informed-decision/review.
- Mount the proposed reloadable registries and Platform's exact read-only
  requester Secret projection, without subPath.
- Add a separate lifecycle PDP and change the sitting PDP to the v12 package.
  Review retains all v11 exact mandates and 15-minute KeyCape MFA; lifecycle
  authoring uses a 12-hour MFA window. Agents cannot accept.
- Initial intake permits decision-record / net-kingdom-admins, 50 new attempts
  per UTC day, with the existing platform-root recipient. Other admins may
  collaborate; this does not silently make them the bound recipient.

The policy chart retains the owner's existing port-only API-server egress
(443/6443). The consumer's new API-server egress is address-specific. CARING is
advisory and consumer fact attribution is unsigned, as in the existing reviewed
contract; neither is presented as a newly enforced control.

## Pre-cutover gates

1. RPF-WP-0051 / CCR-2026-0032: complete the already prepared requester delivery
   under its separate live go, with exact identity/path negative proofs and
   mounted-file refresh/rotation evidence. Only the audit ExternalSecret was
   present in the live namespace at inspection.
2. INFD-WP-0005-T08: State Hub owner supplies production forwarding and separate
   lifecycle/intake audience token projections. Its current dev fixture is not
   an activated forwarder. Confirm notification receiver reachability; keep
   resolution write-back disabled until its owner admission.
3. Refresh live image/config pins and unresolved-entry counts; complete the
   backup/restore steps below; obtain explicit approval of this concrete rollout.
   INFD-WP-0007-T07 and CCR-2026-0032 require this distinct go.

## Cutover and recovery procedure

Before migrating, close new review traffic through the owning ingress workflow,
let active requests finish, and inspect the current schema-2 writer read-only.
The observed baseline was 24 confirmed submissions, 158 delivered outbox rows,
zero unresolved entries; these counts are not a future maintenance-window gate.
Retain the exact current Deployment, Service, runtime ConfigMap, Helm values and
all related policy pins. Do not include credentials in the evidence packet.

Use the existing running image's installed `informed-decision-admin backup` to
create a unique SQLite consistent snapshot in a private directory. Copy the
backup to independently protected custody, record its digest, and verify a
restore on a separate private volume before cutover. Close the old writer before
starting the schema-5 image. Local synthetic restore proof is retained in the
evidence directory; it does not replace this production data restoration check.

Deploy admitted owner policy/custody prerequisites, then the service candidate.
Verify `/healthz`, `/readyz`, pending/blocked counts, actual audience isolation,
wrong-caller refusals and public/private route separation. Exercise two new
records and a revision without changing image/config/package pins. Only a human
may finish review. Correlate the native Approval Engine entry and independent
Audit Core receipts; restart and retrieve the same immutable evidence.

If validation fails, stop the candidate and retain its database plus all new
receipts. **Never start the old schema-2 image on the schema-5 database.** Rollback
requires the verified pre-cutover copy on a separate volume and reconciliation
of every post-cutover external effect before resuming writes. An uncertain
submission stays unresolved; do not retry or discard it to enable rollback.
The prior image is in ../sitting-admission.json and remains a reference, not an
instruction to downgrade the live database.

## Validation evidence

`docs/evidence/2026-10-04-lifecycle-release/` retains container checks, bounded
scan summaries and policy validation. Service: 662 passed, 1 skipped with owner
components; 13 container checks passed, including restart and backup/restore.
Both artifact scans contain zero HIGH/CRITICAL findings. Actual evaluator tests
cover first-audience collaboration across revisions and verify unchanged package
pins; authentication custody in those tests is synthetic. Native activation and
broader browser packet/binding profiles remain explicit workplan tasks.