key-cape/workplans/KEY-WP-0014-native-credential-lane-handoff.md
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Close the KEY-WP-0009 handoff gap and deliver the two blocked admissions
KEY-WP-0009-T04 is done. Re-ran verification on main with an explicit Go 1.23.0
toolchain and a writable build cache: contract validator PASS, build, vet and the
full test suite pass, git diff --check clean. gofmt had drifted on
internal/server/telemetry/events.go and tests/migration/scenario_c_test.go
(comment alignment only, no semantic change); both reformatted so the task's
formatting claim holds. The four handoffs to netkingdom, secrets-engine,
ops-warden and railiance-platform were then actually sent -- the 2026-09-05 audit
had shown the earlier claimed delivery had no receipts -- and each receipt id is
recorded in the workplan and readable back from the hub.

KEY-WP-0013-T02 and KEY-WP-0014-T04 stay in wait. Their remaining work is not
ours to do, so what was owed was the request, and it is now delivered: custody
admission for the two approval clients to railiance-platform, the exact human
client id and callback URI to approval-engine, and the OpenBao-token vs
issuer-JWT split plus Qonto rotation execution authority to ops-warden. Each
message quotes the existing non-secret packet or reviewed sequence and states
what is explicitly not being treated as authorization.

No secret was read, no production resource changed, no route retired.
SCOPE.md updated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016uV8zoCKpA1WRAxsKRYbdH

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1182213@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 966597b9-ae61-46a4-8b9e-1594ab3ec4ad
2026-09-08 10:22:52 +02:00

4.4 KiB

id type title domain repo status owner topic_slug created updated state_hub_workstream_id
KEY-WP-0014 workplan Review native login and client credential lane handoffs infotech key-cape blocked codex native-credential-lane-handoff 2026-09-05 2026-09-08 0d003df3-f7d3-5063-8ca0-e1e33f7df74a

Source: ops-warden inbox message 0dd9c7bd-0ecd-42d1-806f-7cc4ba9730ed. The native service exchange and public PKCE login commands are now implemented. Cross-owner rotation and consumer-specific route cutover remain outstanding.

Design owner command and custody boundaries

id: KEY-WP-0014-T01
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "0c0a0b61-c19e-5631-9cda-8b2dc0f47d8f"

Review ops-warden's existing key-cape-oidc-login proxy and rapp-qonto-keycape-client route contracts. Specify the native interactive login and bounded exchange commands, token delivery, renewal and custody-mediated rotation before implementation. Keep secret custody with OpenBao and avoid retiring the proxy until replacement commands have equivalent verification.

Verify handoff delivery evidence

id: KEY-WP-0014-T02
status: done
priority: low
state_hub_task_id: "d9a5de97-b7d5-5599-98c2-eaab32f51495"

Ops-warden reports KEY-WP-0009-T04's claimed reply did not arrive. Verify prior receipts for all four named recipients before claiming successful notification. No outbound coordination messages were sent during the 2026-09-05 repo review.

Implement and verify native caller commands

id: KEY-WP-0014-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "4e46f474-a15e-594f-ae07-ad37a9667d89"

Implemented keycape service-token and login with HTTPS discovery, RS256/JWKS verification, exact audience bindings, PKCE/state/nonce, private out-of-Git file delivery and redacted errors. Service Basic authentication now form-decodes credentials. Integration tests exercise the real token/JWKS handlers and browser callback, including forged state, tampering, excess scope and unsafe output. See docs/native-authentication.md for invocation and ownership boundaries.

Admit rotation and verify consumer handoff

id: KEY-WP-0014-T04
status: wait
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "e7632c71-9676-5837-a925-7f905e3015c5"

Qonto rotation requires admitted custody/provider transaction and rollback semantics; see the exact review sequence in docs/native-authentication.md. The current login proxy yields an OpenBao token, so it cannot be replaced by a JWT-writing command without adapting its consumer contract. Verify that split with the platform owner and ops-warden before route changes. No route was changed.

2026-09-05 receipt audit: GET /messages/?from_agent=key-cape returned one 2026-03 image-publication message and no KEY-WP-0009 handoff receipts for NetKingdom, secrets-engine, ops-warden or railiance-platform. Corrected the unsupported statement in KEY-WP-0009-T04. This proves only that no receipts are present in the current Hub response, not that no message ever existed. The 2026-09-05 audit's finding stands as recorded; the replacement outbound messages were sent on 2026-09-08 (below).

2026-09-08: 0a6c9d88-cf50-45d8-acdc-99a40747683e -> ops-warden, readable back via GET /messages/?from_agent=key-cape. It puts both open questions to the route and custody owner in one place:

  1. The key-cape-oidc-login proxy yields an OpenBao token and keycape login yields an issuer JWT — different credential types, different verifiers, different enforcement owners, so not interchangeable. Two admissible options are offered: keep the proxy and run keycape login alongside it for JWT consumers, or adapt the route's consumer contract to a JWT and then cut over. Option (a) is recommended until every consumer of the route is enumerated.
  2. Qonto rotation for rapp-qonto-keycape-client, quoting the five-step reviewed sequence from docs/native-authentication.md and asking who executes the successor generation and CAS update, in which transport, under what authority. It records that warden route/warden plan returned no exact admitted lane and that a generic match is not being treated as authorization.

The KEY-WP-0009 handoff ops-warden reported missing has also now been delivered (5bc58847-eed5-4164-bb0f-a0d8455e75b8), closing the KEY-WP-0014-T02 correction.

Task remains wait — no route was changed and no rotation command ships until ops-warden answers (1) and an execution/rollback authority is admitted for (2).