KEY-WP-0009-T04 is done. Re-ran verification on main with an explicit Go 1.23.0
toolchain and a writable build cache: contract validator PASS, build, vet and the
full test suite pass, git diff --check clean. gofmt had drifted on
internal/server/telemetry/events.go and tests/migration/scenario_c_test.go
(comment alignment only, no semantic change); both reformatted so the task's
formatting claim holds. The four handoffs to netkingdom, secrets-engine,
ops-warden and railiance-platform were then actually sent -- the 2026-09-05 audit
had shown the earlier claimed delivery had no receipts -- and each receipt id is
recorded in the workplan and readable back from the hub.
KEY-WP-0013-T02 and KEY-WP-0014-T04 stay in wait. Their remaining work is not
ours to do, so what was owed was the request, and it is now delivered: custody
admission for the two approval clients to railiance-platform, the exact human
client id and callback URI to approval-engine, and the OpenBao-token vs
issuer-JWT split plus Qonto rotation execution authority to ops-warden. Each
message quotes the existing non-secret packet or reviewed sequence and states
what is explicitly not being treated as authorization.
No secret was read, no production resource changed, no route retired.
SCOPE.md updated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016uV8zoCKpA1WRAxsKRYbdH
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1182213@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 966597b9-ae61-46a4-8b9e-1594ab3ec4ad
Closes the runnable half of gap G04. The Scenario B and C scripts could not
execute: absent compose files, binaries sought at src/bin where the Makefile
builds to bin/, --base-dn passed to a generator whose flag is --basedn, and a
hardcoded workstation Go path invoked from outside the module.
Repairing the shell alone would have proved nothing. Both scripts set
KEYCAPE_TEST_ISSUER while the profile suite built its own httptest server and
never read it, so they passed identically whether or not a provider was running.
A harness that cannot fail for the reason it exists is worse than a missing one.
src/tests/conformance targets the issuer named by KEYCAPE_TEST_ISSUER over HTTP:
discovery, the profile authorization surface, published keys parsed under the
runtime's own rules, excluded grants, and -- with credentials -- a real token
exchange verified against those keys. It skips when the variable is unset, so
make test is unchanged.
Run against Keycloak 26.0 rather than asserted to work. Discovery, authorization
surface and key checks passed, and a client_credentials exchange produced a token
that verified against Keycloak's published JWKS through internal/jose.
It also failed, correctly: stock Keycloak advertises the excluded implicit and
password grants, and in Keycloak those are server capabilities rather than
per-client toggles, so no emitted realm removes them. A migrated Keycloak has a
wider grant surface than KeyCape, which substantiates with evidence what SCOPE
previously asserted without it. Scenario B legitimately reports failure today.
Directory migration, credential and MFA preservation and relying-party behaviour
remain unexercised, and Scenario C has never been run end to end, so G04 does not
fully close.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
Closes the local protocol surface of gap G01 from the scope assessment
(KEY-WP-0016). The browser grant validated PKCE, client id and scopes but left
four bindings unenforced, and UserInfo verified less than the caller CLI does.
Authorization-code path: bind the exchange to the redirect URI the code was
issued for, refuse clients whose registration does not permit the grant, and
authenticate confidential clients with a digest-based constant-time comparison
over the same credential sources as the service grant. An empty grantTypes stays
an implicit authorization-code client, matching config validation.
Code consumption: SessionStore.Consume reads and deletes under one lock. The
previous Get/Delete pair spanned JWT signing, and the added test reproduces the
race against that version -- 9 of 16 concurrent exchanges succeeded, and a
failed exchange left the code replayable.
UserInfo: check the JOSE header algorithm before trusting the signature, require
the configured issuer, and require an access token rather than accepting an ID
token of the right shape. Purpose is decided on the scope claim so the issued
token contract, which consumers pin exactly, does not change.
SCOPE.md and the assessment record which bindings are now enforced and that the
Authelia upstream-trust assumption remains open, so G01 is not fully closed and
no profile-conformance claim is made.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
Add signed registration/enrollment handoffs, per-request assurance
policy with login-session isolation, and /logout. coulomb-social
stays AAL1 unless acr_values or another client raises the bar.
Verified first: grant_types_supported advertises client_credentials in
discovery.go, but token.go only ever accepted authorization_code -- no
service-token issuance path exists at all. Building one from scratch is
materially bigger than extending the existing flow; explicitly not
attempted here, left open in the workplan rather than declared done.
What shipped for the human Authorization Code + PKCE flow:
- domain.User.Tenant (new, omitempty) + token.go's effectiveTenant():
falls back to tenant:coulomb (this workstation's actual tenant, ADR-0006)
when unset -- never an empty tenant claim, never a silent reassignment.
- principal_type: "human", unconditional.
- groups/roles promoted from scope-gated to unconditional core claims,
always [] not null when empty. One pre-existing test asserted the old
scope-gated groups behavior -- updated to match the new intentional
behavior, not left failing or reverted.
- assurance built from PKCESession.MFAVerified (new field, threaded
through completeAuthorization's two call sites in authorize.go) --
whether MFA was actually verified in this session, not static enrollment
state. aal2 only when required-and-passed this time, aal1 otherwise.
go build/vet clean, go test ./... green repo-wide. Two new authorize_test.go
cases assert MFAVerified on both paths. tests/profile/profile_test.go's
TestCompleteTokenFlow (the repo's own full HTTP integration test) extended
with real value assertions for all five claims, not just presence checks.
Python conformance tool not run against a live instance (needs the full
Authelia+LLDAP+privacyIDEA stack); TestCompleteTokenFlow's real HTTP round
trip covers the equivalent claim checks instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- T22: docker-compose.dev.yml dev stack, Dockerfile, root Makefile
- T18: Profile test suite (Scenario A) — 8 integration tests with real handlers
- T23: Server binary wiring all components, config validation, /healthz
- Config: ValidateConfig with startup validation
14 test packages pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- T09: /userinfo with RS256 JWT validation, scope-filtered claims
- T15: LLDAP→canonical export tool with validation, migration_event telemetry
- T21: Negative test suite (Scenario D) — all 7 unsupported features verified
All go tests passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
