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Author SHA1 Message Date
e729ad4c28 Prove the migration against live directories and fix what that surfaced
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Finishes the unproven half of gap G04. Running the harness against real LLDAP,
OpenLDAP and Keycloak found four defects that the full unit suite passed over.

Every LLDAP user search pointed at a branch that does not exist. Config.userOU()
defaulted to ou=users while LLDAP stores users under ou=people, and nothing set
UserOU. LookupUser, ListUsers and ValidatePassword all derive from it, so all
three silently found nothing against a stock LLDAP -- human login included, not
only the export. Exposed by an export returning zero users while still emitting a
membership referencing uid=admin, a snapshot the repo's own validator rejects.

raw_attributes_well_formed, added one workplan earlier, rejected the LLDAP
adapter's own _validation_warning annotation, so the exporter's output failed its
own validation. Tooling annotations are exempt now, and a test proves the
exemption does not weaken the rule.

Migrated group memberships were dangling: resolveMemberDN passed a source DN
through unchanged while entries were written to the target branch, so groups
named entries the migrated directory does not contain. And empty groups could
not load at all, since groupOfNames makes member a MUST -- they reference a
placeholder entry the LDIF creates, an organizationalRole rather than a person,
emitted only when some group needs it.

The scenario-c compose file could not start: bitnami/openldap:2.6 does not
exist, though it passed docker compose config. Pinned to the image the scenario
was proved against.

Proof: LLDAP -> export -> validate -> LDIF -> ldapadd into OpenLDAP 1.5.0, every
entry added and every member resolving; a realm from the same export imports into
Keycloak and serves discovery. KeyCape passes 5/5 conformance checks, a migrated
Keycloak 4/5.

Relying-party behaviour and MFA against a migrated realm remain unexercised, and
credential/MFA migration is not supplied at all, so no harness can establish it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P

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Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-08 00:29:34 +02:00
7534552754 Make the replacement harness runnable and target a live issuer
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Closes the runnable half of gap G04. The Scenario B and C scripts could not
execute: absent compose files, binaries sought at src/bin where the Makefile
builds to bin/, --base-dn passed to a generator whose flag is --basedn, and a
hardcoded workstation Go path invoked from outside the module.

Repairing the shell alone would have proved nothing. Both scripts set
KEYCAPE_TEST_ISSUER while the profile suite built its own httptest server and
never read it, so they passed identically whether or not a provider was running.
A harness that cannot fail for the reason it exists is worse than a missing one.

src/tests/conformance targets the issuer named by KEYCAPE_TEST_ISSUER over HTTP:
discovery, the profile authorization surface, published keys parsed under the
runtime's own rules, excluded grants, and -- with credentials -- a real token
exchange verified against those keys. It skips when the variable is unset, so
make test is unchanged.

Run against Keycloak 26.0 rather than asserted to work. Discovery, authorization
surface and key checks passed, and a client_credentials exchange produced a token
that verified against Keycloak's published JWKS through internal/jose.

It also failed, correctly: stock Keycloak advertises the excluded implicit and
password grants, and in Keycloak those are server capabilities rather than
per-client toggles, so no emitted realm removes them. A migrated Keycloak has a
wider grant surface than KeyCape, which substantiates with evidence what SCOPE
previously asserted without it. Scenario B legitimately reports failure today.

Directory migration, credential and MFA preservation and relying-party behaviour
remain unexercised, and Scenario C has never been run end to end, so G04 does not
fully close.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
2026-09-07 23:32:11 +02:00
847abcba73 feat: implement T19, T20 — Scenario B/C replacement tests; complete workplan
- T19: Scenario B tests — IAM swap correctness (7 tests: profile safety, client mapping, user/group preservation)
- T20: Scenario C tests — full expansion correctness (6 tests: LDIF round-trip, target differences, MFA orthogonality)
- CI scripts: test-scenario-b.sh, test-scenario-c.sh
- README: complete documentation with quick start, endpoints, migration guide
- Workplan: all acceptance criteria checked off

All 23 tasks done. 15 test packages, all green. go vet clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-13 02:36:29 +01:00