net-kingdom/workplans/NK-WP-0053-identity-restore-drill-cadence.md
tegwick 73870c5d37 NK-WP-0054, NK-WP-0053-T04: record hub ids
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: sonnet
Assistant-Process: 328925@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 14b795fd-c632-4c01-8d28-e7e490c7b0ed
2026-10-24 19:32:22 +02:00

4.5 KiB

id type title domain repo status flavor owner topic_slug created updated related state_hub_workstream_id
NK-WP-0053 workplan Quarterly isolated identity restore drill infotech net-kingdom active implementation claude netkingdom 2026-10-23 2026-10-23
NK-WP-0049
disaster-control/BackupPolicy.md
7c80ba09-8bd5-540e-8dd3-feb85e201ef3

NK-WP-0053 — Quarterly isolated identity restore drill

Intake for gap G3 of NK-WP-0049-T24. On 2026-10-23 the founder resolved decision e4c288d9 with the recommended split: G1 (a single off-host provider) is an accepted residual risk until 2027-01-31; G2 (off-host host-loss detection) is linked to the outside-node watchdog that RAPP-TELEMETRY-WP-0001-T04 already owes; G3 (no recurring drill) is this workplan.

So far each identity restore has been proved once: LLDAP (NK49-T16), privacyIDEA token material (T31) and audit (T20), and the archive recovery. This workplan turns the existing isolated tooling into a recurring, evidenced drill. It adds no grant, scheduler or production effect; each live drill is an attended owner run.

Define the drill and register it with disaster-control

id: NK-WP-0053-T01
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "6bdfac30-75a8-5a1a-8d66-2fbb0c093958"

Write docs/identity-restore-drill.md: a quarterly cadence aligned with disaster-control BackupPolicy.md, the fixed scope (archive retrieval and verification, isolated LLDAP stage, privacyIDEA token-material check), reuse of tools/bootstrap-recovery/run-isolated-*.sh without changes, the evidence location docs/evidence/<date>-identity-restore-drill/, and pass/fail criteria. Ask disaster-control to add the identity lane to its restore-proof register.

Done when: the drill document is reviewed and disaster-control records the identity lane with a quarterly restore-proof schedule.

2026-10-23: done. The drill procedure is docs/identity-restore-drill.md. disaster-control adopted the lane as DISCTL-WP-0004 (commits 9ca7419 and a54ff81). Changes there: AssetRegister backup-netkingdom-identity, three DataRegister classes, BackupPolicy checks M-7 (25-hour freshness) and M-8 (quarterly drill), G1/G2 in its open-gaps table until 2027-01-31, and an RTO/RPO matrix row. RTO stays TBD until the first drill. When the first drill evidence lands, tell disaster-control (its DISCTL-WP-0004-T03 is waiting on it).

Run the first scheduled drill

id: NK-WP-0053-T02
status: wait
priority: medium
depends_on: [NK-WP-0053-T01]
blocking_reason: "Attended owner run; the operator holds the backup age key. Due by 2027-01-31, the end of the G1 risk-acceptance window."
state_hub_task_id: "8b2cdf5a-69e1-59c6-8e4e-e478f44f77fb"

Run the drill in an attended session and retain the value-safe receipts. Any failure becomes a finding in NK-WP-0049 or its successor; it is never repaired silently.

Done when: a dated, verified evidence set exists and the next due date is recorded.

Extend the drill to Authelia and by-user MFA, operated by admin

id: NK-WP-0053-T04
status: todo
priority: medium
assignee: claude-code
depends_on: [NK-WP-0053-T01]
state_hub_task_id: "20264166-3c88-52d0-a7b4-dd3831c7a685"

The drill document was written before the Authelia stage (run-isolated-authelia.sh) and the by-user MFA stage (run-isolated-privacyidea-mfa.sh) existed, and it lists retained-factor MFA as out of scope. Add both stages to docs/identity-restore-drill.md, and name admin as the operator of record and the MFA test subject (founder intent, 2026-10-24: backup validation is platform operations, with platform-root kept for break-glass). Add the check of docs/crisis-custody-list.md to the drill's preparation, and record in the evidence which identity ran each stage.

admin@coulomb received an OTP on 2026-10-24, so it is first present in the backup captured after 2026-10-25 03:45 UTC. The first admin-operated MFA run must use a generation from after that capture; an older generation holds no token for admin and proves nothing.

Done when: the drill document lists all five stages with admin as operator, the first admin-operated MFA run has passed on a post-enrolment generation, and its evidence names the identity used.

Review the G1 residual-risk acceptance

id: NK-WP-0053-T03
status: wait
priority: low
blocking_reason: "Founder review due 2027-01-31: renew the single-provider acceptance or open a second-provider intake."
state_hub_task_id: "0fa4add7-3d53-51af-a2a2-ea9c63a2d628"

Use the drill results to put the single-provider question back to the founder.