tegwick
632b1f1376
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra Assistant-Session: 01a092fe-13b1-7f12-ac74-7d258af4d79c
82 lines
5 KiB
Markdown
82 lines
5 KiB
Markdown
# Optional MFA for browser clients
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Set `mfaOptional: true` on a reviewed browser registration to allow AAL1 login
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when privacyIDEA authoritatively reports no active enrolled factor. Once an
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active factor exists, require AAL2. A previous AAL1 session cannot satisfy that
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requirement. Explicit AAL2 requests still require MFA. Lookup errors deny login
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through the existing account-recovery path. This setting overrides only the
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provider `requireForAll` default for that client.
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Do not combine this with `mfaRequired`. In particular, `mfaRequired: false`
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means unconditional AAL1 and is not an opt-in enrollment policy. Unchanged
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registrations keep their existing policy. Service clients reject mfaOptional.
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The adapter sends the raw privacyIDEA JWT in Authorization, filters active
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factors before pagination, and requires a successful, complete response before
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concluding there is no active factor. The credential must have realm-scoped
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administrative tokenlist permission: a user-role token only lists its own factors
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regardless of the requested username. Never replace it with a self-service JWT.
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See the [provider API](https://privacyidea.readthedocs.io/en/stable/modules/api/token.html).
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## Deployment gate — not yet enabled
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Live inspection on 2026-09-13 found `requireForAll: true`; both the demo-company
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and account-portal registrations inherit it. Configured token-list credentials
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return HTTP 401, so enabling this setting now would replace the OTP prompt with
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a lookup failure. No live policy has been changed.
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Credential owner: railiance-platform / OpenBao, route
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`net-kingdom-privacyidea-admin-token`. Its concrete delivery and renewal contract
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is unpublished (`resolvable: false`). Obtain an owner-approved realm-scoped
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factor-read credential through the native custody path, with renewal and
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revocation ownership. Do not put credentials in chat, arguments, work records,
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or config examples. The older refresh-pi-token-live.sh needs review before use.
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After credential delivery:
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1. Verify the deployed provider accepts the raw JWT and returns authoritative
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count/tokens results for controlled accounts with and without a factor.
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Confirm realm/resolver mapping and administrative tokenlist scope, including
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visibility of another user's factor; an empty list alone is not proof.
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2. Verify self-service at https://pink-account.coulomb.social: password login,
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TOTP enrollment with possession confirmation before activation, cancellation,
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and factor removal/recovery. This user-facing flow is not yet verified.
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3. Build and pin the reviewed issuer image. Migrate only the exact
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vergabe-demo-company registration to mfaOptional using the owner CAS rollout
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lane; keep unrelated registrations and Secret bytes intact. The current
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vergabe-client-rollout.py intentionally refuses registration differences and
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needs an explicit migration before this policy can be applied.
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4. Resolve account-portal access for unenrolled users without weakening privileged
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access. Review portal policy and self-service permissions before expanding the
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optional setting to this shared client. Add the verified enrollment link to
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account management once that flow works.
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5. Verify fresh password-only admission without a factor, enrollment confirmation,
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then OTP enforcement (including reuse of an old AAL1 session). Verify explicit
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AAL2 still challenges, lookup failures recover without issuing a code, logout
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permits identity switching, and other clients retain their policies.
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Rollback: restore the exact previous client registration and image pin via CAS.
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This restores mandatory MFA for the demo client; it is not password-only access.
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## Credential renewal consumer contract
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KeyCape accepts either `privacyidea.adminToken` (existing startup configuration)
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or `privacyidea.adminTokenFile` (an absolute protected mounted-file path). Configure
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one source only. With a file, KeyCape reads the current value for each factor lookup
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and OTP validation. Deliver renewal atomically; do not truncate a live file in
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place. A projected Secret volume may update asynchronously; a `subPath` mount
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will not provide live renewal. The deployment owner must verify propagation.
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The file contains only the raw provider JWT with an optional trailing newline;
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input is bounded to 16 KiB. Missing, empty, malformed, oversized or unreadable
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files deny the operation without a cached or inline fallback. File contents and
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paths are excluded from credential errors. Provider rejection also denies access;
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file presence alone does not prove credential validity, scope or freshness.
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Default provider requests have a ten-second timeout and do not follow redirects.
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The credential must remain provider-issued, realm-scoped and renewed through
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owner custody. This consumer feature neither mints credentials nor establishes
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an OpenBao path. Deploying an approved file requires a separate protected mount,
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read permission for KeyCape's runtime identity, renewal/expiry ownership, and
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positive factor/no-factor plus failed-credential/recovery evidence. Existing live
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configuration and policy have not been changed by implementing this feature.
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