KEY-WP-0013-T05's tenant blocker did not need the decision it was waiting on. The
two proposed resolutions differ in where a human's tenant comes from -- the
directory record, or the client registration -- and an implementation exists that
is correct under either, so the choice can be made later without another
migration.
A client registration may now declare a tenant. humanTenant() resolves it by four
rules: no declaration keeps the directory answer unchanged; a declared zone
applies where the directory has placed the user nowhere; agreement passes; and a
declared zone conflicting with a directory assignment refuses issuance rather
than relabelling the user.
The refusal is the design, not an edge case. A registration can bind a zone for
unplaced users and can never move a placed one, so this gets the approval chain
its tenant:platform without writing a general cross-tenant override into the
issuer. It fails closed rather than picking a winner, because either answer would
be a silent cross-tenant assertion, and it reports 403 with
error_type: tenant_binding so an operator can tell a misconfigured registration
from a rejected login. If the owners later populate directory tenants, the same
code stops supplying the zone and starts enforcing agreement with it.
Safe only because client registrations are static and deployment-owned. The
tenant contract records that this rule must be revisited if dynamic client
registration is ever admitted.
Tests cover all four rules; neutering the conflict check fails the relabel test
rather than passing silently.
T05 now waits on one thing only: the client_id and callback URI from
informed-decision once it has a deployed origin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016uV8zoCKpA1WRAxsKRYbdH
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keycape-to-keycloak called Transform, which passes no clients, so it wrote a
realm with an empty clients array and nothing said the service-identity contract
had not been migrated. Where clients were supplied, mapClient hardcoded
standardFlowEnabled — silently giving every client_credentials registration the
browser flow — and dropped audience, service subject, tenant, roles, lifetime,
MFA policy, secret reference and handoff URLs. Realm roles and client scopes were
emitted as empty containers.
The defect was not the missing mapping but that a dropped field and an
inapplicable one looked identical in the output.
Add -clients, reading registrations through a new config.Registrations() that
converts without resolving secrets, so migration tooling cannot load material it
has no business holding. Derive flows from the declared grants. Carry the profile
claims as protocol mappers, since Keycloak has no native concept for them, and
lifetime, handoff URLs and the secret reference as attributes — the reference,
never a value. Derive realm roles and client scopes from what is present.
Report what cannot be carried, in UnpreservedReport, kept deliberately separate
from ValidationReport: consistency with the snapshot and completeness of the
migration are different questions and one list cannot answer both. It names the
unmigrated secret, the unenforceable MFA policy, passwords and factor enrolment,
and subject continuity. An incomplete transform emits partial telemetry.
Closes the semantic-preservation half of G03; proof against a live provider is
G04 and stays open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012WAsfsfQmDu4vcBhiMcmQp
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Closes the remaining half of gap G01. The adapter decoded upstream ID-token
claims without verifying anything, justified in a comment by a server-to-server
TLS boundary that nothing enforced.
Operator decision: verify the token rather than police the transport. The hop is
to be HTTPS as defence in depth, but KeyCape does not monitor, check or gate on
that -- a transport check helps only when it is configured correctly, which is
the assumption it was meant to remove. Verification holds regardless of how the
token arrived, so no HTTPS validation or opt-in flag is added.
HandleCallback now verifies the RS256 signature against Authelia's published
keys, the issuer Authelia advertises, KeyCape's own client ID in the audience,
and a sane validity window, before any claim is trusted. It fails closed: an
unreachable or unparseable key set denies the login. The advertised jwks_uri
path is rebased onto the server-side token base URL so split-horizon deployments
resolve, with config overrides where that inference is wrong, and an unknown key
id triggers one refresh so provider rotation needs no restart.
The reusable half lives in internal/jose rather than being copied from
authclient's verifier, since duplicated verification is how two copies drift and
one misses a fix. Migrating authclient onto it is tracked as KEY-WP-0019-T05,
kept separate so it does not destabilise a tested path in this change.
Thirteen rejection cases plus algorithm and rotation coverage; with the
unverified parse restored all fifteen fail, so they test the fix rather than
merely passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P
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