net-kingdom/workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md

id	type	title	domain	repo	status	flavor	owner	topic_slug	created	updated	depends_on	related_repos	state_hub_workstream_id
NK-WP-0048	workplan	Establish SecurityCaseTypes so that known security cases are light	infotech	net-kingdom	active	implementation	claude-code	netkingdom	2026-10-08	2026-10-17		ops-mason ops-warden key-cape railiance-platform informed-decision	e31f3f9d-0748-5137-b0a3-7b3ca46a66eb

NK-WP-0048 - Establish SecurityCaseTypes so that known security cases are light

Why

The founder's direction (2026-10-08): setting up a security integration of a kind that has been done before should be easy, meaning accept the case, then ops-mason arranges it and ops-warden follows through. Setting up a new kind needs ample documentation and tests and an informed-decision, because its shape is part of the security architecture.

Today every integration is hand-built: per-client helper scripts, per-lane custody, founder checklists. The trigger was KEY-WP-0038 (Forgejo as an OIDC client), whose next step was going to be yet another hand-written rollout script.

This plan continues the pattern work of NK-WP-0008 (pattern infospace), NK-WP-0009 (tutorials) and NK-WP-0030 (scenario composition). It turns patterns into SecurityCaseTypes that ops-mason and ops-warden can execute. Canon: canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md (proposed).

Companion plans: ops-mason MASON-WP-0010 (materialization) and ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0044 (follow-through).

Tasks

id: NK-WP-0048-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "930ac3e9-20ec-5473-98cd-3fe8fddb730f"

T01 — Accept the terminology and the canon

Founder review of canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md, including its section 10 open questions. On acceptance the canon status goes from proposed to accepted.

2026-10-08: accepted by the founder (in session). Canon status accepted; section 10's open questions are carried forward to the first type (T04, T05).

id: NK-WP-0048-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "19c25d96-a55c-58f0-9168-3fdbc4955fc2"

T02 — Inventory the de-facto types already built by hand

Read-only. List every security integration built so far and group them by shape. Known starting points:

• browser OIDC relying parties on key-cape: informed-decision-approver, coulomb-social, user-engine portal, openbao-admin, and Forgejo (pending)
• confidential service clients with client_credentials: secrets-engine approval, requester and openbao clients, approval-engine operator
• workload KV read lanes on OpenBao: the railiance-platform credential lane designs and CCRs, for example railiance-backup-offsite-lane
• short-lived SSH certificates through ops-warden (warden sign)
• tunnelled operator access (ops-bridge)

For each: the repositories involved, the hand-built steps, attended human steps, custody paths, verification evidence, and rollback (if any). Output docs/security-case-type-inventory.md, ranking candidate types by how often the shape recurs and how much manual work each instance costs today.

2026-10-08: done, docs/security-case-type-inventory.md. 36 of 37 CCRs are already request_type: workload-kv-read, a de-facto type reviewed each time as if it were new. Browser clients: 5 hand-built plus Forgejo, each with its own rollout script. Confidential service clients need a registration plus two or three KV-read CCRs each. A forge read identity is needed in bulk by ORGREF-WP-0002-T06. Recommendation: oidc-browser-relying-party first (unblocks the forge), workload-kv-read second (largest payoff), then forge-read-identity.

id: NK-WP-0048-T03
status: done
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T01]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "e487975b-73b1-516c-971d-da4cbbb93063"

T03 — Schema, template and validator

• canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json and security-case_v0.1.schema.json
• security-case-types/_template/ with type.yaml, README.md and tests to copy
• a validator, extending tools/security-scenario-composer/, that checks a type, checks a case against its type, and renders the case into the composer's deterministic plan (still execution.permitted: false)

Acceptance: the validator rejects missing sections, secret-shaped parameter values, unpinned providers and cases against non-implemented types, with tests for each.

2026-10-08: done. canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json and security-case_v0.1.schema.json; tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py (validate-type, validate-case, render, reusing the scenario composer); security-case-types/_template/ (a valid, runnable example type over net-kingdom.local-identity, with README sections, an example case and tests that travel with every copy). 31 tests pass, including the composer's existing suite.

id: NK-WP-0048-T04
status: done
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T02, NK-WP-0048-T03]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "2fffe112-7d55-5680-9952-78d74f44f87f"

T04 — Define the first type: browser OIDC relying party

security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/, version 1.0:

• parameters: client id, display name, exact redirect URIs, scopes, client type (confidential or public), MFA pin, the groups the consuming service maps, custody path for the secret (confidential only), consuming service and its owner
• composition: key-cape client registration (key-cape declares it as a playbook capability), secret minting into custody (railiance-platform), LLDAP group existence and membership (net-kingdom identity-provisioner), handover to the consuming service
• materialization (ops-mason) and follow-through (ops-warden) sections
• verification: discovery lists the redirect URI; a test sign-in returns the expected claims for one human; anonymous access to the custody path is denied
• rollback: remove exactly this client and its custody path
• README: threat model, MFA rationale, why redirect URIs are exact, which steps still need an attended login and how that is minimised
• reference instances: informed-decision-approver, coulomb-social, user-engine portal, openbao-admin

Acceptance: complete per canon section 3, tests green, status proposed.

2026-10-08: done. security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/ 1.0 (proposed): type.yaml with 12 parameters (the custody reference is required only for confidential clients), composition over key-cape's new key-cape.oidc-client-registration declaration (contract PASS, maturity: planned), materialization and follow-through, verification and rollback, all conditional on client type where it matters. One attended step, register-client, justified by the live registry being a Kubernetes Secret. README with threat model, alternatives, an honest fit table (portal and vergabe fit; Forgejo is the first confidential case; openbao-admin, coulomb.social and informed-decision-approver do not fit 1.0), and known limits. Examples: Forgejo (checked against the accepted request) and a public portal. The validator gained when / required_when conditions and provider discovery. 43 tests pass. ops-mason's and ops-warden's sections are drafted in the type. Their owners review them in MASON-WP-0010-T01 and WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 before acknowledgment (T05).

id: NK-WP-0048-T05
status: done
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T04, MASON-WP-0010-T01, WARDEN-WP-0044-T01]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3d987d3d-0797-538b-86e4-51185a327ae2"

T05 — Acknowledge the type through informed-decision

Prepare the Decision Memo from the type's README and type.yaml and submit it through informed-decision's production intake. On acknowledgment the type moves to acknowledged.

2026-10-08: Decision Memo prepared. Hub decision e418263e-a71f-4f01-a970-c87c9e187c09. security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/: packet.md (question, one act, what acknowledging does not do, the shape, alternatives, attended steps, limits, evidence), build_intake.py and the built intake.json (memo class decision-record, review group net-kingdom-admins, resolves the hub decision on answer). The envelope passes informed-decision's own validate_submission. Queuing it is an attended operator step, a write inside the production dispatcher pod:

kubectl -n state-hub exec -i deploy/state-hub-memo-dispatch -- \
  python -m api.services.memo_dispatch --queue /data/private enqueue --envelope /dev/stdin \
  < security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/intake.json

The answer then appears for review in informed-decision.

2026-10-08: queued by the founder (pending, queued) after one refusal: the first envelope's idempotency key was not State Hub's stable state-hub.<decision>.<memo> form, and the builder now validates against both sides. The dispatcher delivered it to informed-decision (ledger 7 → 8 delivered). T05 waits for the founder's answer in informed-decision, which resolves hub decision e418263e.

2026-10-08: ops-mason's review (MASON-WP-0010-T01) folded into the type, still 1.0 proposed: secret_ref is no longer a parameter, the type derives platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}; policies are workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso and workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}, each with a templated body (read on that one data path); new openbao_role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id} (Kubernetes auth, ESO service account, 15m, no default policy); catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client; the two rollback steps on the KV path collapse into one metadata delete. The schema and validator now require a body on policy and role items. 105 tests pass. Two consequences: the delivered memo describes the type before these changes (a case-set custody reference, two differently named policies, no ESO role), so the founder answers on a superseded shape unless the memo is re-sent; and Forgejo's custody path moves from the accepted request's proposed platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client to platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, which key-cape (KEY-WP-0038) and railiance-apps (RAPPS-WP-0016-T02) need to adopt in T06. ops-warden's review (WARDEN-WP-0044-T01) is still in progress.

2026-10-08: revised memo nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r2 built (packet.md, intake.json, packet sha256:af6435e2…); it states that it supersedes the first memo and passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation. It needs a new memo id because the dispatcher refuses new content under a delivered idempotency key (idempotency_conflict). Queuing it is the same attended step as above. Both memos serve hub decision e418263e; the first answer resolves it, so the first memo must not stay open: an accept on it would acknowledge the superseded shape, and a decline would resolve the decision against r2. Close it with return (a reviewer verb that requests a new revision and does not resolve the hub decision; only accept and decline do), commenting that r2 supersedes it, then answer r2. withdraw exists in the vocabulary but is not offered to reviewers, and lifecycle revise only applies to lifecycle-registered memos, not intake-delivered ones.

2026-10-09: the founder reports r2 enqueued and the first memo returned. At close, hub decision e418263e still showed open (not verified whether r2 was answered or the answer is still in transit; the dispatcher ledger was not read). ops-warden's review (WARDEN-WP-0044-T01, ops-warden history/2026-10-08-oidc-rp-follow-through-review.md, d470f2e) arrived at 21:25, before r2 was built, and is not in r2. Required before WARDEN-WP-0044-T02: R1 a per-step lane (missing: identity-provisioner caller credential, railiance-platform broker grant), R2 canon meaning of warden_executes: true (caller proxy, caller identity, no standing ops-warden token; ADR-0002), R3 a per-step value_handling. Refinements R4 (one type-level catalog lane instead of a per-case entry, which conflicts with ops-mason's item 5), R5 (ESO Ready gate before bind-env), R6 (exact accepted memberships), R7 (mfa-pinned and secret-delivered checks). Next: if r2 was accepted, fold R1-R3 and R5-R7 in as a follow-up and settle R4 between ops-warden and ops-mason before T06; if not, hold r2, fold them in and build r3. key-cape and railiance-apps were told about Forgejo's new custody path.

2026-10-09: r2 was not answered (hub decision e418263e open; dispatcher 9 delivered), so r2 is held and r3 replaces it. ops-warden withdrew R4 for R4′ (message a66a9204): one catalog entry per case with its body templated in the type. Folded in:

• Canon section 3: a narrow meaning of warden_executes: true (caller proxy, caller identity, no standing credential; ops-warden ADR-0002), plus per-step lane, value_handling and an optional ready_check. A catalog entry body is now required, like policy and role bodies.
• Schema and validator enforce all of these.
• The type: lanes identity-provisioner-groups and keycape-client-secret-generate (both new) and key-cape-oidc-login; mint-secret is generated_in_custody; a Ready gate on deliver-secret; ensure-groups adds exactly the accepted case's memberships; new checks secret-delivered and mfa-pinned; the catalog-entry body follows R4′.
• 110 tests pass.

Memo r3 (nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r3, packet sha256:726dfc01…) passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation. The founder queues it with the same command, returns r2 with a comment that r3 supersedes it, then answers r3.

Prerequisites for T06, not for T05:

• the two new lanes, each through its owner;
• a founder-approved rollout of an identity-provisioner image containing 630ebfd (the deployed one is main-6c4fcaf from 2026-09-24, without /v1/groups/ensure).

ops-mason's request to create LLDAP group fluid-telegram-operators (message 259ec26d) was answered: not possible from here by that path; the founder creates it in the LLDAP admin UI.

2026-10-09: ops-warden finished its side of WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 (message 58d33f40, commit 0e7ceb8): the revised type conforms to warden case check-type, with no further changes asked of the type. This acknowledges that review. Its later addendum R8 (message af274783, ops-warden history/2026-10-08-oidc-rp-follow-through-review.md) showed that lane identity-provisioner-groups cannot exist as declared: the provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods, so a caller-proxy lane would act as user-engine. Taken option 1 (ops-warden's recommendation): ensure-groups and its rollback are attended, in the register-client session on key-cape-oidc-login, run inside the provisioner pod; no token is read. Option 2 (an operator credential of its own on the provisioner) stays open for a later version. warden case check-type now reports only keycape-client-secret-generate (railiance-platform) as missing. 89 tests pass.

Hub decision e418263e was still open, so memo r4 (nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4, packet sha256:452ea421…) replaces r3; it passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation. The founder queues it with the same command, returns r2/r3 if still open with a comment that r4 supersedes them, then answers r4.

Prerequisites for T06 are now: lane keycape-client-secret-generate (railiance-platform), and a founder-approved rollout of an identity-provisioner image containing 630ebfd.

2026-10-09: done. The founder queued r4 (pending, queued), returned r3 as superseded and accepted r4 in informed-decision. informed-decision's hub write-back is off in production (INFD_HUB_WRITEBACK unset), so net-kingdom resolved hub decision e418263e from the founder's report, naming memo r4 in the rationale. The type is acknowledged; it becomes implemented with T06.

id: NK-WP-0048-T06
status: wait
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T05, NK-WP-0048-T08, NK-WP-0048-T09, NK-WP-0048-T12, NK-WP-0048-T13, NK-WP-0048-T14, NK-WP-0048-T15, NK-WP-0048-T16, NK-WP-0048-T17, NK-WP-0048-T18, NK-WP-0048-T20, MASON-WP-0010-T03, WARDEN-WP-0044-T03]
blocking_reason: "Type1.2 architecture has a confirmed source-only founder acknowledgment; canonical1.1 remains unchanged/default and the1.2 reference case stays proposed. Needs explicit version selection/reference-source integration without normal admission bypass, closed owner adapters plus global/native receipt verifier (WARDEN-WP-0044-T03), independently verified six-object structural materialization and CCR42 claims/created-only provenance, exact broker/case/source reconciliation, then separately authorized native mint/delivery and attended registry/consumer verification. Source acknowledgment, a bundle or local tests do not prove implemented/materialized/live status."
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "d9b26bcf-a7c6-59a2-92a0-f913d76a203c"

T06 — First KnownSecurityCase: Forgejo

Write security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml from the parameters the founder accepted in KEY-WP-0038-T01 (key-cape/docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml), so that acceptance carries over as the case acceptance. ops-mason materializes it; ops-warden follows through and verifies it. The type becomes implemented once this reference case is live.

This replaces the hand-built path proposed for KEY-WP-0038-T02.

2026-10-09: case written, security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml, status accepted: the example's parameters plus the founder's 2026-10-08 acceptance of the key-cape request (owner and founder), with the custody-path derivation covered by the type's acknowledgment (memo r4). It validates and renders (plan execution.permitted: false; three attended steps on key-cape-oidc-login); it needs --allow-unimplemented until it is live, since it is the case that makes the type implemented. A test keeps it equal to the type's example. Still open before it runs: ops-mason renders and builds it (MASON-WP-0010-T02, T03, unblocked by T05), ops-warden plans and runs it (WARDEN-WP-0044-T02, T03), railiance-platform's keycape-client-secret-generate lane (asked by ops-mason 789feb39 and ops-warden d9f889b1, both unread), and a founder-approved identity-provisioner rollout containing 630ebfd.

2026-10-09: identity-provisioner rolled out, founder-approved in session: main-630ebfd (sha256:bafb4860…, built by the image workflow) replaces main-6c4fcaf (sha256:ffacd5d7…; only change: 630ebfd, additive). Applied with kubectl set image on the Deployment only (generation 17 → 18, 1/1 Ready); the file's Service, NetworkPolicies and Ingress were not reapplied. Verified in the pod: ensure_service_groups and revoke_service_groups present, /readyz 200; no token used, no group changed. Rollback: kubectl -n sso set image deploy/identity-provisioner provisioner=forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/identity-provisioner@sha256:ffacd5d790a5b7800e0535f3aa95b7de52c7a68e4f575b9192c3e1622fa672c2. The pin in sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml follows.

2026-10-09: ops-warden closed WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 and shipped warden case plan (T02, message 06303d1d); the accepted Forgejo case is refused until ops-mason materializes it, and a materialized copy plans cleanly once keycape-client-secret-generate exists. Its observation that bind-env carries a literal KEYCAPE_<CLIENT_ID>_CLIENT_SECRET: the validator now renders a {param:env} format spec (upper case, - as _, as keycape-client.py derives the name) and rejects unknown specs, and follow-through and rollback text is now checked for unknown placeholders too (patch-level, canon section 6). The type keeps the literal until ops-warden's planner (text.format) renders the spec as well; asked of ops-warden. 53 tests pass.

2026-10-10: ops-warden rendered {param:env} in warden case plan (23ba584, message c1df14b7; other specs and !conversion refused). The type adopts it as a 1.0 patch (canon section 6): bind-env and its rollback now read KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET. ops-mason reports the Forgejo case rendered and built (message 1ebddae9; CCR drafts handed to railiance-platform), so T06 now waits on the platform apply, the mint-secret lane and the attended register-client session.

2026-10-10: key-cape adopted the type's custody path (key-cape ab5cccd, message 88a4559c): docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml and KEY-WP-0038-T02 name platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, field CLIENT_SECRET, delivered as sso/keycape-forgejo-client through external-secrets-keycape-forgejo, and the forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client proposal is withdrawn. This matches the type and the Forgejo example; no change needed here.

2026-10-10: key-cape's type-composition review (key-cape 6038483, message 8e5ed5f6) found the composition sound with two blocking findings, taken as a 1.0 patch (stricter validation and documentation, canon section 6): R1, redirect URIs now refuse ? and # in the type pattern and in keycape-client.py's REDIRECT (KeyCape refuses ? at startup and the single replica would stop); R2, allowed_scopes always includes groups, the renderer refuses access_groups without it, and access_groups now says the consumer enforces the gate because KeyCape has none; R3, mfa_required "false" means the per-user privacyIDEA policy; R4, register-client's justification records the restart for every client, the quiet window, and that the rendered registry must pass KeyCape's client validation before it. The accepted Forgejo case and both examples still validate; 116 tests pass. Open, needs a decision: R2's verification step that the consumer enforces the group gate is a new verification step, hence 1.1 (minor), and the validator pins cases to the exact type version, so the accepted 1.0 Forgejo case would need re-pinning. Also open with key-cape: a KeyCape entry point that validates a rendered client registry without starting the server; until then keycape-client.py mirrors the redirect rule.

2026-10-10: founder go for 1.1, so no 1.0 run overlaps. The type adds verification consumer-enforces-groups, and hand-over now requires the consumer to enforce access_groups (minor, canon section 6; risk class unchanged, no new acknowledgment; history in the type README). The accepted Forgejo case and both examples are re-pinned to oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1 before any apply; the acknowledgment intake keeps @1.0 as the record of what was acknowledged. ops-mason's build and ops-warden's case-ref digest predate this and need a re-render.

2026-10-10: ops-mason re-rendered the Forgejo case from @1.1 (message 22c6bba6; plan digest af1f4f81…, no collisions) and rebuilt the bundle. The rendered OpenBao objects are identical to 1.0, so the already applied CCR-2026-0041 stands; 1.1 changes only consumer-side steps. key-cape shipped keycape check-config (c528daa, message a7b0aeff): KeyCape's startup checks without secret values, including the new duplicate-clientId rule. keycape-client.py --check-config <binary> now runs it on the live and the proposed registry, fed on stdin, and apply refuses a proposed registry that fails; register-client's entry point names the option (1.1 patch). The deployed image predates c528daa, so the binary is built from key-cape source for now. Before the next KeyCape rollout (Forgejo register-client or the CCR-2026-0018 window), the attended operator runs inspect --check-config so the live registry is checked too.

id: NK-WP-0048-T07
status: wait
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T06]
blocking_reason: "The next types follow once the first one is proven end to end."
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "c3c9c3ae-4f23-5ba7-9e6f-e63bcf29b9f7"

T07 — Queue the next types

From the T02 ranking, open the next type drafts (likely the confidential service client and the workload KV read lane), each to be acknowledged on its own. Record which existing hand-built instances get adopted as cases, without rewriting them in place.

id: NK-WP-0048-T08
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "8e519082-dc8b-5e46-b660-03d03e55dcf6"

T08 — identity-provisioner: ensure service-access groups

The type's ensure-groups step calls identity-provisioner groups ensure --groups <list> --members <group=user+user;...>. The provisioner already has idempotent _ensure_group and _add_group, but exposes only tenant-scoped operations. Add the general operation (create if absent, add the listed memberships, never remove others), its rollback (remove only this case's memberships), tests, and the ops-warden route for its service identity.

2026-10-08: done. identity-provisioner/provisioner.py gained ensure_service_groups (POST /v1/groups/ensure) and revoke_service_groups (POST /v1/groups/revoke), behind the existing service-token check. Names matching tenant*, netkingdom-* and lldap_* are reserved; members must already exist; everything is validated before any change; memberships are read back before success; nothing else is ever removed; groups are deleted only when asked and empty. 7 new tests (39 in the provisioner suite). The type's ensure-groups step and its rollback now name these endpoints. The ops-warden route for the provisioner's service token belongs to WARDEN-WP-0044-T01.

id: NK-WP-0048-T09
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "0ee12dfc-8260-5038-bd39-cc7fb4113be0"

T09 — The keycape-client entry point and its declaration

Planned first as key-cape KEY-WP-0038-T04. Moved here because the machinery a live registration needs already lives in net-kingdom, where KeyCape is deployed (sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/): the contained kubectl, the cluster-identity pin and the issuer pin. A copy in key-cape would drift.

2026-10-08: done. sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py derives the KeyCape client record from a case (client-from-case). It adds or removes exactly one client with the existing safeguards (byte-preserving merge, exact match or refuse, shared-reference refusal, compare-and-swap, read-back, contained errors), requires the Deployment env binding first for confidential clients, and requires the case acceptance record for apply instead of a per-client founder decision id. 15 tests, including a regression showing that the vergabe case reproduces its hand-built registration exactly; all 71 helper tests pass. Declaration capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml (contract PASS, maturity: implemented) replaces key-cape's draft. The type now pins it, and for confidential clients adds deliver-secret (delivery from custody into the sso namespace) and bind-env (Deployment env), attended in the same session as register-client. The per-client helpers stay until their clients are adopted as cases.

2026-10-10 — NetKingdom owner review of the execution seam, source only: ops-warden/docs/security-case-execution-proposal.md SHA256 78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c was reviewed against INTENT, SecurityCase canon, acknowledged type1.1, current case and owner source. docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.md supports the closed adapter/receipt direction with explicit versioned schema, structural materialization provenance, unchanged caller/session boundaries, safe CAS reconciliation and exact-created-object rollback requirements. This is owner review, not approval. Supporting file digests are in the adjacent sources JSON.

Current source exposes a circular wait: ops-mason T03 waits on mint while Warden and the broker refuse a non-materialized case. Structural acceptance therefore needs its own native pinned receipt before mint, not a successful mint before materialized. The platform broker additionally pins type1.0 while Forgejo is accepted at1.1; platform-owner alignment and tests are required, not an unchecked version bypass. T06 remains wait. No case/type lifecycle status, grant, authority or live runtime changed by this review. A proposed informed-decision would adopt the source contract only; native materialization and execution acceptance stay distinct.

Final proposal re-review: staged Warden proposal SHA256 78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c adds only the explicitly local reducer appendix, not an accepted wire protocol or executor. The exact-final review and sources JSON supersede the earlier 1035f049... proposal review. Platform staged the exact type1.1 broker correction with ten fake-backend subprocess checks (script SHA256 9576cd211cfc06526ec4cc9bd0a5b06f0f59287a68931bb2d6e3592a951ddc7d). The next source work is the versioned closed adapter/receipt/materialization contract, not another relaxation of the broker's status gate. Native work still requires installed broker provenance, structural reader receipts, exact new materialized-case bytes, caller grant/session revocation and verified execution. No installed/native acceptance is inferred from that staged correction.

2026-10-11 — new source-only type1.2 architecture acknowledgment: Confirmed native founder ACCEPT of infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1@1 at06:47:39Z, approval8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765. Exact frozen packet 0b377d647ca748cd03c92f9792396412048055d4bde9f7bb06ff6d413f7acd68 and submission 585cee731de30d2b37883a57abfd9eb32f023ee694e8d911989109d5caf80569; native receipt retained in docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/. The complete acknowledged1.2 source package is isolated under security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party; default loader and current accepted1.1 case remain untouched because load_type is single-version. The new proposed1.2 case is NOT accepted/materialized/live and has no acceptance fields. Actual reference-migration design approval is a separate Apps owner receipt; no1.1 approval is inherited. Source-recording review/test proof and exact next gates are in docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md. T06 remains wait and T07 remains its existing dependent task; type is NOT implemented and no first-case/native grant or broader workplan finish is asserted.

2026-10-11 — bounded explicit version selection source preparation for T06: The validator now offers optional exact version_roots/--version-root VERSION=PATH selection with duplicate/mismatch/traversal/symlink refusal and no fallback. The default1.1 source and historicalacceptedcase hashes/ordinaryrefusal/preparation render stayunchanged; actual1.1 is acknowledged, not implemented. Acknowledged1.2 ordinaryadmission also refuses; optionalpreparation remains nonexecuting.43local validatorchecks pass and original1.1 CLIrenderbytes match exactly. Makerproof: docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json. FormalNetownerreview/reference-source integration and all existing native adapter, provenance/broker/materialization/attendedproof gates remain; T06 stayswait, no new residual or firstcase/typeimplementation/native grant is inferred.

2026-10-16 — isolated source preparation for T06 (canonical integration pending): Added check-evidence to the existing validator CLI. It reuses exact version selection and ordinary type/case/render admission, checks actual Mason structural request source/inventory/projection pins and reads actual Warden journal rows read-only. Successful rows require exact type-declared descriptors and attempt/ revocation fingerprints. Existing acknowledged types without machine descriptors remain plan-only. The compatibility result never claims authenticated native completion: Request and journal fingerprints are not portable native evidence. Owner authentication/status binding and actual native gates remain unresolved; T06/T07 statuses and both type/case lifecycles remain unchanged. No dispatch, credential access or authority expansion is introduced. See tool README for the existing owner protocol boundaries and source integration tests.

Concrete next Warden owner integration: current Executor.admit refuses every case parameter whose sensitivity is not public/operational, so browser redirect_uris, allowed_scopes, client_type, mfa_required (and 1.2 consumer_namespace) fail after otherwise prepared admission. The sensitive classification is a security-change review level, not secret content. The Warden owner must validate through NetKingdom's existing exact-version case/type validator, then project only descriptor-declared safe target metadata; do not remove the credential/value refusal or copy complete parameters into journals. Actual owner descriptor acknowledgment and independent evidence admission remain prerequisites, with normal admission still refusing unimplemented types.

T10 — Source compatibility checker for Mason and Warden evidence

id: NK-WP-0048-T10
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "4b06ca97-c1e4-5680-bf22-ab75ab1646a4"

Completed 2026-10-16 in published source c31d21ba. The read-only check-evidence command checks the actual Mason structural request and Warden journal source protocols against an exact version/render. Independent source review passed 103 tests at that checkpoint. It always reports native completion false and execution prohibited. Fixtures and local journal fingerprints do not provide authenticated owner/native evidence. This records completed source scope previously described under T06; it does not duplicate native acceptance credit.

T11 — Validate the optional machine-descriptor pin contract

id: NK-WP-0048-T11
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "ef2a0119-f59e-5e45-9519-115da9df7b85"

Completed 2026-10-16. Reproduced the JSON schema rejecting a valid execution_descriptors map while the Python validator accepted malformed maps. The schema now supports the existing Warden optional exact-byte pin map; semantic validation binds keys to declared steps, bounds the map and checks digest shape. The direct evidence API refuses malformed maps before accessing them. Twenty-one new checks and all 127 affected source checks passed. No current type/case bytes, status, owner descriptors or native acceptance changed. Source evidence and publication receipt: Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-acceptance-next/.

T12 — Prepare NetKingdom-owned attended step adapters

id: NK-WP-0048-T12
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "7ce4eee3-cd47-55a9-bfa5-4f1835d4d6fd"

Owner: NetKingdom. Retained scope: prepare bounded attended Deployment env, config verification and restart/readiness steps around the existing helpers. Next action: identify exact current entry points and their revision/readback contracts, then implement fixed source-pinned callbacks or receipt-only attended steps. Completion requires positive/refusal checks, exact target/source pins and uncertainty behavior without acquiring user-engine runtime identity or exposing registry/client secrets. Existing caller/session, cluster/issuer, CAS/readback and status-only output boundaries remain mandatory.

2026-10-16 task refinement: the original broad adapter scope is split into T13 (completed registration source candidate), T14 (group creation provenance), T15 (durable registration recovery) and T16 (descriptor/artifact selection and owner review). This preserves T12's task ID and Hub UUID while giving each remaining outcome an owner and completion gate. T06 now names every source dependency; its native/reference lifecycle acceptance scope remains unchanged. Completion of any source task supplies no Warden, Platform or Apps assent and no native execution authority.

T13 — Prepare the fixed registration adapter source candidate

id: NK-WP-0048-T13
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "b264c10b-565c-5d29-b788-03cf5fbd2883"

Completed 2026-10-16, source implementation and synthetic fixture proof only. Added an injection-only adapter around actual keycape-client.run: fixed case/principal/human/lane/source/acceptance binding, existing CAS/readback, metadata-only owner evidence and per-attempt parent-session revocation boundary. The descriptor source composition pins the exact checker executable digest alongside adapter/helper source. Creation-only rollback authenticates its creation receipt and refuses changed postcreation UID/resourceVersion; pre-existing clients confer no rollback authority. Missing readback, evidence, revocation or process-local creation provenance cannot become retry-safe success.

Evidence: Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-adapter-next/ R3 candidate, explicit patch and postimages, retained R1 rejected custody finding and R2 revision, and 36 passing source checks (16 new, 20 existing). Three checks use actual Warden kernel admission/dispatch/rollback with published Warden d97652a3bb5fa733b063d71a1b74068efcccf572 producer pins unchanged. Owner trust, descriptor/type/case and Kubernetes objects remain synthetic fixtures. This records a completed source deliverable, not independent review, publication, type acknowledgment, exercised procedure, identity admission or native browser acceptance. Independent root source review: Custodian browser-adapter-next/coordinator-review-r3.json. Source integration and normal publication/synchronization receipts: Custodian browser-adapter-next/canonical-integration.json. These receipts supply no other-owner assent or native authority.

Source publication: 0775c2bfa41af236301155bb5a69bbf088bdf823, independently reviewed by the Custodian coordinator before integration. The required initial projection and ordinary UUID writeback both completed with zero failures and zero automation errors. Generated-only brief commits were refused by the normal hook; exact pre-existing staged/working brief bytes were restored. The separate canonical integration receipt retains those refusals and projection evidence. Native admission and all other-owner acceptance remain open.

T14 — Admit governed group rollback against native owner boundaries

id: NK-WP-0048-T14
status: todo
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T20]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "fce95440-a25b-5f27-8ef3-a3d182099113"

Owner: NetKingdom. Next action: specify a CNPG-backed journal through the existing rapp-postgres database-per-consumer contract, or obtain an explicit scoped governed exception to accepted ADR-0015 before any production SQLite proposal. The implemented SQLite backend supplies local/disposable proof only; a new PVC is not an admitted production path. Prepare the native writer-isolation contract for the existing identity-provisioner, and bind the existing protected owner callbacks to the accepted case/source/principal, per-attempt evidence and session revocation. Identify the actual deployment and custody owner through the existing ADR-0015 routes before proposing a rollout; an existing service token, caller-supplied JSON or provenance receipt establishes no new authorization.

2026-10-17 refinement: T20 extracts the completed durable provenance source candidate and disposable LLDAP compatibility proof from this task. The source returns exact creation inventories, retains prestate/intents across process restart and refuses detected shared-member/group-identity drift. Its publication and projection are still pending the coordinator's separate integration receipt. This narrows T14 without closing its original externally referenced native gate. The task remains todo because preparation of the native contracts can proceed; no missing owner assent is represented as received.

Completion still requires independently reviewed/admitted ADR-0015-conforming CNPG storage (or an explicit governed exception), backup/lost-store recovery and migration of legacy requests; a native writer-isolation/fencing or provider CAS/version contract that closes external writer races and remove/re-add ABA; exact case/source/principal and current native object bindings for protected callbacks; and actual per-attempt evidence, revocation and readback/refusal verification through the existing owner paths. Only independently retained confirmed creations may be undone. Every pre-existing/shared group and membership must remain preserved; unresolved intents never expire into retry authority. The disposable fixture supplies none of these native custody, authorization, owner-acceptance or production claims.

T15 — Define authenticated recovery for lost registration process state

id: NK-WP-0048-T15
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "1b825705-4848-5edc-832f-b1622cd9bdb7"

Owner: NetKingdom for registration state, with Warden owning kernel evidence admission. Next action: select the exact existing owner evidence holder/readback contract and define authenticated lookup for the original creation attempt. Completion requires restart/lost-receipt fixtures that bind case/source/principal, original created-only provenance and current native revision before any undo; uncertain outcomes remain non-replayable. The T13 adapter deliberately refuses post-restart rollback and installs no reconciliation callback. A new broker or unverified JSON receipt is not a recovery contract. Actual evidence-holder acceptance and attended recovery remain separately authorized native work.

T16 — Select and review the actual machine descriptor composition

id: NK-WP-0048-T16
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "200bf500-5084-5ae7-be26-3033fe1f296e"

Owner: NetKingdom for descriptor/type source and exact checker artifact; Warden independently owns global provenance/admission. Next action: obtain review of the exact checker source/artifact proposed by T17 and identify native owner evidence/ session callback contracts, then assemble the complete step descriptor set and a proposed explicit type version selection. T13's historical descriptor retains its synthetic checker; T17 supplies an artifact-bound proposal, not admission. Completion requires separate owner source review of exact machine descriptors, artifact/source/config pins, normal type/version admission and independent evidence-verification boundaries. Warden d97652a refreshes producer validator pins for NetKingdom 015694ee; it does not attest T13's new adapter. Pinning any machine descriptor into an acknowledged type is a separately reviewed source change. Platform owns structural/mint/broker/delivery evidence; Apps owns actual consumer login/group enforcement. Neither their assent nor native acceptance is supplied by this task.

2026-10-16 source checkpoint: T19 below extracts the completed per-attempt executable snapshot implementation and reviewed fixture proof. T16 retains native executable storage/custody, exact owner evidence/session callbacks, complete descriptor composition and ordinary type/version admission. The successor descriptor/source pins are proposed only; the earlier descriptor history is preserved. T14 group provenance and T15 durable restart/recovery remain independent open requirements. No native acceptance is counted here.

T17 — Build and exercise the exact offline config-checker artifact

id: NK-WP-0048-T17
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "8c3e4baa-a218-5996-af9e-fe1153a46dac"

Completed 2026-10-16, isolated artifact/source fixture proof only. Built the existing key-cape/src/cmd/keycape command from published clean source revision 3c71226a1a7b8a2bdb710e9c497e1a1f7f8a3987, source tree f0010b9cab17dbc3a787628a29657d98b900320f, with cached Go 1.23.0, CGO disabled, Linux/amd64 v1, trimmed paths, disabled VCS stamping and offline read-only module selection. The full retained closure pins 108 source files, 9876 toolchain files and ten used module source directories. Three isolated build locations produced identical 13633409-byte artifacts: sha256:be37738fe1c08259fb4f9ca0daf0f9301bfffc237e5bb38435525dfbf11ccff5.

Eight disposable checks use the actual executable and maintained helper/kernel, with complete synthetic configs and a minimal environment: add/created-only removal, normal pinned producer admission, rollback, lost-readback uncertainty, stale revisions, substituted checker refusal, invalid startup config and missing secret-env refusal. No checker stub or producer-pin override remains. The artifact-bound descriptor proposal is sha256:76b1153d188062ece53fcd5e8d35290fdbfd02a69dd79d4b001fc42781afcdc3. Evidence: Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-checker-artifact-next/. The first two build attempts succeeded but their closure collection failed; both failures are retained, as is refusal of the older incomplete synthetic fixture. No production config, credentials or cluster mutation was used.

This extracts completed build/fixture scope from T16 without claiming KeyCape owner endorsement, native checker selection/storage custody, acknowledged type integration, native evidence/session callbacks or attended browser acceptance. T16 retains exact owner review and composition/admission scope. The attended registration procedure remains unexercised.

T18 — Make checker input and executable selection deterministic

id: NK-WP-0048-T18
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "9c45da71-fb4c-5f20-9065-90f448f37c64"

Completed 2026-10-16, isolated source correction and real-artifact fixture proof only; independent integration/publication remain separately recorded. KeyCape source review identified non-secret KEYCAPE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL_URL and KEYCAPE_BROWSER_LOGOUT_URL overrides in config.Load. The original helper inherited ambient environment, allowing valid supplied configuration to be rejected or invalid supplied URL configuration to be admitted. A bare relative checker filename could also be replaced by PATH lookup after the adapter had hashed the selected local file. All three counterexamples are retained against the unchanged predecessor.

The existing helper now resolves the selected checker file to an absolute path and passes an explicit empty subprocess environment. Three opt-in real-checker regressions verify both URL-verdict directions and relative-file selection under a non-checker PATH decoy. All 39 affected checks pass with the exact supplied artifact, as do 11 real-artifact helper/kernel scenarios. Source evidence: Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-checker-environment-r2/. Historical descriptors remain retained; the helper correction changes successor source-composition pins and requires their separate review/admission. An absolute path is not immutable custody and does not eliminate file replacement races; T16 retains native executable storage/custody and callback/type admission. No production configuration, credentials or cluster mutation was used.

Source integration and publication: 916ba4b33e03179274d03b78bd898a4843e8653f, following independent Custodian source review in browser-checker-environment-r2/coordinator-review.json. The ordinary protected projection pass assigned T17/T18 UUIDs with zero failures and zero automation errors; generated-only brief commit refusal is retained. The exact prior staged/working brief bytes were restored. Final source/publication/ projection evidence is retained in Custodian browser-checker-environment-r2/ canonical-integration.json. These source receipts do not admit native executable custody, owner callbacks, acknowledged type changes or browser identities.

T19 — Bind checker execution to verified immutable attempt bytes

id: NK-WP-0048-T19
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "f50fdcd1-00be-5c3c-be0c-345aa2126032"

Completed 2026-10-16, independently reviewed source implementation and synthetic fixture proof only. The registration adapter now opens a bounded regular checker artifact without following its terminal symlink, verifies the reviewed digest, and snapshots the exact bytes into a write/grow/shrink/seal-removal-sealed Linux memfd before helper access. Live and proposed config checks execute that same fd through procfs with the existing empty environment; the fd closes on completion or failure. Unsupported snapshot/seal/exec policy refuses through the existing parent-session revocation and uncertainty boundaries. The earlier unbounded pre-snapshot path read was removed during independent review; actual adapter symlink/FIFO/oversize refusal tests verify helper access never starts.

Evidence: Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/browser-resume-r1/, including exact base/preimages/postimages/patch, proposed descriptor, coordinator source review and canonical integration receipt. Independent Custodian checks passed 49 affected source tests and 12 actual Go checker/helper/kernel scenarios; the sets overlap and are not separate acceptance counts. Existing published Warden d97652a producer pins remain unchanged. The exact KeyCape artifact remains sha256:be37738fe1c08259fb4f9ca0daf0f9301bfffc237e5bb38435525dfbf11ccff5. The predecessor path-replacement refusal and the first expanded reopened-fd test failure are retained; the latter fixture was corrected to restore write mode before independently proving seals block reopened-fd writes and shared mmap.

This source task adds no native owner custody, callback, evidence trust, type acknowledgment, credential access, consumer sign-in or rollback acceptance. Executable memfds, Linux seals and usable procfs are explicit runtime dependencies and still require native admission. This is an extracted source outcome from T16, not completion of T16; T12/T14/T15 and all external-owner gates remain open.

Publication verified by the coordinator after the source worker usage limit: 8790dd18ae83c4651ef3d1d923312a118a5b436b is the actual remote main revision. All five canonical source hashes match the reviewed packet. Normal synchronization completed with zero failures/automation errors; all 19 task statuses match the projection. T19's assigned UUID is retained. The original staged and working brief bytes were restored and independently compared. The exact source, projection and publication checks are in Custodian browser-resume-r1/canonical-integration.json. Native acceptance remains open under T16 and the other named owner tasks.

T20 — Prepare durable group provenance and prove disposable LLDAP compatibility

id: NK-WP-0048-T20
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "863fcbdb-e246-51ba-87ca-a2f44d01d6f8"

Completed 2026-10-17, source candidate preparation and bounded synthetic compatibility proof only. This extracts evidenced implementation/fixture scope from T14; T14 retains native storage, writer isolation, protected callback and owner-acceptance gates. Source integration/publication and State Hub projection are pending the coordinator's separate receipts; no revision or task UUID is invented here.

The existing identity-provisioner group ensure/revoke interface now has a reviewed candidate for a bounded owner-private SQLite journal, proven only in local/disposable use. The initial storage instructions wrongly suggested a native persistent-volume path; source review against accepted ADR-0015 corrected them before publication. Production SQLite-on-a-PVC is not admitted: T14 retains CNPG/rapp-postgres storage admission or a separately governed exception. The local journal saves complete prestate and intent before each attempted directory mutation, inventories only confirmed new groups/memberships, binds original ensure idempotency and correlation to the exact request digest, and refuses unsigned caller inventories or legacy broad revoke requests. Replays never recreate removed state. Missing, replaced or untrusted storage and missing intent rows stop execution; definite before-mutation refusals retain evidence without stranding unrelated valid work. Interrupted writes/readback remain unresolved across reopening. Revoke validates all targeted native ids and complete member postimages before destructive work, removes only confirmed creations and never deletes a preexisting empty group. Server/configuration wiring, image-copy closure and owner storage/request migration instructions are included. The existing endpoint's caller authentication remains the existing boundary, not a new grant.

The candidate was prepared against NetKingdom 878abc93588e12b6da1bac055cfbb3abb8d7adf1; exact source patch digest sha256:1f3f3ca94c46dadac8f24896053d4d23179de795e50a24298a0cfbcc46cca30e. The independent Custodian review passed all 65 provisioner checks. The earlier 62-check candidate, two independent-review findings and subsequent fixes remain retained rather than overwritten. Seven additional fixture-plan checks exercise the preparation boundary; these counts overlap the same candidate and do not measure task-completion percentage or independent acceptance.

A separately reviewed bounded fixture then exercised the exact candidate against cached pinned disposable LLDAP and Python images, through actual GraphQL. All 14 closed compatibility/containment oracles passed: exact creation inventory, separate-process SQLite reopening/replay/revoke, complete preexisting directory preservation including empty/shared groups and memberships, refusal of shared membership drift, retained uncertainty after a lost response following a real addition, and refusal of unknown/cross-case receipt bindings. The fixture used only newly generated synthetic users/passwords/key material in private tmpfs, with a network-none anchor and shared loopback helper, no host ports/mounts, no image pulls and no production or actual credential contact. The coordinator's safe receipt reports both exact owned containers absent after cleanup; final independent cleanup verification remains the coordinator's integration duty.

Evidence: Custodian docs/changes/netkingdom-target-2026-10-16/group-provenance-r1/, including exact source base/pre/postimages, patch/manifest, independent review and retained refinements. Native fixture manifest sha256:8a0514f5f14137355972400cd4852f48c892316d28e3abd3c86635d7cb81eef2; retained safe result native-fixture/execution-result.json (original /tmp/nk48-groups-native-review-5pywb19z/result.json). The source task supplies no native owner assent, production rollout, protected session/evidence callbacks, ordinary type admission or consumer login proof. LLDAP has no conditional membership mutation or generation token here: exact readback cannot exclude ABA or a concurrent external writer, so T14 remains open.