Claim ownership of the browser-facing approver UI that approval-engine deliberately does not contain. approval-engine's INTENT names an approvals inbox under Non-Goals, and docs/keycape-service-registrations.md records that the human approver client's client_id and callback URI "must come from its owner once it exists" — leaving key-cape's KEY-WP-0013-T02 blocked on an unassigned component. - INTENT.md: Decision Memo concept, the binding/awareness split and the two hashes, ownership and non-ownership against the named estate repositories, and a provisional PEP-shaped layer placement flagged for a gate-house ruling rather than asserted. - GOAL.md: Stage 1 is the L3 approval approver surface — the narrowest real consumer with a live blocking dependency — plus the written answer to who owns the approver UI. - workplans/INFD-WP-0001: founding documents, the gate-house layer/ownership ruling, the four specs (PRD, UseCaseCatalog, ArchitectureBlueprint, EvidenceModel), schema and canonicalizer promotion out of history/ with the isolation vectors under test, the key-cape client registration, and a walking skeleton that includes return and discuss. history/ is preserved unmodified as provenance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V3W1dQG7GFFM9d94jFx7iR Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 1565372@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 16bb2f25-b34c-49ef-8e94-5fec3567a568
184 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
184 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
# Canonicalization algorithm v0.2
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Two hashes exist on every presentation.
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| Hash | Input | Enters the signature? |
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|---|---|---|
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| `view_hash` | binding document | yes, for every binding verb at `organizational` and above |
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| `awareness_hash` | awareness document | no, unless a `promote` disposition copied named fields into `awareness_promoted` |
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That split is the whole point of pre-sign vs post-sign.
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Reference implementation: `canonicalize.py`.
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## 1. Profile
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Restricted JCS (RFC 8785 subset):
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1. UTF-8.
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2. No insignificant whitespace.
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3. Object keys sorted by raw UTF-8 bytes (all keys in this spec are ASCII).
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4. Arrays keep author order except where this spec sorts (`packet` by `item_id`, `highlights` by `id`, hats/scopes/identities by `id`, permission lists lexicographically).
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5. Numbers are integers only. Timestamps stay strings (`YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ`).
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6. Strings use RFC 8259 escaping; U+0000–U+001F as `\u00xx`.
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7. Drop keys whose value is `null`. Keep empty arrays.
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8. Unknown keys are stripped. Adding a field to the live memo does not change a hash until it is added to the allow-list below.
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## 2. Binding document (`view_hash`)
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Allow-list, then normalize:
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```
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memo_id
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memo_version
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question
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requested_act
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binding_level
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brief
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locale
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ui_release
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packet[] → {item_id, hash} sorted by item_id
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highlights[] → {id, item_id, locator, required_ack, severity} sorted by id
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binding → BindingSlice (pre-sign identity + scope)
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awareness_promoted → only fields explicitly promoted into the bind
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```
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`binding` allow-list:
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```
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principal
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available_identities[] sorted by id
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target the scope this act enters
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available_bind_scopes[] scopes choosable as *this* bind, sorted by id
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granted_at_bind roles/permissions sorted
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justification
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blast_radius
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terms
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```
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Hats, last-used role, other-tenant orientation, situation notes **do not appear here**.
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`hash` form is always `alg:hex` (`sha256:…`).
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Then:
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```
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canonical = dumps(binding_document)
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view_hash = SHA-256(UTF-8(canonical))
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```
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`dumps` is the JCS-subset serializer in `canonicalize.py`.
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## 3. Awareness document (`awareness_hash`)
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Allow-list:
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```
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memo_id
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memo_version
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locale
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ui_release
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proposed_hat
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proposed_hat_source system_default | last_used | policy | explicit | inferred
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available_hats[] sorted by id
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available_scopes[] sorted by id (orientation only)
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last_session
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situation_note
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```
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Same `dumps` + SHA-256.
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## 4. Dynamic linking
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A binding disposition stores both hashes on the presentation and signs only `view_hash`.
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Signed attributes (AES/QES) MUST contain at least:
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```
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memo_id
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memo_version
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disposition.verb
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presentation.view_hash
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```
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They MUST NOT contain `awareness_hash` unless `promote` ran.
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## 5. Promote
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`promote` copies named awareness fields into `binding.awareness_promoted` on a **new memo version**. Typical case: an elevating hat (`hat.elevates=true`) must become part of the bind, or a tenant that looked like a hat is actually a bind-scope.
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After promote:
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- new `view_hash`
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- previous presentations invalid
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- route restarts or current step is re-presented
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## 6. Test vectors
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Computed with `canonicalize.py`.
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### V1 — login binding (identity + tenant)
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Input: `vectors/login-binding.json`
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`view_hash.hex` =
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```
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492d9d311bf44ec9de0d0abef28abac7d31df2781527e8fe276a3186ee1b06b8
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```
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What is inside: chosen principal, break-glass identity as an *available bind identity*, target tenant ACME, sibling tenant Beta as an *available bind-scope*, gate privileges `authenticated` + `session.create`, monitoring terms.
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What is not inside: Finance Controller hat, last session, Payroll Admin.
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### V2 — login awareness (hats + last session)
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Input: `vectors/login-awareness.json`
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`awareness_hash.hex` =
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```
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2be7742970a01e7a879ae5040660659fb8c9a5c024e6c7fb338f3944a4fe05d1
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```
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Proposed hat `hat:finance-controller` source `last_used`. Payroll Admin is listed with `elevates=true` so the UI can show it and the state machine can refuse `configure` on it.
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### V3 — ADR accept
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Input: `vectors/adr-binding.json`
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`view_hash.hex` =
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```
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1c89ec07c3cc9d16f85a1ba1be5169456b3c55d21161f64037787779ae91f202
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```
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### Isolation checks the implementation must keep green
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1. Shuffling object keys in the input JSON does not change either hash.
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2. Adding or changing awareness fields on a combined object does not change `view_hash`.
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3. Changing `binding.target.id` from `tenant:acme` to `tenant:beta` **does** change `view_hash` (that is a different login).
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4. Changing only `proposed_hat` changes `awareness_hash` only.
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5. Selecting `hat:finance-controller` after login emits `session.hat_selected` and does not rewrite `view_hash`.
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## 7. UI mapping (login)
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```
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ PRE-SIGN (editable, bound) │
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│ Identity [ Bernd Worsch ▾ ] │
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│ Scope [ ACME Corp / Payroll-Prod ▾ ] │
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│ At gate authenticated · session.create │
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│ Terms sessions recorded │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ AWARENESS (shown, not signed) │
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│ After login you will wear │
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│ Finance Controller (last used, Tue 18:12) │
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│ other hats: Auditor · Payroll Admin (needs new bind) │
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│ Other tenants you support: Beta GmbH (needs new bind) │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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[ Switch identity ] [ Change tenant ] [ Proceed ]
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```
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Proceed signs V1. After session start, hat dropdown is `configure`. Tenant dropdown to Beta opens a child memo.
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