tegwick
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Closes the remaining half of gap G01. The adapter decoded upstream ID-token claims without verifying anything, justified in a comment by a server-to-server TLS boundary that nothing enforced. Operator decision: verify the token rather than police the transport. The hop is to be HTTPS as defence in depth, but KeyCape does not monitor, check or gate on that -- a transport check helps only when it is configured correctly, which is the assumption it was meant to remove. Verification holds regardless of how the token arrived, so no HTTPS validation or opt-in flag is added. HandleCallback now verifies the RS256 signature against Authelia's published keys, the issuer Authelia advertises, KeyCape's own client ID in the audience, and a sane validity window, before any claim is trusted. It fails closed: an unreachable or unparseable key set denies the login. The advertised jwks_uri path is rebased onto the server-side token base URL so split-horizon deployments resolve, with config overrides where that inference is wrong, and an unknown key id triggers one refresh so provider rotation needs no restart. The reusable half lives in internal/jose rather than being copied from authclient's verifier, since duplicated verification is how two copies drift and one misses a fix. Migrating authclient onto it is tracked as KEY-WP-0019-T05, kept separate so it does not destabilise a tested path in this change. Thirteen rejection cases plus algorithm and rotation coverage; with the unverified parse restored all fifteen fail, so they test the fix rather than merely passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NV9oijZukGyGbRQGGKnK4P Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 713576@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 384c511d-9bce-4cb8-a676-2aef6c0c8df6
132 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
132 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
# SCOPE
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Reviewed 2026-09-05 against source revision `b989de4`.
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## Purpose and boundary
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KeyCape is Go identity **Tooling** for NetKingdom's lightweight IAM deployment.
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It runs its own OIDC-style issuer, uses Authelia for upstream browser
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authentication, reads identities from LLDAP, and delegates factor checks to
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privacyIDEA. It also provides caller authentication commands, directory snapshot
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validation, and migration artifact generators.
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It issues identity, role, scope and assurance claims. Resource authorization
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belongs to access-engine and consuming services; secret custody and OpenBao
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policy/token enforcement belong to their platform owners. The implemented subset
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supports NetKingdom integrations, but complete profile conformance and drop-in
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Keycloak interchangeability are not established.
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## Implemented capabilities
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| Surface | What the current source provides |
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| --- | --- |
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| Issuer HTTP API | Discovery, `/authorize` and its callback/registration-return routes, `/token`, `/jwks`, `/userinfo`, local `/logout`, and `/healthz`. |
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| Human authentication | Authorization code with S256 PKCE, exact registered redirects, scope allow-lists, Authelia login, privacyIDEA MFA challenges, client-specific assurance requirements, browser session reuse, step-up/fresh-login handling, and configured registration/enrollment handoffs. |
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| Service authentication | Static confidential `client_credentials` clients authenticated with form-encoded `client_secret_basic`; configured subject, tenant, roles, scopes and per-client token lifetime. Secrets are resolved from environment references at startup. |
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| Tokens and identity | Locally signed RS256 JWTs; configurable access-token resource audience while ID tokens retain the client audience; human/service principal types, tenant, groups, roles, scope and assurance claims. UserInfo resolves canonical directory subjects and filters profile/email/groups by scope. |
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| Caller commands | `keycape login` for public-client browser PKCE login and `keycape service-token` for service exchange. HTTPS discovery/JWKS verification and private JSON token-file delivery outside Git; no token output on stdout. |
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| Validation and migration | Canonical snapshot checks; deterministic LLDAP user/group/membership export that records whether it enumerated the whole directory; basic Keycloak realm JSON; LDIF generation for OpenLDAP, 389 Directory Server and AD targets. These generate artifacts rather than execute a complete migration. |
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| Diagnostics and packaging | Structured authentication/enforcement/migration events, a process health response, Go build/test/vet targets, a container containing the KeyCape binary, and development/CI scaffolding. |
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## Material limits
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- Client registrations, service secrets and the signing key are loaded at startup.
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Login, authorization and handoff state are process-local. There is no shared
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session store, general refresh-token flow, token introspection/revocation API,
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or automatic signing-key/client-secret rotation service. Logout clears the
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local KeyCape session, not every upstream or downstream session/token.
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- The optional tenant-engine `tenant_roles` adapter and handler support exist,
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but the server entry point does not configure them. That claim is not an
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enabled capability of the stock executable.
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- The LLDAP export enumerates the group subtree directly, so groups with no
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members are present, and every snapshot carries a `groupEnumeration` field
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saying whether that enumeration ran or the membership-derived fallback did
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(KEY-WP-0018). A failed enumeration aborts the export rather than writing a
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smaller snapshot, and read failures are reported rather than skipped. Users,
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groups and memberships are sorted, so an unchanged directory exports
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identically. Completeness beyond users, groups and memberships — passwords and
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MFA credentials in particular — is still not covered.
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- The Keycloak CLI exports users/groups through the basic transformer and has
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no client-list input. Library-level client mapping does not preserve the full
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current service-identity, audience, tenant/role, MFA and lifetime contract.
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Password and MFA credential migration is not supplied.
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- Snapshot validation is a limited Go rule set, not full machine-readable schema
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enforcement. The canonical YAML model and discovery metadata now match the
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runtime client-registration surface and are held there by a conformance check
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(KEY-WP-0017); the Go model is the runtime authority and the YAML the reviewed
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contract. That is narrower than schema enforcement in general.
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- The authorization-code grant now binds the redirect URI,
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enforces grant-type eligibility, authenticates confidential clients and
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consumes codes atomically, and UserInfo enforces algorithm, issuer and
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access-token purpose (KEY-WP-0016). Upstream Authelia ID tokens are verified
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before any claim is trusted — signature against the provider's published keys,
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advertised issuer, own client ID in the audience, validity window — failing
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closed and independently of transport (KEY-WP-0019). KeyCape deliberately does
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not check or gate on the upstream transport. Enforcing these bindings
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is not complete profile conformance. Relying parties must repeat `redirect_uri`
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on the token exchange and present the access token, not the ID token, to
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`/userinfo`; see [authorization-code bindings](docs/authorization-code-bindings.md).
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See the assessment below.
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- Tests cover local handlers, adapters, transformations and CLI protocol behavior.
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They do not establish complete replacement against a running Keycloak/full-LDAP
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stack. The Scenario B/C shell harnesses are incomplete.
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- The server listens on HTTP; HTTPS termination is deployment-owned.
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`/healthz` reports process status without probing dependencies. Development
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Compose needs configuration/key material absent from the checkout. Production
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deployment and custody are external; a source implementation or example client
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fragment does not prove live registration or consumer cutover.
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- Approval-client provisioning, coordinated Qonto rotation, native consumer
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handoffs and notification receipt closure remain open in KEY-WP-0009/0013/0014.
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## Deliberate exclusions
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General-purpose IAM, dynamic client registration, implicit/password grants,
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wildcard redirects, arbitrary identity brokering, resource authorization policy,
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OpenBao credential custody, and Keycloak operations are outside this repository's
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ownership. Registration/enrollment handoffs do not implement user provisioning
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or factor enrollment themselves.
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## Entry points and verification
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Run the issuer with `keycape --config PATH`; `keycape server` and
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`keycape migrate` are not implemented subcommands. Caller commands are
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`keycape login` and `keycape service-token`.
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Separate binaries under `src/cmd/` are `validator`, `lldap-export`,
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`keycape-to-keycloak`, and `lldap-to-ldap`. `make -C src build` places binaries in
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root `bin/`; the container packages only `keycape`. Tests live under `src/tests/`
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and alongside packages in `src/internal/`.
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`make test`, `make lint` (Go vet), `make build`, and `make contract-test` are the
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root checks. The capability-contract check requires the sibling NetKingdom
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validator. These checks passed for the reviewed revision in the preceding
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implementation session; the scope assessment is a source/documentation review.
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Use this repo for its bounded issuer, caller JWT acquisition, identity adapters
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and migration preparation. Consult [INTENT.md](INTENT.md) for the architectural
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target, [native authentication](docs/native-authentication.md) for caller
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constraints, and the [scope/intent assessment](history/2026-09-05-011726-scope-intent-assessment.md)
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for evidence, priorities and remaining gaps.
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## Provided capabilities
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```capability
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type: security
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title: Bounded OIDC and service-token issuance
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description: Implements static-client browser PKCE and client-credentials authentication with RS256 identity claims through Authelia, LLDAP and privacyIDEA; complete Keycloak interchangeability remains unproven.
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keywords: [oidc, pkce, authentication, iam, sso, mfa, identity, service-token]
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```
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```capability
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type: security
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title: Verified caller JWT acquisition
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description: Provides native browser login and service-token exchange commands with HTTPS discovery, JWKS verification and private token-file delivery.
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keywords: [oidc, pkce, jwt, cli, authentication, jwks]
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```
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```capability
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type: security
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title: Directory validation and migration artifact generation
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description: Checks canonical snapshots and produces LLDAP exports, basic Keycloak realm JSON and target-specific LDIF; does not perform or prove a complete live migration.
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keywords: [migration, identity, lldap, keycloak, ldif, validation]
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```
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