net-kingdom/bounded-executor/README.md
tegwick abed4360d4 NK-WP-0056-T10: journey-only executor mode; fail-closed proof on the T08 stack
cli.py --journey-only: read-only, no admission; journey-read role only
(CCR-2026-0059), no Kubernetes/directory client, no approval or audit call;
exit 0 pass / 1 fail closed / 4 refused. Shared operations.journey_from_kv
with the admission check. Synthetic proof: healthy pass, broken svc-authelia
bind fails closed at authelia_first_factor, restored pass, journey token
cannot read the bind; all_met, no values. 45 executor tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 5502@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 68b3b02f-5d0f-4e71-8421-796f62e50196
2026-10-31 19:56:52 +01:00

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Markdown

# Bounded executor (NK-WP-0056)
Runs one founder-approved Bounded Execution Admission (`canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md`)
exactly once. Founder decision 6d1adce9: net-kingdom writes the executor; `rapp-bounded-executor` deploys it as one
Job per admission in `sso`.
`executor.py` is the core runner (T11):
- **preflight, no effect:**
- the admission is valid (BEA-1..14);
- the executed files match their pins;
- the trust states hold;
- every operation and check is known;
- the window is open and longer than the wall-time budget;
- the approval-engine approval binds this admission's digest, names this executor as actor and was approved
only by listed HUMAN approvers at aal2. The name-to-subject map is configured; no guessing.
- **consume once:** `request_digest` = admission digest, `decision_id` = run id. An unclear outcome is resolved by
reading the approval back, never by a second consume.
- **custody:** emit `execution.run.started` to audit-core. If the event can't be stored, the run stops.
- **steps:** in plan order, one consumer at a time. Checks run after every mutating step, after their settle time.
The kill switch and the budget are checked between steps.
- **failure:**
- A failed check, an exhausted budget or the kill switch reverts in reverse order.
- Each revert must pass its own checks.
- A clean revert may retry within `attempts`.
- An outcome that can't be determined stops without guessing.
- A failed revert stops and alerts.
- **receipt:** one `execution.attribution.receipt` per run, with PDP `not-evaluated` in the pilot. It never holds a
value that an operation handled.
Operations, checks, the approval carrier, the trust oracle, the audit sink, alerts and clocks are injected.
`operations.py` (T12) holds the pilot's real operations:
- OpenBao KV v2 with CAS;
- LLDAP self-rotation;
- ExternalSecret force-sync and its status;
- rollout restart, where a rollout that never becomes ready is a definite failure and is reverted;
- the synthetic journey check.
An operation signals a known-bad outcome with `definite_failure`, and the runner reverts. Any other error stops
without guessing.
`synthetic_pilot.py` runs a rotation and a deliberate revert on the T08 stack plus OpenBao:
`uv run bounded-executor/synthetic_pilot.py`.
`cli.py --journey-only` (T10) is a read-only run with no admission. It uses the journey-read role only (CCR-2026-0059),
runs the synthetic journey once and prints its value-free receipt. Exit codes: `0` pass, `1` fail closed, `4` refused.
`synthetic_journey_only.py` proves it on the T08 stack: it passes when healthy and fails closed on a broken bind.
`cli.py` (T13) is the Job's entry point: one admission, one approval id, a non-secret config. Exit codes: `0`
completed, `3` reverted, `4` refused before any effect, `5` stopped, unknown or failed revert, `6` consumed but not in
custody. `Containerfile` builds the image, which `.forgejo/workflows/bounded-executor-image.yaml` publishes by digest.
Deployment is in `rapp-bounded-executor`, which pins the digest and renders one ConfigMap and Job per admission
(`make run`, founder-run). That package also holds the ServiceAccount and Role, copied from
`sso-mfa/k8s/bounded-executor/rbac.yaml`, and the executor's egress-only NetworkPolicy. The receiving side in `sso` is
`allow-bounded-executor-to-*` in `sso-mfa/k8s/network-policies/netpol-sso.yaml`.
```bash
python3 -m pytest bounded-executor/tests # or: make bounded-executor-test
```