The standard is accepted at v0.7 on the owner's decision. §14 keeps two things
apart, as ops-warden asked: boundary assent, given by four repositories at the
version named in each record and undisturbed since; and revision review, where
all four reviewed v0.6 and every change in v0.7 is the adopted remedy of a
finding they raised. What is not claimed: nobody has reviewed v0.7 as text.
Accepting a standard nobody has re-read is deliberate. The estate will learn
more from using it than from another round of prose, and the v0.7 changes were
requested rather than invented. Findings against the accepted text stay
welcome — that is §12's normal business, not an exception.
The companion moves from canon/standards to the repository root as
SECURITY-COMPANION.md and becomes v0.2, so onboarding starts at the front door
rather than three directories down. One copy, not two: a second copy of a fact
is how the estate gets two sources for it.
v0.2 closes the gap access-engine found in v0.1 — it said publish your stance
map without saying where, and omitted the inventory obligation, so a repository
could satisfy it faithfully and no register would learn of its stance. It also
carries what v0.7 added: the corrected PEP obligations, the evidence threat
decomposition with its stated residual, cadence as MUST for load-bearing
sources with heartbeat for rare ones, the four agent rules and the glas-harness
seam, and the Railiance axes with their unsettled mapping.
It points readers at ops-warden for how to get things done. The companion says
what the rules are; ops-warden stewards the paths through them.
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Four reviews. kings-guard found that v0.6 claimed a human/agent principal
separation in §1 and §15 while §3.4 was byte-identical to v0.5: a silent edit
failure, and their framing is the right one — a rule stated about a standard in
its own change log is not a rule, which is §11's principle turned on the
standard. The same failure had dropped two §16 entries. Both restored.
§3.4 is now written: no standing credential, conduit or engine API only, agent
memory is not a state plane, every action reconstructable as the caller's, and
the seam with glas-harness for session semantics.
The rest are collisions between rules each written for its own clean case:
- §6.4(1) forbade what §6.4(3) blesses. A PEP may proceed under its declared
§9.3 stance where the application of that stance is recorded in place of the
decision — stricter than v0.6, since a fail-open result becomes metadata
rather than silence. Raised by ops-warden, the reference shape it made a
violation.
- §6.4(2) forbade the session-bound allow §9.7.1 permits. Now scoped to replay
outside the decision's own binding and lifetime, with access-engine's
canonical request digest as the mechanical test. Negative caching ruled
permitted where the refusal is recorded and the lifetime declared.
- §13.1 now exists: v0.6 mandated a stance-map register and implemented none.
Its first inventory has one row, which is the finding.
- §9.6 gained a threat decomposition after audit-core corrected its own remedy:
atomicity prevents accidental omission, cadence and reconciliation detect the
adversarial case, nothing prevents it at a compromised source. Cadence is now
MUST for load-bearing sources, with heartbeat or reconciliation required for
low-volume classes where rate monitoring cannot work.
- §9.7.2 splits by role: per input class at a PDP, one boundary deadline at a
PEP.
- §17 moves the decision-record schema to access-engine, which argued it against
its own interest.
- §13 stops attributing the actuation gap to kings-guard; §19 removed, since a
verdict inside a standard grades the document it lives in.
§20 records the Railiance interaction boundary on railiance-master's own
definitions: the four axes, that a workload is a managed running deployable so
approvals are never one, and that rein-* is not a fifth axis but a glas-harness
concern. What is unsettled is listed as unsettled.
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v0.6 is dense, self-referential, and written for readers who already live in the
estate. That is acceptable in canon and poor as a contract for the nine
repositories yet to declare and for the Staff agents expected to conform.
The companion is the operative form: the rules, no change log, no review
archaeology. Machine-readable layer key, the three sanctioned Tooling shapes as
a table, the PEP obligations, the evidence bound with the two unsound claims
written out, the four agent rules, and the four conformance states. The statute
governs on disagreement, and a disagreement is reportable as a finding.
Its §9 records that operations is HelixForge's responsibility — reef, rail,
rapp, rein — consuming the NetKingdom security and approval framework, and that
the interface is NOT yet specified. What holds today is only what holds for any
consumer. No mapping of those concepts onto the layer model should be assumed
until it is written; the statute's §16 carries the same open question.
Its §10 states the two things the estate cannot do yet — nothing is observed in
production, nothing can be contained automatically — so no reader plans around
a capability that does not exist.
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From the independent assessment of 2026-08-29, which found the model sound as a
layering constitution and incomplete as a self-healing one: cognition,
authority, and execution are specified, but the two verbs that close a healing
loop — observe in production, actuate through a deterministic surface — are
pending, and one is unstaffed.
Section numbers below §14 are unchanged; the estate cites them.
- §3.3 types the Engine layer: PDP, PIP, Evidence, Lifecycle, with a role column
in §4. Collapsing them hid different failure modes — a PIP outage is input
degradation, a PDP outage is consumer residue, an evidence-plane outage must
not block the operation it records. A new engine is a PIP unless amended.
- §6.4 names the enforcement point. The standard was precise about the decision
and silent about the gate, so enforcement lived in Staff runbooks. Four
obligations: no side effect without a decision record, no local recaching of
the verdict, a declared unreachable-engine stance, reconstructability.
- §9.2 replaced. Containment was marked pending against kings-guard, the right
mark on the wrong repository: reduce, step-up, and isolate are
authority-changing operations, so they are rendered by an Engine and enforced
by a PEP. Actuation is an unowned Engine concept held at zero. Staff proposes
containment and never performs it.
- §3.4 separates human and agent principals inside Staff — same permissions,
different blast radius. No standing credential, conduit or engine API only,
agent memory is not a state plane, every action reconstructable as the
caller's.
- §9.7 puts time into the model: explicit lifetimes, revocation visibility
deadlines, consumption as a state change never inferred from a decision
record, and the three race modes named. §9.8 states what holds under
partition.
- §17 requires the Taxonomy artifacts — claim, decision-record, gap-record, and
emission-cadence schemas — without which §6.2 and §11 are reviewable but not
compileable. Ownership proposed, not assigned.
- §18 composes the sibling standards, which had been cited in frontmatter and
nowhere in the rules.
- §5 sunsets the uncatalogued-infrastructure carve-out. §5.3 declines a proposed
fourth "operator of third-party Tooling" shape: it would convert a tracked gap
into a permanent allowance, which is the relabelling failure this standard
exists to prevent.
- §10 gains the six artifacts a layer change must carry, written from the
zone-engine case, including a permission freeze during the cut.
- §2 lifts the observation rule so it cannot be lost in a summary. §13 separates
its three normative rules from the table, now a snapshot due to move into
maturity-engine. §16 decides the approval custody question: no. §19 records
the fitness verdict.
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All four reviewing repositories returned findings on v0.4 and one contested a
rule. Every change below came from a reviewer, not from gate-house.
- §9.1 split into `pending` (no route, capability zero) and `declared-gap`
(route exists under §5.3, capability works). v0.4's single mark would have
forced a false "pending" onto ops-warden's production SSH issuance —
the fix was worse than the defect, and the defect was in this section.
- §9.3 rewritten. flex-auth contested it and was right: it collapsed "engine
reachable but degraded" with "engine unreachable", and the second has no
evaluator in the path to express anything. Input degradation is the engine's;
unreachability is the consumer's, bounded by a declared auditable total
stance — which ops-warden ADR-0009 already satisfies. v0.4 had ruled against
shipped behaviour in a repository that assented to it.
- §5 scoped: "Tooling-layer system" means a §4 Tooling row. Without this every
Staff repository was in undeclared violation for writing progress events.
- §9.4 requires the outbox to be local — no synchronous audit-core dependency
inside the state-change transaction, so an audit outage cannot block a
revocation.
- §9.5 forbids compiling maturity levels into registry content while decision
provenance carries no registry-snapshot digest.
- §9.6 gained load-bearing versus attributive evidence, the mirror rule that
absence is not evidence of non-occurrence, and kings-guard's finding that
suppression biases posture optimistic and silently.
- §11 gained a fourth state: blocked-clean, which MUST NOT rank below
conforming. A repository that declined a break-glass path and left a
capability at zero complied at cost; one that quietly opened a client and
declared nothing did not.
- §11 gained a machine-readable declaration form; ops-warden's layer.yaml is
the reference implementation.
- §13 gained state and owner-status columns; access-engine's decline of
authentication evidence is recorded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Conformance sweep across the §4 catalog found two defects in this standard.
§11 required every catalogued repository to declare its layer in INTENT.md,
which OpenBao cannot do — the estate catalogues it but does not author it. That
is the §9.1 defect applied to conformance rather than capability: a rule
assigning an obligation the holder cannot discharge. For components the estate
does not author, the catalog row is the declaration.
§11 also did not say what a declaration is. A layer stated about a repository
by another repository is not one. The nine repositories carrying gate-house's
layering review note appear to declare a layer, but the words are gate-house's
and sit above a line admitting the body is unadapted — assertion, not assent,
which is the pattern this estate rejects.
§14 now records the honest count: seven of fifteen estate-authored repositories
have declared in their own voice. Adoption is not claimed on the basis of notes
gate-house wrote into other repositories.
Amended in place rather than versioned: v0.4 is proposed and unassented.
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audit-core assented to the approval evidence half with conditions and
corrected the rationale twice. Both corrections were against wording this
standard had taken from that repository's INTENT rather than its contract.
- §4 catalogues audit-core as an Engine, on its own declaration. v0.3 named it
as an owner in §9.4 and §13 without listing it — a §11 defect in the standard
itself, which audit-core raised.
- §9.4 rationale rewritten to cite docs/integrity.md rather than INTENT
principle 6: an in-database chain detects a rewritten payload only if the
attacker does not recompute the suffix, which a database owner can, and even
with external attestation the store is not WORM or object lock. tamper
evidence is conditional on live preconditions.
- §9.4 gained emission atomicity as approval-engine's obligation, and the
prohibition on audit-core exposing an approval-validity query — a boundary
audit-core stated unprompted, applying §6.1 to itself.
- §9.6 added, estate-wide: evidence proves alteration and truncation, not
omission at source. A suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact and
verification reports intact. "The audit record proves it happened" is unsound
and is replaced with the sound form.
- §13 gained two gaps: stronger approval custody (unassigned — deciding whether
approvals need archival custody distinct from other sources is doctrine work
not yet done) and emission atomicity (approval-engine).
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v0.2 recorded the approval object as the one open architectural hole, and
carried a latent instance of its own §9.1 rule: gate-house was catalogued as
owning conformance review with no engine to act through. Two engines were
seeded to close both.
- §9.4: the approval object goes to approval-engine — not Staff (§3.4 forbids
the runtime state), not access-engine (an evaluator owning what it evaluates
is self-dealing), not audit-core (append-only is the opposite property).
access-engine consumes approvals as input claims under §6.2; audit-core takes
the tamper-evident evidence. Operative state and evidence record are separate
artifacts with separate owners.
- §9.5: graded progression goes to maturity-engine. gate-house judges and
proposes; maturity-engine computes and remembers. Carries the guardrail that
a level may never gate a decision directly — under §6.1 that would be a
second decision point by the graded back door.
- §4 catalog gained both engines; §13 register updated.
Status proposed: the new engines are seeded by owner direction with no other
side to assent yet, and the approval evidence half needs audit-core's assent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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All three repositories whose boundaries moved assented, each with a decision
record (flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-001, kings-guard KG-DEC-2026-001, ops-warden
ADR-0010), and each returned a finding. v0.2 carries the results and is
accepted; v0.1 is marked superseded and retained because the twelve estate
INTENT review notes cite it.
- §5 restructured into three sanctioned shapes: read-only diagnostics, conduit
(ops-warden's question, ruled), and declared engine gap (ops-warden's
amendment, accepted). v0.1 offered only the first, which is narrower than the
estate as it stands — a rule with no lane for a real sanctioned case gets
satisfied by relabelling rather than by closing the gap.
- §6.2 added: doctrine must reach the decision as an input claim or a versioned
policy rule. This is §6.1 applied to gate-house on the same terms it applies
to engines, drawn back by flex-auth.
- §9 added: the catalog may not assign a capability the rules forbid
discharging. Containment marked pending an engine surface; degraded-mode
fallback ruled into access-engine rather than Staff.
- §11: conformance now has three states, distinguishing a tracked gap from an
undeclared violation.
- §12 made normative, stating that an unsatisfiability finding is a success of
the conformance loop.
- §13 added: open gaps register, including the unowned approval storage and
lifecycle capability — recorded, deliberately not assigned.
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States how the security estate is layered — Taxonomy, Tooling, Engines,
Staff — distinguished by determinism and by the artifact each layer
produces, and what each layer may own.
Carries two normative rules. §5: Staff never touches Tooling directly; it
acts only through Engine APIs — the architectural form of "no privilege
from cognition", and mechanically checkable. §6: access-engine is the only
policy decision point, generalizing to the whole estate the ruling first
drawn in zone-engine/INTENT.md §5, and barring any Staff repository from
hosting a decision point.
Also fixes the vocabulary the estate has used for more than one thing:
access lane vs access rule, doctrine vs runbook, control plane as Engine
vocabulary, and the posture asymmetry.
Owner gate-house, published by net-kingdom. Status proposed: the two
adaptations carrying the most weight — flex-auth's reframing and rename to
access-engine, and kings-guard and ops-warden releasing vocabulary — are
not yet assented by their owners.
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Answers zone-engine ZONE-WP-0001-T01.
Decision 5.6 — enforcement stance is a sibling standard, not an axis. The six
ladders are monotone and the whole current/target/guard machinery depends on it;
enforcement stance is not (ADR-0006 is the finding that the top rung is wrong for
the SSH lane). And this framework is descriptive: an accurately declared exempt
would be conformant and exempt. Membership is declared, stance belongs to the
control owner. Zone membership rides tenancy.yaml under a reserved zones: key so
the estate keeps one declaration surface; the schema permits it, unconstrained.
Decisions 8.4.1/8.4.2 — 'substrate location is not evidence' stated once instead
of three repo-local slogans, and the reef/P/V gap recorded as this document's
defect rather than zone-engine's scope. NK-WP-0027 takes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
T02 done. Deployed user-engine digest c501aeb2 reads the projected flex-auth
token per decision (verified in the running container); flex-auth-user-engine
138aa347 serves with caller-auth enforce. Probes: valid 200
decision:d9aef25f08e17b84, missing token 401, wrong-system 403.
Closes manifest drift: runtime.yaml pinned e3b5f65b, the digest T01 warned
against, while the cluster ran c501aeb2. Re-applying it would have rolled the
portal back to an image that cannot authenticate to a PDP now in enforce.
kubectl diff is now empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
audit-core, railiance-platform and flex-auth all reviewed. Every posture I
guessed was too generous, on every repo that has now self-reported.
Two of my statements about other repos were wrong as fact in canon. flex-auth
does not call tenant-engine synchronously on the authorization path - the
adapter is built and has no non-test caller, which is also why they cannot
reach I3. And I justified A4 partly as ending the copying of action strings
between repos; AuthZEN standardises the envelope and deliberately not the
action vocabulary, so that argument is withdrawn and the interoperability one
kept.
Section 13.1 was found broken independently by audit-core and flex-auth: it
required an evidence artifact for every claim while defining none below I2, A2,
E1, P1, R2 - so section 5's own worked example of a conformant absorbed repo
could not satisfy it on any axis. At or below the no-control rung a declaration
now needs a stated reason, not an artifact.
The weakest-surface rule from draft-6 was insufficient alone. A bare minimum
destroys signal, since E3-write with E1-read declares identically to E1/E1.
Declare per path, quote the minimum. Two services found this shape in
themselves within a day, so it is the common case rather than a corner.
n/a is now an admissible level. P0 presupposes a database and R0 presupposes
retained data; a stateless service is neither, and without n/a a missing rung
forces the fabrication section 6 prohibits - which is what draft-1 was rejected
for.
The A ladder had no seat for a decision point. flex-auth cannot occupy A3,
since delegating to flex-auth is not something flex-auth can do. A PDP now
declares two numbers: its own inbound level and the maximum it enables. They
read A0 enables A3, which is more alarming than A3, which is the point.
The ladders described consumers and not providers. railiance-platform showed
apps-pg at I0 A0 E0 where the zeros are structural, and OpenBao at E0 where the
mechanism in place is E4 machinery aimed at a consumer boundary - literally
correct and inverting the real security position. A provider now declares what
it makes reachable.
Crypto-shredding needed a condition it did not have. audit-core showed that a
hash over a low-entropy canonical record is a confirmation oracle, so
destroying the key does not make content unrecoverable while the commitment
survives - and that shreddability is not retrofittable onto a chain committing
to cleartext. R4 by key destruction now requires that no retained commitment
reveal the erased content.
Section 9 named database credentials only; audit-core pointed out the argument
applies with more force to the credential carrying the tenant claim. Extended.
Section 17 led with the connection ceiling when memory binds first and fails
worse. Corrected against rapp-postgres ADR-0004.
Also: a low level may be permanent by design and the guard must not nag it, and
the A4 evidence artifact now requires recording decision differences, since
substitution proves interface portability rather than equivalence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
tenant-engine assessed itself against the ladders and came back with
corrections. All five are adopted, because the ratification test says that if a
repo cannot express itself the ladders are wrong - and it could not, in three
places.
I2 conflated authority with verification. Its text named tenant-engine as the
source of existence, which made the level describing canonical identity
unclaimable by the service that provides it. An axis is assessed on a service's
own inbound surface, never on its authority over the concept. tenant-engine is
the source of tenant records and is at I1, because the acting identity arrives
in the request body rather than in a verified token.
A level now reports the weakest surface. tenant-engine has PDP-authorized
mutations and three unauthorized read routes - including the one flex-auth
calls for aal2-class decisions - and reported A2 rather than A3. Publishing the
stronger surface would be accurate about that surface and misleading about the
service. A per-surface vector was considered and rejected as premature.
The E ladder assumed all data is tenant-keyed. A registry whose rows ARE the
tenants has no predicate to scope a policy by, and enforcing one would break
the service rather than secure it. Mixed-shape services now declare an E level
plus a named registry exception; an unnamed exception is an overclaim. Without
this they overclaim or sit at E2 forever, which is what tenant-engine was
facing.
Retention and erasure are two dimensions and one level cannot carry both.
tenant-engine is R1 on backup and R0 on erasure - its lifecycle contract
deliberately defines no hard-delete, so a tenant record cannot be deleted ever,
by design, while carrying display_name and contact_email. Declared R1/R0 now.
And the compounding - personal data, no erasure path, a backup window set by
the longest-retaining co-resident - is the substrate owner's to surface,
because each part looks locally reasonable alone.
My own error, corrected: I listed tenant-engine as a live P1 occupant in both
the ladder and the E/P matrix. They are on SQLite. P1 is TEN-WP-0009's target
and the provisioning is my own unapplied intake. Asserting a placement that a
workplan exists to create is exactly the kind of claim this document forbids.
Worth recording: they found an unfiltered cross-tenant read in their own event
accessor while assessing against the ladder, before publishing anything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An earlier revision of this section asserted the adversarial facility was
deliberately not NetKingdom's, on independence grounds. Overruled, and the
counter-argument is better: offensive security is security work.
The facility is also framed more broadly than this document assumed - it is
pointed at infrastructure we choose, our own estate among them, and testing
conformance to this framework is one use of a general capability rather than
its purpose.
The tension I raised is left in the text rather than deleted, because it is
real: NetKingdom now owns both this framework and the facility that tests
conformance to it. The mitigation is that findings leave for risk-nexus under
separate ownership instead of being closed in place, and the trigger to
revisit is conformance findings starting to close quietly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Question 12 asked whether to add a quality-of-service dimension. No - because
we could not enforce it. Community PostgreSQL has no resource governor, so a
declared priority would be an unenforced claim in a declaration, which is what
retiring tenantIsolation was about. An axis implies graduation and enforcement
and this has neither.
Co-residents are equal, and a consumer whose latency cannot survive an
unprioritised neighbour escalates to P2. Service class is still declared, as a
category not a level: it informs placement, acts as a trigger, and gives
"acceptable degradation" in the noisy-neighbour artifact something to be
acceptable relative to - what batch tolerates is an outage for latency-critical.
Class mixture must be visible, because an unenforceable risk nobody can see is
worse than one that is stated. rapp-postgres now reports it and the live
instance already flags latency-critical beside batch.
Gateway-level prioritisation in a connection proxy is recorded as the known
escalation short of P2 - real, and infrastructure we do not run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
whitehat-security takes the adversarial evidence artifacts - the framework's
highest-severity gap, unowned since it was drafted. audit-core and tenant-engine
were right to decline it as fleet-scope work; the answer was a home of its own
rather than a volunteer.
Recorded here with the part that bears on this document: the facility is
deliberately not owned by NetKingdom, which owns this framework. Verifying
conformance to a standard while reporting to the standard's owner is
self-grading one level up.
Two consequences land back on the framework. Cadence becomes a security
parameter rather than a schedule, since for a detection-based control the
interval between runs is the exposure window. And a passing suite is proof that
the attacks attempted did not work, not proof of isolation - recording a green
run as "E2 verified" would be exactly the overclaim section 6 prohibits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ratifies the tenant capability-role model (PLTF/IAM/VEN/CUS, non-exclusive,
independent of ADR-0013's grouping axis), a hybrid carrying mechanism
(tenant-engine authoritative, key-cape caches a tenant_roles claim at
issuance, flex-auth re-validates live for aal2-class decisions), and
tenant-engine as a new, separate service owning tenant existence, grouping,
capability roles, and plan/subscription assignment -- not a module inside
user-engine, whose own boundary contract already scopes it to consuming
tenant identifiers, not owning them.
canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md defines that
ownership boundary before the repo exists, mirroring how
user-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md was sequenced.
canon/standards/iam-profile_v0.3.md (minor version per ADR-0011's own
governance -- optional claim addition, no breaking change) adds the
tenant_roles claim, folds in ADR-0013's tenant-identifier vocabulary, and
documents the live-revalidation requirement. docs/platform-identity-
security-architecture.md's Tenant Model section and SCOPE.md's canonical
spec pointer updated to match; other historical citations of v0.2 left as
version-pinned references, not bulk-updated.
Records Bernd's trial-tenant policy: trial-grouped tenants may hold any
capability role (showcase/test/explore), with safety enforced through
tenant-engine-owned resource guardrails (spend limits, entity/action
counts) rather than role gating -- guardrail design is reserved, explicitly
not specified by this change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refine the recursive platform security architecture to make OpenBao the
canonical runtime secret authority, with SOPS/age, K8s Secrets, and the
emergency bundle reframed as bootstrap/delivery/break-glass mechanisms.
- credential-management standard v0.2: add OpenBao runtime authority
section, rotation rules, and prohibited patterns (OpenBao-as-PDP,
tenant platform-root)
- platform-identity-security-architecture: mark implemented; add
flex-auth/Topaz implications, Coulomb onboarding path, and a
production-readiness checklist
- NK-WP-0004/0005: document bootstrap-to-OpenBao handoff boundary
- NK-WP-0006/0007: status -> done with implementation reviews; add
recursive platform/tenant split and OpenBao broker/audit role for
object-storage STS vending
- NK-WP-0008: status -> done; repoint corpus to infospace-bench
- new ADR-0007 (orchestration boundary), ADR-0008 (STS vending
boundary), and the object-storage STS credential-vending architecture
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
