key-cape/workplans/KEY-WP-0009-provider-capabilities-and-service-identities.md
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Close the KEY-WP-0009 handoff gap and deliver the two blocked admissions
KEY-WP-0009-T04 is done. Re-ran verification on main with an explicit Go 1.23.0
toolchain and a writable build cache: contract validator PASS, build, vet and the
full test suite pass, git diff --check clean. gofmt had drifted on
internal/server/telemetry/events.go and tests/migration/scenario_c_test.go
(comment alignment only, no semantic change); both reformatted so the task's
formatting claim holds. The four handoffs to netkingdom, secrets-engine,
ops-warden and railiance-platform were then actually sent -- the 2026-09-05 audit
had shown the earlier claimed delivery had no receipts -- and each receipt id is
recorded in the workplan and readable back from the hub.

KEY-WP-0013-T02 and KEY-WP-0014-T04 stay in wait. Their remaining work is not
ours to do, so what was owed was the request, and it is now delivered: custody
admission for the two approval clients to railiance-platform, the exact human
client id and callback URI to approval-engine, and the OpenBao-token vs
issuer-JWT split plus Qonto rotation execution authority to ops-warden. Each
message quotes the existing non-secret packet or reviewed sequence and states
what is explicitly not being treated as authorization.

No secret was read, no production resource changed, no route retired.
SCOPE.md updated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016uV8zoCKpA1WRAxsKRYbdH

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 1182213@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 966597b9-ae61-46a4-8b9e-1594ab3ec4ad
2026-09-08 10:22:52 +02:00

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Markdown

---
id: KEY-WP-0009
type: workplan
title: "Provider capability declarations and bounded service identities"
domain: infotech
repo: key-cape
status: finished
owner: codex
topic_slug: netkingdom
created: "2026-08-23"
updated: "2026-09-08"
depends_on:
- NK-WP-0030
- KEY-WP-0006
state_hub_workstream_id: "c1a9b1cc-2ff0-566a-b544-1a2ef967fc0d"
---
# KEY-WP-0009 — Provider capabilities and bounded service identities
Publish KeyCape-owned security-scenario interfaces and make the existing
service-token issuer precise enough for OpenBao machine-login consumers. This
work accepts identity issuance ownership without taking over OpenBao roles,
policies, secret custody, or privacyIDEA token lifecycle.
## Publish C1 and C2b provider declarations
```task
id: KEY-WP-0009-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "eaf7af48-b3d6-5f85-b0ce-ff2b640f9cc3"
```
Publish Playbook Capability Contract v0.1 declarations for the KeyCape C1
runtime and its privacyIDEA-backed C2b integration. Name exact entry points,
parameter authority, resource ownership, trust requirements, and readiness
evidence. Do not claim C2a or privacyIDEA-owned token lifecycle.
Published `capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.lightweight-sso.yaml` and
`capabilities/playbooks/key-cape.privacyidea-token-authority.yaml`. The latter
claims the KeyCape integration for C2b while leaving factor enrollment, token
state, custody keys, validation decisions, and lifecycle with privacyIDEA.
## Define bounded service-auth contracts
```task
id: KEY-WP-0009-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "212eb75c-a36c-5cb8-bf67-7d524f00f9ef"
```
Define the KeyCape service-auth claims, renewal/expiry, failure, custody, and
owner boundaries required by secrets-engine and OpenBao JWT roles. Add
per-client access-token lifetimes so a bounded client contract does not depend
on an unrelated global default.
Added a validated 1m-1h per-client `tokenLifetime` override, applied it to JWT
`exp` and `expires_in`, and documented claims, renewal, expiry, residual JWT
validity, explicit OpenBao cleanup, and no-fallback failure semantics in
`docs/openbao-service-auth-contract.md`.
## Accept coding-agent issuance ownership
```task
id: KEY-WP-0009-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "c41e0144-8169-57cf-8c34-eb52e65d6d76"
```
Publish the non-secret static registration for `codex-railiance-platform` with
the exact audience, subject, tenant, role, scope, and 15-minute lifetime already
accepted by railiance-platform. KeyCape owns JWT issuance and client disablement;
railiance-platform owns the exact-bound OpenBao role and policy; OpenBao owns
resulting token enforcement; secret values remain outside this repository.
Accepted ownership through the exact non-secret registration in
`config/service-clients.example.yaml`. Added the parallel reviewed
`secrets-engine-openbao` contract. Live value generation/materialization,
deployment merge, and OpenBao role/policy application remain with their named
custody and platform owners and are not implied by this source registration.
## Validate and hand off
```task
id: KEY-WP-0009-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "6945c0c0-bbb6-552b-8d62-d806d3fd0018"
```
Run the canonical declaration validator, Go formatting/build/vet/tests, and
repository checks. Reply to NetKingdom, secrets-engine, ops-warden, and
railiance-platform with revision-independent paths and exact ownership status.
Both declarations pass NetKingdom's canonical validator. The full Go suite,
vet, build, `gofmt`, YAML parsing, and `git diff --check` pass using an explicit
Go 1.23 toolchain and writable local cache; the workstation's default Go cache
is read-only and was not used.
2026-09-05 correction: the earlier statement that State Hub handoffs were
delivered was not supported by receipt IDs. The audit found no matching handoff
receipts in the Hub response. KEY-WP-0014-T02 records the correction.
2026-09-08 closure. Verification re-run on `main` with `GOTOOLCHAIN=go1.23.0` and
a writable `GOCACHE`: `make contract-test` PASS, `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`
and `go test ./...` all pass, `git diff --check` clean. `gofmt` had drifted on
`src/internal/server/telemetry/events.go` and `src/tests/migration/scenario_c_test.go`
(comment alignment only, no semantic change); both were reformatted so the
formatting claim now holds.
The four handoffs were then actually sent, and each receipt is readable back via
`GET /messages/?from_agent=key-cape`:
| Recipient | Receipt id |
| --- | --- |
| netkingdom | `692ed0d7-e21b-48e7-8600-5b32b551c627` |
| secrets-engine | `479a1698-87dc-4ee2-a732-c2dc18bc4e84` |
| ops-warden | `5bc58847-eed5-4164-bb0f-a0d8455e75b8` |
| railiance-platform | `9c6a4e70-6bc0-4ad6-8293-35a56e507dfc` |
Each names revision-independent paths, the 2026-09-08 verification result, and
the same ownership split: KeyCape owns issuance, static registrations, client
disablement and the claim set; secret custody, OpenBao roles/policies and token
enforcement, privacyIDEA factor and token lifecycle, resource authorization and
deployment remain with their named owners. C2a is not claimed. This closes the
notification gap; it is still not evidence of live deployment or provider cutover.