key-cape/src/internal/server/oidc/token_test.go

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package oidc_test
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
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"keycape/internal/adapters/tenantengine"
"keycape/internal/domain"
profileerrors "keycape/internal/errors"
"keycape/internal/server/oidc"
"keycape/internal/server/telemetry"
)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock UserRepository
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
type mockUserRepo struct {
users map[string]*domain.User
}
func (m *mockUserRepo) LookupUser(_ context.Context, username string) (*domain.User, error) {
u, ok := m.users[username]
if !ok {
return nil, domain.ErrUserNotFound
}
return u, nil
}
func (m *mockUserRepo) LookupGroups(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]domain.Group, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (m *mockUserRepo) ValidatePassword(_ context.Context, _, _ string) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}
func (m *mockUserRepo) ListUsers(_ context.Context) ([]domain.User, error) {
users := make([]domain.User, 0, len(m.users))
for _, u := range m.users {
users = append(users, *u)
}
return users, nil
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// PKCE helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// makeVerifierAndChallenge returns a code_verifier and its S256 code_challenge.
func makeVerifierAndChallenge() (verifier, challenge string) {
b := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
verifier = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
h := sha256.New()
h.Write([]byte(verifier))
challenge = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))
return
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func newTokenHandler(t *testing.T, sessions *oidc.SessionStore, users domain.UserRepository) (*oidc.TokenHandler, *rsa.PrivateKey) {
t.Helper()
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate key: %v", err)
}
emitter := &captureEmitter{}
h := &oidc.TokenHandler{
KEY-WP-0005-T01: IAM Profile core claims for the human PKCE flow Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done. What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow: - domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant(): falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006) when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment. - principal_type: "human", unconditional. - groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims, always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional behavior, not left failing or reverted. - assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) -- whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise. go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks. Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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ClientConfig: testClient(),
Sessions: sessions,
Users: users,
SigningKey: key,
KEY-WP-0005-T01: IAM Profile core claims for the human PKCE flow Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done. What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow: - domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant(): falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006) when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment. - principal_type: "human", unconditional. - groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims, always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional behavior, not left failing or reverted. - assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) -- whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise. go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks. Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Issuer: "https://auth.netkingdom.local",
TokenLifetime: 15 * time.Minute,
KEY-WP-0005-T01: IAM Profile core claims for the human PKCE flow Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done. What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow: - domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant(): falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006) when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment. - principal_type: "human", unconditional. - groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims, always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional behavior, not left failing or reverted. - assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) -- whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise. go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks. Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Emitter: emitter,
}
return h, key
}
Harden the authorization-code grant and UserInfo verification Closes the local protocol surface of gap G01 from the scope assessment (KEY-WP-0016). The browser grant validated PKCE, client id and scopes but left four bindings unenforced, and UserInfo verified less than the caller CLI does. Authorization-code path: bind the exchange to the redirect URI the code was issued for, refuse clients whose registration does not permit the grant, and authenticate confidential clients with a digest-based constant-time comparison over the same credential sources as the service grant. An empty grantTypes stays an implicit authorization-code client, matching config validation. Code consumption: SessionStore.Consume reads and deletes under one lock. The previous Get/Delete pair spanned JWT signing, and the added test reproduces the race against that version -- 9 of 16 concurrent exchanges succeeded, and a failed exchange left the code replayable. UserInfo: check the JOSE header algorithm before trusting the signature, require the configured issuer, and require an access token rather than accepting an ID token of the right shape. Purpose is decided on the scope claim so the issued token contract, which consumers pin exactly, does not change. SCOPE.md and the assessment record which bindings are now enforced and that the Authelia upstream-trust assumption remains open, so G01 is not fully closed and no profile-conformance claim is made. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
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// seededRedirectURI is the redirect stored by seededSession, and the value the
// token endpoint now requires the exchange to repeat (KEY-WP-0016-T02).
const seededRedirectURI = "https://app.example.com/callback"
func tokenRequest(params url.Values) *http.Request {
Harden the authorization-code grant and UserInfo verification Closes the local protocol surface of gap G01 from the scope assessment (KEY-WP-0016). The browser grant validated PKCE, client id and scopes but left four bindings unenforced, and UserInfo verified less than the caller CLI does. Authorization-code path: bind the exchange to the redirect URI the code was issued for, refuse clients whose registration does not permit the grant, and authenticate confidential clients with a digest-based constant-time comparison over the same credential sources as the service grant. An empty grantTypes stays an implicit authorization-code client, matching config validation. Code consumption: SessionStore.Consume reads and deletes under one lock. The previous Get/Delete pair spanned JWT signing, and the added test reproduces the race against that version -- 9 of 16 concurrent exchanges succeeded, and a failed exchange left the code replayable. UserInfo: check the JOSE header algorithm before trusting the signature, require the configured issuer, and require an access token rather than accepting an ID token of the right shape. Purpose is decided on the scope claim so the issued token contract, which consumers pin exactly, does not change. SCOPE.md and the assessment record which bindings are now enforced and that the Authelia upstream-trust assumption remains open, so G01 is not fully closed and no profile-conformance claim is made. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
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// Supply the matching redirect_uri for code exchanges unless the test is
// deliberately exercising a mismatch, so each case still fails for the
// reason it is testing.
if params.Get("grant_type") == "authorization_code" && !params.Has("redirect_uri") {
params = cloneValues(params)
params.Set("redirect_uri", seededRedirectURI)
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/token",
strings.NewReader(params.Encode()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
return req
}
Harden the authorization-code grant and UserInfo verification Closes the local protocol surface of gap G01 from the scope assessment (KEY-WP-0016). The browser grant validated PKCE, client id and scopes but left four bindings unenforced, and UserInfo verified less than the caller CLI does. Authorization-code path: bind the exchange to the redirect URI the code was issued for, refuse clients whose registration does not permit the grant, and authenticate confidential clients with a digest-based constant-time comparison over the same credential sources as the service grant. An empty grantTypes stays an implicit authorization-code client, matching config validation. Code consumption: SessionStore.Consume reads and deletes under one lock. The previous Get/Delete pair spanned JWT signing, and the added test reproduces the race against that version -- 9 of 16 concurrent exchanges succeeded, and a failed exchange left the code replayable. UserInfo: check the JOSE header algorithm before trusting the signature, require the configured issuer, and require an access token rather than accepting an ID token of the right shape. Purpose is decided on the scope claim so the issued token contract, which consumers pin exactly, does not change. SCOPE.md and the assessment record which bindings are now enforced and that the Authelia upstream-trust assumption remains open, so G01 is not fully closed and no profile-conformance claim is made. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
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func cloneValues(params url.Values) url.Values {
out := make(url.Values, len(params)+1)
for key, values := range params {
out[key] = append([]string(nil), values...)
}
return out
}
func seededSession(sessions *oidc.SessionStore, verifier string) (code string) {
challenge := s256Challenge(verifier)
sess := &oidc.PKCESession{
ClientID: "test-client",
RedirectURI: "https://app.example.com/callback",
PKCEChallenge: challenge,
PKCEChallengeMethod: "S256",
State: "state1",
Nonce: "nonce1",
Username: "alice",
Scopes: []string{"openid", "profile", "email", "groups"},
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute),
}
return sessions.Create(sess)
}
func s256Challenge(verifier string) string {
h := sha256.New()
h.Write([]byte(verifier))
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))
}
func decodeTokenResponse(t *testing.T, body string) map[string]interface{} {
t.Helper()
var m map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(body), &m); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("could not decode token response: %v (body: %q)", err, body)
}
return m
}
func parseJWTPayload(t *testing.T, token string) map[string]interface{} {
t.Helper()
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected 3 JWT parts, got %d", len(parts))
}
payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode JWT payload: %v", err)
}
var claims map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &claims); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal JWT payload: %v", err)
}
return claims
}
func aliceUser() *domain.User {
return &domain.User{
ID: "user-alice",
Username: "alice",
Email: "alice@example.com",
Groups: []string{"admin", "users"},
Enabled: true,
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// T07 Token Endpoint Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestTokenHandler_ValidExchange_ReturnsJWT(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d (body: %s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
if _, ok := resp["access_token"]; !ok {
t.Error("missing access_token")
}
if _, ok := resp["id_token"]; !ok {
t.Error("missing id_token")
}
if resp["token_type"] != "Bearer" {
t.Errorf("expected token_type Bearer, got %v", resp["token_type"])
}
if _, ok := resp["expires_in"]; !ok {
t.Error("missing expires_in")
}
}
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func TestTokenHandler_SuspendedUserCannotExchangeCode(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
user := aliceUser()
user.Groups = append(user.Groups, "netkingdom-suspended")
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": user}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
verifier := "suspended-verifier-with-enough-entropy"
code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
req := tokenRequest(url.Values{
"grant_type": {"authorization_code"},
"code": {code},
"client_id": {"test-client"},
"code_verifier": {verifier},
})
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected 403, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if _, ok := sessions.Get(code); ok {
t.Fatal("authorization code must be consumed when suspension is detected")
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_WrongGrantType_FeatureNotSupported(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"password"},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400, got %d", w.Code)
}
errType := decodeProfileError(t, w.Body.String())
if errType != profileerrors.ErrFeatureNotSupported {
t.Errorf("expected feature_not_supported_by_profile, got %q", errType)
}
}
func serviceTokenHandler(t *testing.T) *oidc.TokenHandler {
t.Helper()
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, oidc.NewSessionStore(), &mockUserRepo{})
h.ClientConfig["rapp-qonto"] = &domain.Client{
ClientID: "rapp-qonto",
AllowedScopes: []string{"finance.qonto.read"},
GrantTypes: []string{"client_credentials"},
ClientType: "confidential",
ClientSecret: "test-service-secret",
ServiceSubject: "service:rapp-qonto",
Tenant: "tenant:friendly:binky",
Roles: []string{"finance-reader"},
}
return h
}
func TestTokenHandler_ClientCredentials_ReturnsScopedServiceToken(t *testing.T) {
h := serviceTokenHandler(t)
req := tokenRequest(url.Values{
"grant_type": {"client_credentials"},
"scope": {"finance.qonto.read"},
})
req.SetBasicAuth("rapp-qonto", "test-service-secret")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
if _, ok := resp["id_token"]; ok {
t.Fatal("service exchange must not return id_token")
}
claims := parseJWTPayload(t, resp["access_token"].(string))
if claims["sub"] != "service:rapp-qonto" ||
claims["tenant"] != "tenant:friendly:binky" ||
claims["principal_type"] != "service" ||
claims["scope"] != "finance.qonto.read" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected service claims: %#v", claims)
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_ClientCredentials_UsesPerClientLifetime(t *testing.T) {
h := serviceTokenHandler(t)
h.ClientConfig["rapp-qonto"].TokenLifetime = 5 * time.Minute
req := tokenRequest(url.Values{
"grant_type": {"client_credentials"},
"scope": {"finance.qonto.read"},
})
req.SetBasicAuth("rapp-qonto", "test-service-secret")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
if got := int(resp["expires_in"].(float64)); got != 300 {
t.Fatalf("expires_in: want 300, got %d", got)
}
claims := parseJWTPayload(t, resp["access_token"].(string))
ttl := int64(claims["exp"].(float64) - claims["iat"].(float64))
if ttl != 300 {
t.Fatalf("JWT lifetime: want 300 seconds, got %d", ttl)
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_ClientCredentials_RejectsWrongSecret(t *testing.T) {
h := serviceTokenHandler(t)
req := tokenRequest(url.Values{"grant_type": {"client_credentials"}})
req.SetBasicAuth("rapp-qonto", "wrong")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("expected 401, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_ClientCredentials_RejectsExcessScope(t *testing.T) {
h := serviceTokenHandler(t)
req := tokenRequest(url.Values{
"grant_type": {"client_credentials"},
"scope": {"finance.qonto.write"},
})
req.SetBasicAuth("rapp-qonto", "test-service-secret")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_PKCEMismatch_InvalidProfileUsage(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
realVerifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
code := seededSession(sessions, realVerifier)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{"wrong-verifier-that-does-not-match"},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400, got %d", w.Code)
}
errType := decodeProfileError(t, w.Body.String())
if errType != profileerrors.ErrInvalidProfileUsage {
t.Errorf("expected invalid_profile_usage, got %q", errType)
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_CodeNotFound_InvalidProfileUsage(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{"no-such-code"},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{"any-verifier"},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400, got %d", w.Code)
}
errType := decodeProfileError(t, w.Body.String())
if errType != profileerrors.ErrInvalidProfileUsage {
t.Errorf("expected invalid_profile_usage, got %q", errType)
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_JWTClaims_CorrectSubAndIssuer(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
idToken, ok := resp["id_token"].(string)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("id_token is not a string")
}
claims := parseJWTPayload(t, idToken)
if claims["sub"] != "user-alice" {
t.Errorf("sub: expected user-alice, got %v", claims["sub"])
}
if claims["iss"] != "https://auth.netkingdom.local" {
t.Errorf("iss: expected https://auth.netkingdom.local, got %v", claims["iss"])
}
if claims["aud"] != "test-client" {
t.Errorf("aud: expected test-client, got %v", claims["aud"])
}
if claims["nonce"] != "nonce1" {
t.Errorf("nonce: expected nonce1, got %v", claims["nonce"])
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_ScopeFiltering_ProfileScope(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
// Seed session with only openid scope (no email, no groups).
verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
challenge := s256Challenge(verifier)
sess := &oidc.PKCESession{
ClientID: "test-client",
RedirectURI: "https://app.example.com/callback",
PKCEChallenge: challenge,
PKCEChallengeMethod: "S256",
Username: "alice",
Scopes: []string{"openid"}, // no profile/email/groups
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute),
}
code := sessions.Create(sess)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
idToken := resp["id_token"].(string)
claims := parseJWTPayload(t, idToken)
// Without profile scope, preferred_username must not be present.
if _, ok := claims["preferred_username"]; ok {
t.Error("preferred_username must be absent when profile scope is not granted")
}
// Without email scope, email must not be present.
if _, ok := claims["email"]; ok {
t.Error("email must be absent when email scope is not granted")
}
KEY-WP-0005-T01: IAM Profile core claims for the human PKCE flow Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done. What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow: - domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant(): falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006) when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment. - principal_type: "human", unconditional. - groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims, always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional behavior, not left failing or reverted. - assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) -- whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise. go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks. Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 00:03:31 +02:00
// groups is a required IAM Profile core claim (iam-profile_v0.3.md) --
// present regardless of scope, unlike preferred_username/email above.
if _, ok := claims["groups"]; !ok {
t.Error("groups must be present as a core claim even without a groups scope (KEY-WP-0005-T01)")
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_ScopeFiltering_AllScopes(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
code := seededSession(sessions, verifier) // has openid, profile, email, groups
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
idToken := resp["id_token"].(string)
claims := parseJWTPayload(t, idToken)
if claims["preferred_username"] != "alice" {
t.Errorf("preferred_username: expected alice, got %v", claims["preferred_username"])
}
if claims["email"] != "alice@example.com" {
t.Errorf("email: expected alice@example.com, got %v", claims["email"])
}
if _, ok := claims["groups"]; !ok {
t.Error("groups claim must be present when groups scope is granted")
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_TokenIssuedTelemetry(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate key: %v", err)
}
capture := &captureEmitter{}
h := &oidc.TokenHandler{
ClientConfig: testClient(),
Sessions: sessions,
Users: users,
KEY-WP-0005-T01: IAM Profile core claims for the human PKCE flow Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done. What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow: - domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant(): falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006) when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment. - principal_type: "human", unconditional. - groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims, always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional behavior, not left failing or reverted. - assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) -- whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise. go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks. Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 00:03:31 +02:00
SigningKey: key,
Issuer: "https://auth.netkingdom.local",
TokenLifetime: 15 * time.Minute,
Emitter: capture,
}
verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
found := false
for _, ev := range capture.events {
if ev.EventType == telemetry.EventTokenIssued {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
t.Error("expected token_issued telemetry event")
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_CodeDeletedAfterUse(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
}
// First use — should succeed.
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("first use: expected 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
// Second use — code should be gone.
req2 := tokenRequest(params)
w2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w2, req2)
if w2.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("second use: expected 400 (code replay), got %d", w2.Code)
}
}
2026-07-24 00:18:17 +02:00
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// KEY-WP-0005-T02: cached tenant_roles claim
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestTokenHandler_TenantRoles_PresentWhenTenantEngineReachable(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Write([]byte(`{"tenant_id":"tenant:coulomb","roles":["IAM","VEN"]}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
h.TenantEngine = tenantengine.New(server.URL, nil)
verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d (body: %s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
claims := parseJWTPayload(t, resp["id_token"].(string))
roles, ok := claims["tenant_roles"].([]interface{})
if !ok || len(roles) != 2 || roles[0] != "IAM" || roles[1] != "VEN" {
t.Errorf("tenant_roles: want [IAM VEN], got %v", claims["tenant_roles"])
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_TenantRoles_OmittedButIssuanceSucceedsWhenUnreachable(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
// Unreachable: nothing listens on this port.
h.TenantEngine = tenantengine.New("http://127.0.0.1:1", nil)
verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
// Token issuance itself must not fail just because the cache source is
// down -- this is the literal point of KEY-WP-0005-T02's fail-open rule.
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 even with tenant-engine unreachable, got %d (body: %s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
claims := parseJWTPayload(t, resp["id_token"].(string))
if _, present := claims["tenant_roles"]; present {
t.Errorf("tenant_roles must be omitted (not null, not []), got %v", claims["tenant_roles"])
}
// Every other core claim must still be present -- one missing optional
// claim must not cascade into missing required ones.
for _, c := range []string{"tenant", "principal_type", "groups", "roles", "assurance"} {
if _, ok := claims[c]; !ok {
t.Errorf("required claim %q missing even though only tenant_roles should be affected", c)
}
}
}
func TestTokenHandler_TenantRoles_OmittedWhenTenantEngineNotConfigured(t *testing.T) {
sessions := oidc.NewSessionStore()
users := &mockUserRepo{users: map[string]*domain.User{"alice": aliceUser()}}
h, _ := newTokenHandler(t, sessions, users)
// h.TenantEngine left nil -- must not panic, must simply omit the claim.
verifier := "dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
code := seededSession(sessions, verifier)
params := url.Values{
"grant_type": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code": []string{code},
"client_id": []string{"test-client"},
"redirect_uri": []string{"https://app.example.com/callback"},
"code_verifier": []string{verifier},
}
req := tokenRequest(params)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d (body: %s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
resp := decodeTokenResponse(t, w.Body.String())
claims := parseJWTPayload(t, resp["id_token"].(string))
if _, present := claims["tenant_roles"]; present {
t.Errorf("tenant_roles must be omitted when TenantEngine is nil, got %v", claims["tenant_roles"])
}
}