key-cape/workplans/KEY-WP-0013-approval-engine-resource-audience.md

id	type	title	domain	repo	status	owner	topic_slug	created	updated	state_hub_workstream_id
KEY-WP-0013	workplan	Approval-engine resource audience and client registrations	infotech	key-cape	blocked	codex	approval-engine-resource-audience	2026-09-05	2026-09-08	6e815d88-b0e3-5ce0-be5d-13ab15917f7f

Source: approval-engine inbox request 5583e896-52f2-45bd-895f-02f227b7e836, reviewed against its local registration and caller-authentication contracts.

Implement static resource audiences

id: KEY-WP-0013-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "a92432a2-4e92-5b90-be2b-d82b784bf8f0"

Added optional static audience configuration for access tokens in both grants; ID tokens retain the relying-party audience. Added human access-token scope. Published bounded approval service fragments and the human registration contract. Regression tests cover the default audience, request override resistance, JWKS signature validation, ID-token separation and service registration scope isolation. Browser requests and token exchanges now enforce the client scope allow-list, including grants removed after authorization.

Provision and prove live registrations

id: KEY-WP-0013-T02
status: wait
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "607897c5-bad9-55e5-86df-7802f592d6e8"

Needs deployment-owned custody for both new service secret references and the upstream issuer precondition. Deploy the implementation and service registrations together, then prove live JWKS verification and denied excess scopes without logging values. Local signature proof is not live rollout evidence. See docs/approval-engine-auth-contract.md. The separate human UI callback gate is retained in T05; a bearer-only resource server does not own a redirect and its absence does not block these service clients.

2026-09-05 follow-up: read-only deployment metadata shows the current image is forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/key-cape:main-153258b and only the Qonto service secret environment reference is present. The two approval clients are not materialized through deployment environment references. Published a concrete non-secret admission packet at docs/approval-engine-provisioning-request.yaml. Custody routing has no exact admitted lane for these two clients. warden plan returned founder_required but matched an unrelated generic database lane; that mismatch is not authority to provision. Human callback clarification is pending. No secrets were read or production resources changed.

2026-09-08: the two blocking requests were sent and their receipts are readable back via GET /messages/?from_agent=key-cape.

• 278a3ebe-b529-49f6-bd1a-e3ebcf318260 -> railiance-platform. Custody admission for both clients, quoting docs/approval-engine-provisioning-request.yaml verbatim: exact OpenBao paths and client_secret field, the two Kubernetes delivery references, the two KEYCAPE_*_CLIENT_SECRET environment names, tenant:platform per decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6, and the 15m lifetime. It asks for four things explicitly: confirm/correct the paths and fields, confirm the delivery references, name the authority for the attended first provision, and agree a rollout window in which registrations and the KeyCape version that reads them deploy together. It restates that the warden plan founder_required result matched an unrelated generic database lane and is not being treated as authorization.
• 43fbd997-6e22-4859-8433-58b784c2df6c -> approval-engine. Requests the two missing human-registration inputs — the exact client_id and the full callback URI — noting redirects are matched exactly and a near-miss fails closed at /authorize. Restates the human client shape (public, S256 PKCE, audience: approval-engine, allowedScopes: [openid, approval:approve], mfaRequired: true, no consume grant) and asks approval-engine to confirm it validates the access token, not the ID token, against the deployed /jwks.

Deployment state is unchanged from the 2026-09-05 observation: neither approval client is materialized. Task remains wait — the two admissions are owned by railiance-platform and approval-engine respectively, and live provisioning proof cannot begin until both land. Still no secret read and no production resource changed.

2026-09-08, second pass. Custody and the human callback are still owed, but one part of this task was ours all along and was not built: the task requires proving "live JWKS verification and denied excess scopes without logging values", and there was no way to do that except by hand, against production, at the moment custody lands — which is the worst time to be improvising a check.

Shipped keycape verify-client (src/internal/authclient/verify.go, documented in docs/native-authentication.md). Per registration it verifies discovery origin, the client_credentials exchange and its RS256 signature against the deployed JWKS, exact sub/tenant/roles/principal_type, that every -deny-scope is refused, and that the token carries no scope that was not requested — the last being a gap the caller commands do not cover, since they prove requested scopes were granted and not that nothing extra came back. Failures name the claim, never the observed value, and nothing is written to disk, so it is safe to run against production. The exact invocation for each of the two clients is now recorded in the verification: block of docs/approval-engine-provisioning-request.yaml, so admission hands back a command rather than a description.

Tests: src/internal/authclient/verify_test.go covers the passing case, an over-broad registration, a live predecessor secret, an identical "rotation" and output non-disclosure. Verified with teeth — neutering mustFail makes the suite fail rather than pass silently.

Task stays wait. What is owed from elsewhere is unchanged and unreduced: the two secret values through an admitted custody path, and the exact human client_id and callback URI. Nothing here provisions anything.

Reconcile tenant vocabularies across approval layers

id: KEY-WP-0013-T03
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "e98da2eb-1f05-5c7f-bc84-711fa38b8c4a"

Source: glas-harness inbox message 356f6977-d361-4e3b-83ab-b2c7f4759286 (GLAS-WP-0015), which asks for the exact store tenant, JWT tenant, CheckRequest tenant, any permitted mapping and wrong-tenant denial evidence.

Published docs/tenant-claim-contract.md. The KeyCape-owned JWT tenant for all four reviewed service registrations is tenant:coulomb, bound at registration and required by config validation. Approval store platform and policy tenant:platform are owned by approval-engine and flex-auth; KeyCape performs no normalization or aliasing, so exact comparison does not match today. No mapping was invented and no live registration or policy subject was changed — the two admissible resolutions are recorded for the owning parties to decide.

Added src/internal/server/oidc/tenant_test.go: request-supplied tenant and tenant_hint cannot alter the claim; two registrations never carry each other's tenant (the wrong-tenant denial basis); human tokens default to tenant:coulomb rather than an empty claim. Local issuance proof only, not live-rollout evidence.

Align approval registrations to tenant:platform

id: KEY-WP-0013-T04
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "d93e21cc-a422-5e78-981f-9c00f3161375"

Source: glas-harness inbox message f487c63a-dd7e-4ad8-9188-eec9fbea59c6, operator decision 5ed3fb35-eca9-413a-82b9-95171ba85bf6 ("Use tenant:platform for the Glas approval dependency chain", verified resolved in the hub). This closed resolution 2 of the two options recorded in KEY-WP-0013-T03.

Changed the tenant field on exactly secrets-engine-approval and approval-engine-operator in config/service-clients.example.yaml and the two matching entries in docs/approval-engine-provisioning-request.yaml to tenant:platform, each annotated with the decision id. codex-railiance-platform, secrets-engine-openbao and the human directory default keep tenant:coulomb. No audience, scope, subject, role, lifetime or MFA change; no cross-tenant grant.

Evidence: TestApprovalClientIssuesExactPlatformTenantAndRejectsAliases (exact tenant:platform with aud=approval-engine even when the caller requests platform, tenant:coulomb or TENANT:PLATFORM), TestUnrelatedServiceClientKeepsCoulombTenant, and TestServiceRegistrationTenantsAreExactPerDecision, which pins every reviewed client's tenant against the real fixture so a reintroduced alias fails the build. Full go test ./... and go vet ./... pass. Choice only — live provisioning and the other admission gates remain with KEY-WP-0013-T02.

Assign and register the human approver browser client

id: KEY-WP-0013-T05
status: wait
priority: high
assignee: the-custodian
blocking_reason: "An actual approver UI owner, client ID and deployed callback are not yet supplied. approval-engine is a bearer-only resource server."

Own the residual human registration separately from service-client T02. Reuse an existing accepted UI if available; do not invent a callback on approval-engine. Require public S256 PKCE, exact redirect, MFA, approval:approve without consume, and a real human access-token proof. No service credential substitutes for this. HFACT-WP-0001-T03 consumes the acceptance where a human approval is required.

Make negative rollout evidence discriminate actual issuer refusal

id: KEY-WP-0013-T06
status: progress
priority: high
assignee: the-custodian

Critical-path review found mustFail accepted any Exchange error: timeout, HTTP 5xx, invalid token or JWKS failure could falsely prove excess-scope denial or predecessor rejection after a successful positive exchange. Preserve a bounded typed provider refusal, require the exact token endpoint/status/error/feature, and prove the checker rejects unrelated failures without exposing provider bodies. Publish the verified image candidate and return its immutable digest to T02.

Platform's 2026-09-08 return is RPF-WP-0035-T05 and proposed CCR-2026-0017/0018. The custody field is CLIENT_SECRET; Kubernetes key client-secret and both env names remain as requested. These records cover verifier-side delivery only. Owner approval, client-side retrieval and the actual upstream ID-token issuer proof remain distinct gates. Public discovery currently advertises https://auth.coulomb.social; that alone is not the signed-token observation.