key-cape/src/internal/server/oidc/authorize.go

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package oidc
import (
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"context"
"errors"
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"html/template"
"net/http"
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"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"keycape/internal/domain"
profileerrors "keycape/internal/errors"
"keycape/internal/server/telemetry"
)
// PendingState holds the authorization request parameters while the user is
// being authenticated by the upstream provider (e.g. Authelia). It is keyed
// by the opaque state value that is round-tripped through the upstream.
type PendingState struct {
ClientID string
RedirectURI string
PKCEChallenge string
PKCEChallengeMethod string
State string
Nonce string
Scopes []string
ExpiresAt time.Time
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AuthenticatedUser string
ACRValues []string
TenantHint string
MaxAge *time.Duration
PromptLogin bool
}
// pendingStateStore is a thread-safe map of state → PendingState.
type pendingStateStore struct {
mu sync.Mutex
store map[string]*PendingState
}
func newPendingStateStore() *pendingStateStore {
return &pendingStateStore{store: make(map[string]*PendingState)}
}
func (p *pendingStateStore) Store(state string, ps *PendingState) {
p.mu.Lock()
p.store[state] = ps
p.mu.Unlock()
}
func (p *pendingStateStore) Load(state string) (*PendingState, bool) {
p.mu.Lock()
ps, ok := p.store[state]
p.mu.Unlock()
return ps, ok
}
func (p *pendingStateStore) Delete(state string) {
p.mu.Lock()
delete(p.store, state)
p.mu.Unlock()
}
// AuthorizeHandler implements GET /authorize and GET /authorize/callback.
type AuthorizeHandler struct {
ClientConfig map[string]*domain.Client
Auth domain.AuthProvider
MFA domain.MFAProvider
Sessions *SessionStore
Logins *LoginSessionStore
Handoffs *HandoffStore
Issuer string
Emitter telemetry.Emitter
pending *pendingStateStore
once sync.Once
}
// PendingStates returns the underlying pending-state store so tests can seed it.
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) PendingStates() *pendingStateStore {
h.init()
return h.pending
}
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) init() {
h.once.Do(func() {
if h.pending == nil {
h.pending = newPendingStateStore()
}
if h.Logins == nil {
h.Logins = NewLoginSessionStore()
}
if h.Handoffs == nil {
h.Handoffs = NewHandoffStore()
}
})
}
// ServeHTTP dispatches to the authorize or callback handler based on path.
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h.init()
switch {
case strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/callback"):
h.ServeHTTPCallback(w, r)
case strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/return"):
h.serveHandoffReturn(w, r)
case strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/register"):
h.serveRegisterFromPending(w, r)
default:
h.serveAuthorize(w, r)
}
}
// serveAuthorize handles the initial GET /authorize request.
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) serveAuthorize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
q := r.URL.Query()
clientID := q.Get("client_id")
redirectURI := q.Get("redirect_uri")
responseType := q.Get("response_type")
scope := q.Get("scope")
state := q.Get("state")
nonce := q.Get("nonce")
codeChallenge := q.Get("code_challenge")
codeChallengeMethod := q.Get("code_challenge_method")
acrValues := strings.Fields(q.Get("acr_values"))
tenantHint := firstNonEmpty(q.Get("tenant_hint"), q.Get("tenant"))
promptCreate, promptLogin := parsePrompt(q.Get("prompt"))
maxAge, maxAgeErr := parseMaxAge(q.Get("max_age"))
if maxAgeErr != nil {
profileerrors.InvalidProfileUsage("max_age must be a non-negative integer", "max_age").
Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Emit auth_start telemetry immediately.
h.Emitter.Emit(ctx, telemetry.Event{
Timestamp: time.Now(),
EventType: telemetry.EventAuthStart,
ClientID: clientID,
Endpoint: "/authorize",
Result: "pending",
})
// 1. Validate client_id.
client, ok := h.ClientConfig[clientID]
if !ok {
profileerrors.InvalidProfileUsage("unknown client_id", "client_id").
Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// 2. Validate redirect_uri — check for wildcards first, then exact match.
for _, registered := range client.RedirectURIs {
if strings.ContainsAny(registered, "*?") {
profileerrors.RejectedForSafety(
"wildcard redirect URIs are not permitted",
"redirect_uri",
).Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
}
if !uriRegistered(client.RedirectURIs, redirectURI) {
profileerrors.InvalidProfileUsage(
"redirect_uri does not match any registered URI",
"redirect_uri",
).Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// 3. Validate response_type.
if responseType != "code" {
profileerrors.FeatureNotSupported(
"only response_type=code is supported",
"response_type="+responseType,
).Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// 4. Validate scope contains openid.
if !scopeContains(scope, "openid") {
profileerrors.InvalidProfileUsage(
"scope must include openid",
"scope",
).Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
for _, requestedScope := range strings.Fields(scope) {
if !containsString(client.AllowedScopes, requestedScope) {
profileerrors.InvalidProfileUsage("requested scope is not allowed", "scope").Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
}
// 5. Validate code_challenge is present.
if codeChallenge == "" {
profileerrors.InvalidProfileUsage(
"code_challenge is required (PKCE S256)",
"code_challenge",
).Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// 6. Validate code_challenge_method.
if codeChallengeMethod == "plain" {
profileerrors.RejectedForSafety(
"code_challenge_method=plain is rejected for security; use S256",
"code_challenge_method",
).Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if codeChallengeMethod != "S256" {
profileerrors.InvalidProfileUsage(
"code_challenge_method must be S256",
"code_challenge_method",
).Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Store pending state so the callback can reconstruct the session.
ps := &PendingState{
ClientID: clientID,
RedirectURI: redirectURI,
PKCEChallenge: codeChallenge,
PKCEChallengeMethod: codeChallengeMethod,
State: state,
Nonce: nonce,
Scopes: strings.Fields(scope),
ACRValues: acrValues,
TenantHint: tenantHint,
MaxAge: maxAge,
PromptLogin: promptLogin,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute),
}
h.pending.Store(state, ps)
if promptCreate {
h.startHandoff(w, r, ps, HandoffRegister)
return
}
// Delegate to Auth provider.
authURL, err := h.Auth.AuthorizeURL(ctx, domain.AuthRequest{
ClientID: clientID,
RedirectURI: redirectURI,
State: state,
Scopes: strings.Fields(scope),
PKCEChallenge: codeChallenge,
PKCEChallengeMethod: codeChallengeMethod,
})
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "upstream auth provider error", http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, authURL, http.StatusFound)
}
// ServeHTTPCallback handles GET /authorize/callback.
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) ServeHTTPCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h.init()
ctx := r.Context()
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if r.Method == http.MethodPost {
h.serveMFASubmission(w, r)
return
}
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
w.Header().Set("Allow", "GET, POST")
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
q := r.URL.Query()
state := q.Get("state")
code := q.Get("code")
mfaToken := q.Get("mfa_token")
// Recover pending state keyed by state param.
ps, ok := h.pending.Load(state)
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unknown or expired state", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if time.Now().After(ps.ExpiresAt) {
h.pending.Delete(state)
http.Error(w, "authorization request expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Handle upstream callback.
result, err := h.Auth.HandleCallback(ctx, domain.CallbackParams{
Code: code,
State: state,
})
if err != nil || result == nil || result.Username == "" {
h.Emitter.Emit(ctx, telemetry.Event{
Timestamp: time.Now(),
EventType: telemetry.EventAuthFailure,
ClientID: ps.ClientID,
Endpoint: "/authorize/callback",
Result: "failure",
ErrorType: "auth_failed",
})
if h.clientEligible(ps.ClientID, HandoffRegister) {
h.renderUnknownUserSignup(w, ps)
return
}
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h.pending.Delete(state)
http.Error(w, "authentication failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
decision, err := h.decideAssurance(ctx, ps, result.Username, h.Logins.fromRequest(r))
if err != nil {
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h.Emitter.Emit(ctx, telemetry.Event{
Timestamp: time.Now(),
EventType: telemetry.EventAuthFailure,
ClientID: ps.ClientID,
Endpoint: "/authorize/callback",
Result: "failure",
ErrorType: "mfa_check_error",
})
http.Error(w, "mfa check error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if decision.RequireMFA {
if handed, herr := h.maybeEnrollmentHandoff(ctx, w, r, ps, result.Username); herr != nil {
http.Error(w, "enrollment check error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
} else if handed {
return
}
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if mfaToken == "" {
ps.AuthenticatedUser = result.Username
h.pending.Store(state, ps)
h.renderMFAChallenge(w, ps, "")
return
}
if err := h.MFA.ValidateMFAToken(ctx, result.Username, mfaToken); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, domain.ErrMFANotEnrolled) {
if handed, herr := h.maybeEnrollmentHandoff(ctx, w, r, ps, result.Username); herr != nil {
http.Error(w, "enrollment check error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
} else if handed {
return
}
}
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h.pending.Delete(state)
h.emitMFAFailure(ctx, ps.ClientID)
http.Error(w, "MFA validation failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
h.pending.Delete(state)
h.completeAuthorization(w, r, ps, result.Username, true)
return
}
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h.pending.Delete(state)
h.completeAuthorization(w, r, ps, result.Username, decision.MFAVerified)
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}
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) decideAssurance(ctx context.Context, ps *PendingState, username string, login *LoginSession) (domain.AssuranceDecision, error) {
client := h.ClientConfig[ps.ClientID]
providerRequired := false
if !domain.ACRRequiresAAL2(ps.ACRValues) && (client == nil || client.MFARequired == nil) {
var err error
providerRequired, err = h.MFA.CheckMFARequired(ctx, username)
if err != nil {
return domain.AssuranceDecision{}, err
}
}
in := domain.AssuranceInput{
Client: client,
ACRValues: ps.ACRValues,
ProviderRequired: providerRequired,
RequestUser: username,
PromptLogin: ps.PromptLogin,
MaxAge: ps.MaxAge,
}
if login != nil {
in.SessionLevel = login.Level
in.SessionUser = login.Username
in.SessionIssuedAt = login.IssuedAt
}
return domain.DecideAssurance(in), nil
}
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func (h *AuthorizeHandler) serveMFASubmission(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid form", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
state := r.Form.Get("state")
mfaToken := r.Form.Get("mfa_token")
ps, ok := h.pending.Load(state)
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unknown or expired state", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if time.Now().After(ps.ExpiresAt) {
h.pending.Delete(state)
http.Error(w, "authorization request expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if ps.AuthenticatedUser == "" {
h.pending.Delete(state)
http.Error(w, "mfa challenge not active", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if strings.TrimSpace(mfaToken) == "" {
h.renderMFAChallenge(w, ps, "Enter the one-time code.")
return
}
if err := h.MFA.ValidateMFAToken(ctx, ps.AuthenticatedUser, mfaToken); err != nil {
h.pending.Delete(state)
h.emitMFAFailure(ctx, ps.ClientID)
http.Error(w, "MFA validation failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
h.pending.Delete(state)
KEY-WP-0005-T01: IAM Profile core claims for the human PKCE flow Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done. What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow: - domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant(): falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006) when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment. - principal_type: "human", unconditional. - groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims, always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional behavior, not left failing or reverted. - assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) -- whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise. go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks. Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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// Reached only after ValidateMFAToken succeeded above -- MFA was
// required and passed, unlike the callback path where mfaRequired may
// be false.
h.completeAuthorization(w, r, ps, ps.AuthenticatedUser, true)
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}
KEY-WP-0005-T01: IAM Profile core claims for the human PKCE flow Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done. What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow: - domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant(): falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006) when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment. - principal_type: "human", unconditional. - groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims, always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional behavior, not left failing or reverted. - assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) -- whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise. go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks. Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 00:03:31 +02:00
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) completeAuthorization(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, ps *PendingState, username string, mfaVerified bool) {
level := domain.AssuranceAAL1
if mfaVerified {
level = domain.AssuranceAAL2
}
if login := h.Logins.Create(username, level); login != nil {
writeLoginCookie(w, login, issuerIsHTTPS(h.Issuer))
}
// Generate authorization code and store PKCE session.
sess := &PKCESession{
ClientID: ps.ClientID,
RedirectURI: ps.RedirectURI,
PKCEChallenge: ps.PKCEChallenge,
PKCEChallengeMethod: ps.PKCEChallengeMethod,
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State: ps.State,
Nonce: ps.Nonce,
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Username: username,
Scopes: ps.Scopes,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute),
KEY-WP-0005-T01: IAM Profile core claims for the human PKCE flow Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done. What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow: - domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant(): falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006) when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment. - principal_type: "human", unconditional. - groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims, always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional behavior, not left failing or reverted. - assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) -- whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise. go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks. Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MFAVerified: mfaVerified,
}
authCode := h.Sessions.Create(sess)
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h.Emitter.Emit(r.Context(), telemetry.Event{
Timestamp: time.Now(),
EventType: telemetry.EventAuthSuccess,
ClientID: ps.ClientID,
Endpoint: "/authorize/callback",
Result: "success",
Scopes: ps.Scopes,
})
// Redirect to client with code and state.
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redirectTo, err := url.Parse(ps.RedirectURI)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid redirect_uri", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
q := redirectTo.Query()
q.Set("code", authCode)
q.Set("state", ps.State)
redirectTo.RawQuery = q.Encode()
http.Redirect(w, r, redirectTo.String(), http.StatusFound)
}
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) startHandoff(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, ps *PendingState, kind HandoffKind) {
client, ok := h.ClientConfig[ps.ClientID]
if !ok {
profileerrors.InvalidProfileUsage("unknown client_id", "client_id").
Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
dest := client.RegistrationURL
if kind == HandoffEnroll {
dest = client.EnrollmentURL
}
if dest == "" {
profileerrors.RejectedForSafety(
"client is not eligible for this handoff",
string(kind),
).Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
token, err := h.Handoffs.Issue(kind, ps)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "handoff error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
loc, err := appendHandoff(dest, token)
if err != nil {
profileerrors.RejectedForSafety("handoff destination is not a valid URL", string(kind)).
Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, loc, http.StatusFound)
}
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) serveRegisterFromPending(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
w.Header().Set("Allow", "GET")
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
state := r.URL.Query().Get("state")
ps, ok := h.pending.Load(state)
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unknown or expired state", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if time.Now().After(ps.ExpiresAt) {
h.pending.Delete(state)
http.Error(w, "authorization request expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
h.startHandoff(w, r, ps, HandoffRegister)
}
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) serveHandoffReturn(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
w.Header().Set("Allow", "GET")
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
token := r.URL.Query().Get("kc_handoff")
env, err := h.Handoffs.Consume(token)
switch {
case errors.Is(err, errHandoffExpired):
http.Error(w, "handoff expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
case errors.Is(err, errHandoffReplay):
http.Error(w, "handoff already used", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
case err != nil:
http.Error(w, "invalid handoff", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
client, ok := h.ClientConfig[env.ClientID]
if !ok {
profileerrors.InvalidProfileUsage("unknown client_id", "client_id").
Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if !uriRegistered(client.RedirectURIs, env.RedirectURI) {
profileerrors.RejectedForSafety(
"handoff redirect_uri does not match the registered client",
"redirect_uri",
).Write(w, http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
restart := url.Values{}
restart.Set("client_id", env.ClientID)
restart.Set("redirect_uri", env.RedirectURI)
restart.Set("response_type", "code")
restart.Set("scope", strings.Join(env.Scopes, " "))
restart.Set("state", env.State)
restart.Set("code_challenge", env.PKCEChallenge)
restart.Set("code_challenge_method", env.PKCEChallengeMethod)
if env.Nonce != "" {
restart.Set("nonce", env.Nonce)
}
if env.TenantHint != "" {
restart.Set("tenant_hint", env.TenantHint)
}
http.Redirect(w, r, "/authorize?"+restart.Encode(), http.StatusFound)
}
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) maybeEnrollmentHandoff(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, ps *PendingState, username string) (bool, error) {
if !h.clientEligible(ps.ClientID, HandoffEnroll) {
return false, nil
}
enrolled, err := h.MFA.HasEnrolledFactor(ctx, username)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
if enrolled {
return false, nil
}
ps.AuthenticatedUser = username
h.pending.Store(ps.State, ps)
h.startHandoff(w, r, ps, HandoffEnroll)
return true, nil
}
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) clientEligible(clientID string, kind HandoffKind) bool {
client, ok := h.ClientConfig[clientID]
if !ok {
return false
}
switch kind {
case HandoffRegister:
return client.RegistrationURL != ""
case HandoffEnroll:
return client.EnrollmentURL != ""
default:
return false
}
}
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) renderUnknownUserSignup(w http.ResponseWriter, ps *PendingState) {
clientName := ps.ClientID
if client, ok := h.ClientConfig[ps.ClientID]; ok && client.DisplayName != "" {
clientName = client.DisplayName
}
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
_ = unknownUserTemplate.Execute(w, struct {
State string
ClientName string
}{
State: ps.State,
ClientName: clientName,
})
}
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func (h *AuthorizeHandler) emitMFAFailure(ctx context.Context, clientID string) {
h.Emitter.Emit(ctx, telemetry.Event{
Timestamp: time.Now(),
EventType: telemetry.EventAuthFailure,
ClientID: clientID,
Endpoint: "/authorize/callback",
Result: "failure",
ErrorType: "mfa_failed",
})
}
func (h *AuthorizeHandler) renderMFAChallenge(w http.ResponseWriter, ps *PendingState, errorMessage string) {
clientName := ps.ClientID
if client, ok := h.ClientConfig[ps.ClientID]; ok && client.DisplayName != "" {
clientName = client.DisplayName
}
status := http.StatusOK
if errorMessage != "" {
status = http.StatusBadRequest
}
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(status)
_ = mfaChallengeTemplate.Execute(w, struct {
State string
Username string
ClientName string
ErrorMessage string
}{
State: ps.State,
Username: ps.AuthenticatedUser,
ClientName: clientName,
ErrorMessage: errorMessage,
})
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2026-05-24 17:03:01 +02:00
var mfaChallengeTemplate = template.Must(template.New("mfa-challenge").Parse(`<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
<title>KeyCape MFA</title>
<style>
:root { color-scheme: light; font-family: Inter, ui-sans-serif, system-ui, -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", sans-serif; }
body { margin: 0; min-height: 100vh; display: grid; place-items: center; background: #f6f7f9; color: #17202a; }
main { width: min(420px, calc(100vw - 32px)); background: #fff; border: 1px solid #dfe4ea; border-radius: 8px; padding: 28px; box-shadow: 0 18px 45px rgba(23, 32, 42, .08); }
h1 { margin: 0 0 6px; font-size: 22px; font-weight: 650; letter-spacing: 0; }
p { margin: 0 0 20px; color: #52606d; line-height: 1.45; }
label { display: block; margin: 0 0 8px; font-size: 13px; font-weight: 650; color: #344054; }
input[type="text"] { width: 100%; box-sizing: border-box; height: 44px; border: 1px solid #c9d3df; border-radius: 6px; padding: 0 12px; font: inherit; background: #fff; }
input[type="text"]:focus { outline: 2px solid #2f80ed; outline-offset: 2px; border-color: #2f80ed; }
button { width: 100%; height: 44px; border: 0; border-radius: 6px; margin-top: 16px; background: #17324d; color: #fff; font: inherit; font-weight: 650; cursor: pointer; }
button:focus { outline: 2px solid #2f80ed; outline-offset: 2px; }
.meta { font-size: 13px; color: #667085; }
.error { margin: 0 0 12px; color: #b42318; font-size: 13px; font-weight: 650; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<main>
<h1>Verify sign-in</h1>
<p class="meta">{{.Username}} for {{.ClientName}}</p>
{{if .ErrorMessage}}<p class="error">{{.ErrorMessage}}</p>{{end}}
<form method="post" action="/authorize/callback" autocomplete="off">
<input type="hidden" name="state" value="{{.State}}">
<label for="mfa_token">One-time code</label>
<input id="mfa_token" name="mfa_token" type="text" inputmode="numeric" autocomplete="one-time-code" required autofocus>
<button type="submit">Verify</button>
</form>
</main>
</body>
</html>`))
var unknownUserTemplate = template.Must(template.New("unknown-user").Parse(`<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
<title>KeyCape sign-in</title>
<style>
:root { color-scheme: light; font-family: Inter, ui-sans-serif, system-ui, sans-serif; }
body { margin: 0; min-height: 100vh; display: grid; place-items: center; background: #f6f7f9; color: #17202a; }
main { width: min(420px, calc(100vw - 32px)); background: #fff; border: 1px solid #dfe4ea; border-radius: 8px; padding: 28px; }
h1 { margin: 0 0 8px; font-size: 22px; }
p { margin: 0 0 16px; color: #52606d; line-height: 1.45; }
a { display: inline-block; height: 44px; line-height: 44px; padding: 0 16px; border-radius: 6px; background: #17324d; color: #fff; text-decoration: none; font-weight: 650; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<main>
<h1>Account not found</h1>
<p>No KeyCape identity is available for this {{.ClientName}} sign-in. Create an account to continue. This does not issue a token.</p>
<a href="/authorize/register?state={{.State}}">Create account</a>
</main>
</body>
</html>`))
func parsePrompt(raw string) (create, login bool) {
for _, part := range strings.Fields(raw) {
switch strings.ToLower(part) {
case "create":
create = true
case "login":
login = true
}
}
return create, login
}
func parseMaxAge(raw string) (*time.Duration, error) {
if strings.TrimSpace(raw) == "" {
return nil, nil
}
secs, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil || secs < 0 {
return nil, errors.New("invalid max_age")
}
d := time.Duration(secs) * time.Second
return &d, nil
}
func firstNonEmpty(values ...string) string {
for _, v := range values {
if strings.TrimSpace(v) != "" {
return v
}
}
return ""
}
func uriRegistered(registered []string, target string) bool {
for _, u := range registered {
if u == target {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func scopeContains(scope, want string) bool {
for _, s := range strings.Fields(scope) {
if s == want {
return true
}
}
return false
}