audit-core assented to the approval evidence half with conditions and corrected the rationale twice. Both corrections were against wording this standard had taken from that repository's INTENT rather than its contract. - §4 catalogues audit-core as an Engine, on its own declaration. v0.3 named it as an owner in §9.4 and §13 without listing it — a §11 defect in the standard itself, which audit-core raised. - §9.4 rationale rewritten to cite docs/integrity.md rather than INTENT principle 6: an in-database chain detects a rewritten payload only if the attacker does not recompute the suffix, which a database owner can, and even with external attestation the store is not WORM or object lock. tamper evidence is conditional on live preconditions. - §9.4 gained emission atomicity as approval-engine's obligation, and the prohibition on audit-core exposing an approval-validity query — a boundary audit-core stated unprompted, applying §6.1 to itself. - §9.6 added, estate-wide: evidence proves alteration and truncation, not omission at source. A suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact and verification reports intact. "The audit record proves it happened" is unsound and is replaced with the sound form. - §13 gained two gaps: stronger approval custody (unassigned — deciding whether approvals need archival custody distinct from other sources is doctrine work not yet done) and emission atomicity (approval-engine). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2564823@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 2a7ed827-4928-4b9f-8613-9135c9cadfe9
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| netkingdom-security-layer-model-v0.3 | standard | NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.3 | netkingdom | superseded | 0.3 | canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.2.md | gate-house | net-kingdom | 2026-08-28 | 2026-08-28 | 2026-08-28 | 3m | gate-house@516ed4e | security-layer-model_v0.3 | canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.4.md |
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NetKingdom Security Layer Model v0.3
Superseded 2026-08-28 by v0.4.
audit-coreassented to §9.4 and corrected its rationale twice: this version rested the evidence argument on an aspirational INTENT principle rather than the shipped integrity bound, and did not state that no append-only archive can prove omission at source. v0.4 also cataloguesaudit-core, which this version named as an owner without listing.
1. Purpose
This standard states how NetKingdom's IT-security estate is layered, and what each layer may and may not do. It answers one question:
Given a repository, which layer is it in, and what does that permit it to own?
The layers are distinguished by determinism and by the kind of artifact the layer produces, not by technical tier, deployment topology, or team.
It is not an org chart, not a network model, not a deployment topology, and not a dependency graph. It does not assign work, and it does not replace any repository's boundary contract; it constrains what such a contract may claim.
What changed in v0.3. Two engines were seeded to own concepts v0.2 recorded
as unowned: approval-engine takes the approval object that §13 left homeless,
and maturity-engine takes graded progression — closing a §9.1 defect in
gate-house's own catalog claim, which asserted conformance review with no engine
to act through. §15 records the change list. v0.3 is proposed: the two new
engines are seeded by owner direction and have no other side to assent yet, and
the evidence half of the approval split needs audit-core's assent.
What changed in v0.2. v0.1 was assented to by all three repositories whose boundaries moved, and each returned a finding. v0.1 had one lane for a Staff repository that legitimately touches Tooling — read-only diagnostics — which is narrower than the estate as it actually stands, and a rule with no lane for a real sanctioned case is satisfied by relabelling rather than by closing the gap. v0.1 also catalogued a capability (§4, containment) that §5 forbade discharging, and applied its reconstructability test to engines but not to the doctrine gate-house feeds them. §15 records the full change list.
2. Authority and conformance
| Fact or rule | Authority |
|---|---|
| The layers, their definitions, and the rules between them | This standard, owned by gate-house |
| Which layer a given repository is in | This standard, §4 catalog |
| What a repository owns within its layer | That repository's INTENT.md and boundary contract |
| Whether a specific request is permitted | access-engine — never this standard |
| Whether a Tooling contact is sanctioned | The declaring repository, under the shapes in §5, reviewable by gate-house |
| Security doctrine and invariants | gate-house |
| Publication | net-kingdom canon |
A repository conforms when its INTENT.md declares its layer, its claims fall
within that layer's permissions (§3), and its Tooling contacts take one of the
sanctioned shapes in §5 or are declared as gaps under §5.3.
3. The layers
| Layer | Character | Produces | Deterministic |
|---|---|---|---|
| Taxonomy | cross-cutting language | terms, semantic contracts, standards | n/a — describes |
| Tooling | infrastructure and state | data structures, persistence | yes |
| Engines | interfaces for a modeled concept | APIs, contracts | yes |
| Staff | management, operations, change, controlling | specifications, decisions, workplans, tasks | no |
3.1 Taxonomy
Cross-cutting language. Taxonomy repositories define terms and semantic contracts so the other layers interoperate without integration by interpretation. They own no runtime position and no state any layer depends on.
info-tech-canon holds ecosystem-wide semantic contracts. NetKingdom-specific
security architecture — including this standard — is net-kingdom canon's.
3.2 Tooling
Deterministic infrastructure: data structures, persistence, and the consistent, performant, scalable keeping of state. Much of it is third-party.
3.3 Engines
Deterministic APIs for a modeled concept — a user, a tenant, a zone, a secret, an access rule. An engine's defining property is that the same authoritative input state yields the same result. Engines are where the estate's deterministic guarantees live, and therefore where every enforcement boundary MUST sit.
A repository whose core function is inference or judgment fails this test by construction and is Staff, however much of its work happens at runtime.
3.4 Staff
Interactive and non-deterministic. Staff is the management layer: operations, change, innovation, and controlling. It works through agentic capability — assistants and autonomous agents — and its artifacts are specifications, decisions, workplans, and tasks.
Staff repositories MUST NOT hold state that another layer depends on at runtime, and MUST NOT render or cache any decision an Engine is responsible for.
Acting at runtime does not make a repository an Engine. Being agentic makes it Staff, and §5 governs how it acts.
4. Layer catalog
| Repository | Layer | Owns |
|---|---|---|
info-tech-canon |
Taxonomy | ecosystem-wide semantic contracts and terminology |
net-kingdom |
Taxonomy | NetKingdom standards of record; publication |
key-cape |
Tooling | packaged identity tooling; IAM profile; authentication |
OpenBao |
Tooling | secret storage, leases, PKI, dynamic secret engines |
user-engine |
Engine | users, accounts, memberships |
tenant-engine |
Engine | tenant-as-an-entity facts |
zone-engine |
Engine | zone identity and membership — offline reference conformance per its 2026-08-23 disposition |
secrets-engine |
Engine | credential abstraction, custody, lifecycle |
access-engine |
Engine | the policy decision — the only decision point (§6) |
approval-engine |
Engine | the approval object — durable, authenticated, consumable, atomically supersedable (§9.4) |
maturity-engine |
Engine | graded progression against declared criteria and evidence; the gap register; capability readiness (§9.5) |
gate-house |
Staff | security doctrine, authority context, curriculum; conformance review — through maturity-engine (§9.5) |
ops-mason |
Staff | building and tearing down access routes and perimeters |
ops-warden |
Staff | operational access lanes, stewardship, runbooks; SSH certificate issuance |
kings-guard |
Staff | adaptive defence, observation; containment — pending (§9.2) |
whitehat-security |
Staff | offensive validation |
access-engine is the ruled name for the repository currently called
flex-auth; both denote the same authority until the governed rename completes.
Execution conditions for that rename are recorded in its migration decision, not
here.
5. The binding rule
Staff never touches Tooling directly. It acts only through Engine APIs.
A Staff repository MUST NOT hold a direct client for a Tooling-layer system — no direct database connection, no direct OpenBao client, no direct cluster mutation — outside the shapes below. This is the architectural form of no privilege from cognition, and it is deliberately mechanically checkable.
Three shapes are sanctioned. Everything else is a violation.
5.1 Read-only diagnostic observation
A Staff repository MAY read Tooling state for diagnostics where the owning
engine exposes no equivalent. It MUST be declared in the repository's
INTENT.md. It grants no write, and it is an engine gap to close, not a
standing arrangement.
5.2 Conduit
A Staff repository MAY run the owner's tool under the caller's identity, supplying no authority of its own. The test is the supplied-authority property: the conduit MUST NOT present its own credential, MUST NOT widen what the caller could already do, and MUST be reconstructable as the caller's action in audit.
A conduit that presents its own token is not a conduit; it is §5.3 or a violation. This shape MUST be declared, and the no-authority property SHOULD be covered by a test.
5.3 Declared engine gap
Where a Staff repository must contact Tooling directly and no engine exposes the capability, it MUST declare the contact rather than take an exemption. A declared gap carries, machine-readably:
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
capability |
what the contact does |
intended_owner |
the engine that should own it |
blocked_on |
why it cannot move today |
review |
a date, not "when convenient" |
A declared gap is tracked non-conformance, not conformance. It does not expire on its own and it is not a licence to add more. It exists because a rule offering no lane for a real sanctioned case gets satisfied by relabelling rather than by closing the gap — and a tracked gap is visible, whereas a relabelled one is not.
Prior art: ops-warden runs equivalent machinery for delegated lanes (27
catalog entries carrying delegation:, queryable via warden route gaps), and
has offered it as reusable.
6. One decision point
access-engine is the only policy decision point in NetKingdom. No other
repository, in any layer, may render or cache authorization decisions.
First ruled in zone-engine/INTENT.md §5 — "flex-auth is the policy decision
point. It stays the only one." The failure mode, from the same source: "It
becomes a second decision point… it would arrive as a small convenience."
6.1 Compiled data that determines an outcome is still deciding
A registry, cache, or schema that resolves a result before the engine runs has decided early. Provenance MUST remain reconstructable from the engine's decision record.
6.2 Doctrine reaches the decision as an input, or it is not applied
This rule binds gate-house on the same terms. An authority ceiling, mandate constraint, or operating-mode restriction that determines an outcome MUST reach the decision either as an input claim on the request or as a rule in the versioned policy package, so that its application is reconstructable from the decision record.
Doctrine that influences outcomes by any other route is a second decision point wearing an author's hat. This is not a limit on gate-house's authorship; it is what keeps that authorship auditable at decision time.
6.3 No Staff repository may host a decision point
A deterministic authority boundary inside a non-deterministic layer contradicts the invariant the estate is built on. gate-house was re-cut on this ground.
7. Relationship to the Active Secrets Management Canon
Staff interactive, non-deterministic ≈ Cognitive Plane
Engines deterministic APIs ≈ Authority Plane
Tooling deterministic state ≈ Execution Plane
Taxonomy cross-cutting language
Cognition proposes. Authority disposes. Infrastructure executes. is therefore NetKingdom's layering rule, not only its security maxim. §5 and §6 are that principle applied to repositories rather than to requests.
8. Vocabulary demarcations
| Term | Belongs to | Not |
|---|---|---|
| access lane | ops-warden, ops-mason (Staff) — how a worker reaches a host | the decision whether they may |
| access rule | access-engine (Engine) — whether an actor may act | the route by which they arrive |
| control plane | Engine layer | a Staff repository's self-description |
| doctrine | gate-house | a lane owner's runbook |
| runbook | the Staff repository stewarding the lane | a substitute for doctrine |
| posture | kings-guard publishes; gate-house defines its authority meaning; access-engine renders it | a privilege source |
Posture carries an asymmetry that MUST hold: adaptive systems may reduce authority, require step-up, or request containment. They MUST NOT probabilistically manufacture additional authority.
9. Capability assignment
9.1 The catalog may not assign what the rules forbid discharging
A Staff repository MUST NOT be catalogued in §4 as owning a capability that requires a Tooling contact no engine exposes. Where the capability is intended but the engine surface does not yet exist, the catalog entry MUST be marked pending and the gap declared under §5.3.
v0.1 violated this: it catalogued kings-guard as owning containment while §5 forbade the only route to discharging it, making the capability zero rather than degraded. Raised by kings-guard, KG-DEC-2026-001.
9.2 Containment is pending an engine surface
No engine exposes a containment surface today — nothing to reduce authority, require step-up, or isolate a workload as a deterministic API. kings-guard's containment claim is marked pending in §4 until one exists.
9.3 Degraded-mode fallback belongs inside the engine
Where a capability must survive partial failure, the fallback belongs to the
engine, not to Staff. The deterministic fail to reduced authority default is
access-engine's, applied when it cannot reach its own inputs.
This keeps the decision at the decision point and keeps the fallback deterministic — which a Staff-layer fallback could never be. It is also why engine-unavailable is not grounds for a Staff break-glass path: an incident is when an attacker most wants the shortcut, and a containment path that bypasses the decision point becomes an authority path the moment it is subverted.
9.4 Approvals are an engine concept, not a Staff or audit concern
The approval object — durable, authenticated entries, distinct-approver
counting, atomic supersession, single consumption, revocation without holder
cooperation — is owned by approval-engine.
It is not Staff's: §3.4 forbids Staff holding state another layer depends on at runtime. It is not the decision point's: an evaluator that owns the object it evaluates is self-dealing. It is not the audit fabric's: an approval needs mutable, in-path, current-state semantics, and an append-only archive is built for the opposite property.
access-engine consumes approvals as input claims under §6.2 and never
mutates them. Every issuance, use, supersession, and revocation is emitted to
audit-core as tamper-evident evidence: the operative state and the evidence
record are different artifacts with different owners.
9.5 Graded progression is an engine concept
Maturity — how far a subject has progressed against declared criteria and
submitted evidence — is owned by maturity-engine. Given the same criteria and
the same evidence it MUST return the same level; that determinism is what makes
it an Engine rather than an opinion.
The division with Staff: gate-house judges and proposes; maturity-engine computes and remembers. Interpretation is inference and stays Staff. A criterion that cannot be evaluated by rule is not yet a criterion.
This closes a defect in v0.2's own catalog: gate-house was assigned
conformance review with no engine to act through, which is exactly the §9.1
problem raised against the containment claim. Staff acts only through Engine
APIs, including gate-house.
A maturity level MUST NOT gate a decision directly. Under §6.1, compiled
data that determines an outcome is still deciding. If a level determines whether
an action is permitted, it MUST reach access-engine as an input claim or a
versioned policy rule under §6.2, never by a consumer branching on a fetched
level.
Approvals and maturity are deliberate opposites — a closed binary state machine against an open graded ladder — and neither engine may drift toward the other.
10. Changing layer
A repository's layer is not permanent. zone-engine changed layer in practice
when its runtime hypothesis was falsified.
A layer change MUST be recorded as a decision, MUST update the repository's
INTENT.md, and MUST obtain assent from the repositories whose boundaries move.
A repository MUST NOT acquire a new layer's permissions by gradual practice.
11. Conformance
Conformance has three states, and the distinction is the point:
| State | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Conforming | no Tooling contact, or only §5.1/§5.2 shapes, declared |
| Declared gap | a §5.3 contact with owner, blocker, and review date — tracked non-conformance |
| Undeclared violation | anything else — a finding |
Mechanically checkable:
- every repository in §4 declares its layer in
INTENT.md; - every direct Tooling client in a Staff repository maps to a declared §5.1, §5.2, or §5.3 entry;
- no repository other than
access-engineexposes an authorization decision surface; - no §4 capability is catalogued without an engine surface or a pending mark.
Requires review: whether claims stay inside layer permissions; whether compiled or cached data has become an early decision (§6.1); whether doctrine is reaching decisions as declared inputs (§6.2); whether the §8 vocabulary is used correctly.
12. The conformance loop
Doctrine no engine implements is fiction. The loop is normative, not aspirational:
gate-house asserts an invariant
→ the engines implement it, or declare a gap
→ whitehat-security tries to break it
→ kings-guard observes it in operation
→ findings return to gate-house as doctrine change
A finding that a rule is unsatisfiable is a success of this loop, not a failure of the reporting repository. v0.2 exists because three repositories used it on first contact.
13. Open gaps
Declared under §5.3 or raised as unowned capability, as of 2026-08-28:
| Gap | Declared by | Intended owner |
|---|---|---|
SSH-CA signing write (VaultCA, bao kv put) |
ops-warden | secrets-engine |
| Authentication / assurance evidence | kings-guard | user-engine, access-engine |
| Secret-use evidence | kings-guard | secrets-engine |
| Containment surface | kings-guard | access-engine + runtime engines |
| Registry-snapshot digest in decision provenance | flex-auth | flex-auth (self-declared) |
| Approval storage and lifecycle — durable object, authenticated entries, atomic supersession | flex-auth | approval-engine — assigned in v0.3 (§9.4) |
| Approval evidence — tamper-evident record of issuance, use, supersession, revocation | gate-house | audit-core — proposed, assent pending |
| Conformance review has no engine surface | gate-house (self) | maturity-engine — assigned in v0.3 (§9.5) |
The approval gap is resolved in v0.3 by seeding approval-engine (§9.4), which
unblocks FLEX-WP-0017 T03 and T05 once implemented. Its evidence half is
proposed to audit-core and awaits that repository's assent.
Gaps are recorded here but tracked in maturity-engine (§9.5) once it exists;
this table is the interim register and should not outlive it.
14. Adoption
Status is accepted. All three repositories whose boundaries moved have assented in writing, each with a decision record:
| Repository | Record | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| flex-auth | FLEX-DEC-2026-001 |
assent to all three items; one self-declared non-conformance; two rename conditions |
| kings-guard | KG-DEC-2026-001 |
assent; declined the offered §5 relaxation; raised §9.1 |
| ops-warden | ADR-0010 |
assent to all three; veto not exercised; offered the §5.3 amendment |
Adoption for a repository means its INTENT.md declares its layer, its
ownership claims fall inside that layer, its Tooling contacts are declared under
§5, and any shared boundary has been assented to by the other side.
15. Change log
v0.1 → v0.2:
- §5 restructured into three sanctioned shapes. Added §5.2 conduit (ops-warden's question, ruled) and §5.3 declared engine gap (ops-warden's amendment, accepted).
- §6.2 added — doctrine must reach the decision as an input claim or a versioned policy rule (flex-auth's boundary drawn back, accepted).
- §9 added — the catalog may not assign a capability the rules forbid discharging; containment marked pending; degraded-mode fallback ruled into the engine (kings-guard's finding).
- §11 restructured — conformance now has three states, distinguishing a tracked gap from an undeclared violation.
- §12 made normative, with the explicit statement that an unsatisfiability finding is a success of the loop.
- §13 added — open gaps register, including the unowned approval storage and lifecycle capability.
- §4 catalog gained the pending mark and ops-warden's SSH certificate lane.
v0.2 → v0.3:
- §9.4 added — approvals assigned to
approval-engine, with the operative state and the evidence record separated between it andaudit-core. - §9.5 added — graded progression assigned to
maturity-engine, closing the §9.1 defect in gate-house's own conformance-review claim, and carrying the guardrail that a level may never gate a decision directly. - §4 catalog gained both engines; gate-house's conformance-review claim now names the engine it acts through.
- §13 register updated: the approval hole is assigned, two new entries added.
16. Open questions
- Whether
audit-coreaccepts the approval evidence half (§9.4, §13). - Whether the gap register migrates from this standard into
maturity-engineonce that engine exists, leaving the standard to state the rules only. - Whether Tooling warrants subdivision between third-party and homegrown.
- How a future
role-enginedivides responsibility withaccess-engine. - Whether declared gaps need an estate-wide register rather than per-repository
declarations; ops-warden's
warden route gapsis candidate machinery. - Whether non-security repositories adopt the same model.