Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 4515@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 0bf96127-6e04-41be-bfda-d11717c3f354
6.6 KiB
Crisis custody list
NK-WP-0054-T07. Drafted 2026-10-24 from repository documents and the founder's statements
that day. This list holds no secret value, ever. It names what unlocks recovery, who
holds it, where, and whether using it needs the very services being recovered. Anything
the repository cannot establish is marked TO CONFIRM; the founder confirms each one.
It belongs with the backup documentation: disaster recovery guide, identity restore drill and Credential Management Standard §4. That standard names the custody categories. This list makes them concrete.
The one rule
For every row, answer: does using this item work when SSO and OpenBao are down? A recovery path that is satisfied only by logging in to something being restored is a circular dependency and is recorded as a gap, not as custody.
Roles used below
| Role | Identity | Used for |
|---|---|---|
| Crisis operator | admin |
Runs recovery and routine validation (founder intent, 2026-10-24) |
| Authorizer | platform-root / king credential |
Break-glass authority from offline custody; nothing routine |
| Developer | tegwick |
Builds and tests tooling; holds no recovery keys |
Items
| # | Item | Unlocks | Holder and location | Works with SSO and OpenBao down? | Last proven use | Gap or action |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Custodian/backup age private key (recipient age1zvry…50syr3tsz, labelled railiance-backup) |
Decrypts the identity backup bundle and the SOPS custody files | Founder, independently held password safe or offline packet (Standard §4) | Yes, offline | Entered by the founder at hidden prompts 2026-10-24 (LLDAP, Authelia, privacyIDEA stages) | TO CONFIRM: number of copies, who else could recover if the founder cannot |
| 2 | Storage Share Backup account app password |
Downloads the protected ciphertext without OpenBao or SSO | Founder, independent custody TO CONFIRM |
Yes, provider is outside the platform | Fresh retrieval 2026-10-24 | One provider copy only; residual risk accepted until 2027-01-31 (G1, NK-WP-0053) |
| 3 | OpenBao unseal shares (2 of 3 required in the restore drill) | Unseals a restored or production OpenBao; with the shares, generate-root can mint a root token for break-glass (ceremony not yet documented) |
Founder as platform-root holds all three shares (single-holder custody: accepted exception, hub decision 37464824, 2026-10-27), in the founder's replicated browser password safe under the kingpath.credentials pseudo-URL entry (confirmed 2026-10-27) |
Yes: the safe is independent of NetKingdom SSO and OpenBao; it depends on the browser vendor's sync account and its own factor | Original shares used in the isolated restore RPF-WP-0064-T07, 2026-10-24 | Single holder = single point of loss (reviewed at NK-WP-0055-T09). The founder holds the initial root token offline (2026-10-27); its validity is checked in the king-path drill (NK-WP-0055-T13) against an isolated restored OpenBao, never production |
| 4 | platform-root / king account and factors |
Final authority; break-glass | Independently held password safe or offline packet (Standard §4; custody doc) | No if used through KeyCape: its login and OTP are validated by the services being recovered | OTP validated against restored privacyIDEA 2026-10-24 (isolated) | TO CONFIRM the offline path that works with SSO down (OpenBao shares, item 3) and record it |
| 5 | Founder admission signing key (SSH, principal bernd) |
Signs attempt and restore admissions | Founder, workstation key; verifier anchor /etc/secrets-engine/admission/allowed_signers |
Yes | Signed the T40 admission 2026-10-23 | TO CONFIRM which identity this key belongs to; the anchor is workstation-bound, so a backup of key and anchor is needed |
| 6 | admin password and OTP token |
Day-to-day platform administration and, per intent, recovery operation | Founder; OTP enrolled 2026-10-24 | No: login and token checks need KeyCape, LLDAP and privacyIDEA | Token not yet in any restored backup; first restore proof after the 2026-10-25 03:45 UTC capture | Same account as the directory bind used by Authelia and privacyIDEA until the split in NK-WP-0054-T05 |
| 7 | pi-admin credentials (privacyIDEA internal admin) |
Token repair and re-enrolment | Founder's replicated browser password safe (confirmed 2026-10-27) | Custody yes (replicated, independent of SSO); use needs a running privacyIDEA | Not yet drilled | Add a pi-admin check to the drill (NK-WP-0053-T04) |
| 8 | make creds-bundle) |
— | — | — | Never drilled; none existed on the workstation | Superseded by the daily identity backup, which carries the current service secrets. make creds-bundle packs only greenfield creds-generate output and stays a greenfield bootstrap step |
| 9 | Operator access to the production host or cluster for a real restore | Applying a restore to production | Cluster: ops-bridge tunnel k3s-api-railiance01 (SSH as tegwick to 92.205.62.239 with a static key file, local port 16444) plus the attended admin kubeconfig ~/.kube/config-railiance01 (client certificate), today on the founder workstation only. Host: Host Europe provider interface with console and rescue access to railiance01 (confirmed 2026-10-27) |
Yes: static key, client certificate and provider console need neither KeyCape nor OpenBao. No for ops-warden SSH certificates (warden's backend is OpenBao) | Cluster path used 2026-10-27 | Founder decision 2026-10-27: an age-encrypted copy of the cluster break-glass material goes to the Storage Share Backup account so it survives workstation loss (NK-WP-0055-T13). Open: runs as tegwick under an agent-labelled actor; provider console never drilled |
Non-secret recovery assets
These need no custody but must be reachable: the published recovery kit on Storage Share
(guide, tools ZIP, checksum; verify the checksum against a trusted copy), the pinned
container images, and a trusted checkout of this repository. TLS for kc.coulomb.social
has no custody: it is reissued through ACME and needs working public DNS and HTTP-01.
Maintenance
- Review at every restore drill (NK-WP-0053), and record the date each item was last proven. An item never proven stays marked as such.
- Loss or suspected exposure of any item goes to its owner's rotation and revocation process (Standard §6); this list rotates nothing.
- A machine-readable, non-secret record with a freshness check, modelled on
tools/custody-record, is proposed in NK-WP-0054-T07. Until then this document is the list.