net-kingdom/docs/service-identity-inventory.md

Service identity inventory

NK-WP-0054-T01. First inventory, 2026-10-24. Read-only. It is built from repository manifests, scripts, ConfigMaps, templates and documents, plus the sibling repository railiance-platform read as files. No Kubernetes Secret, live service or archive was read, and no credential value appears here. Where the repository cannot establish a fact, the row says unknown and names who must confirm it.

"Established" means the cited file says it. It does not mean the live estate matches; live state is T04's job.

Classes used

Class	Meaning
human	A person's login
break-glass	Final authority, kept offline, not routine
bind	A service's directory lookup credential
service-admin	An administrative account for one service
workload	A service or agent identity obtaining tokens or secrets
infrastructure	A database or platform role below the application

People

Identity	Class	Established facts	Source	Status
platform-root (king credential)	break-glass	Dedicated final-custody credential, independent of day-to-day accounts; held in an independently held password safe or offline packet. Not for production use (founder, 2026-10-24)	docs/platform-root-custody.md, Standard §4	Established
tegwick	human	Setup operator, Git/Gitea, tooling; "not the desired long-term platform root of trust"	docs/platform-root-custody.md	Established
admin	human and bind and directory super-admin	The human platform admin is the same account as LLDAP uid=admin (founder, 2026-10-24); see LLDAP	founder statement; LLDAP rows	Established
Founder admission key, principal bernd	break-glass	SSH signing key for attempt admissions; verifier anchor on the workstation	secrets-engine docs/founder-admission.md	Which identity owns it is unknown; founder confirms

LLDAP (directory)

Identity	Class	Privilege	Credential custody	Consumers	Source	Status
uid=admin,ou=people,dc=netkingdom,dc=local	bind + service-admin + human	Full directory administration, web UI at the IP-restricted admin host	lldap-secrets key LLDAP_LDAP_USER_PASS; password from KeePassXC or custody for the web UI; present in every identity backup bundle	the human; Authelia (LDAP bind); KeyCape (LDAP lookups); privacyIDEA resolver lldap-coulomb; identity-provisioner (admin API, as LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD)	authelia/configmap.yaml, keycape/bootstrap-config.json (template), privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py, identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml, lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md	Established from manifests. KeyCape's live bind is in the Secret keycape-config, not read
Other users	human	Seven users existed in the 2026-10-16 backup (count only)	LLDAP database	n/a	restore receipt actual-isolated-lldap-recovery.json	Unknown names; directory owner confirms
Groups	policy	Seventeen groups in the same backup (count). Named in the repository: net-kingdom-admins, net-kingdom-users, activity-core-operators, fluid-telegram-operators	lldap/OPERATOR-GROUPS.md, OpenBao role files	gate Authelia domain rules and OpenBao roles	as cited	Names beyond these unknown

Authelia

Identity	Class	Privilege	Custody	Consumers	Source	Status
LDAP bind as uid=admin	bind	Directory super-admin (more than a lookup needs)	authelia-secrets ldap_password	Authelia	authelia/configmap.yaml	Established
OIDC client keycape	workload	Only registered client; one_factor; MFA is done by KeyCape and privacyIDEA	verifier in authelia-secrets; plaintext in keycape-config	KeyCape	authelia/configmap.yaml	Established
Notifier credential	workload	SMTP submission as platform@coulomb.social	authelia-smtp	Authelia	authelia/configmap.yaml, NK-WP-0047	Gated; activation state unknown

Authelia has no local user store or admin UI in this configuration (LDAP backend only).

KeyCape

Identity	Class	Privilege	Custody	Consumers	Source	Status
LDAP bind as uid=admin	bind	Directory super-admin	keycape-config	KeyCape	keycape/bootstrap-config.json (template)	Template only; live value unknown
Authelia client keycape	workload	Upstream sign-in	keycape-config	KeyCape	same	Established
privacyIDEA factor-reader token	workload	Reads factor state; exact rights unknown	keycape-factor-read, delivered by railiance-platform (RPF-WP-0040); OpenBao policy keycape-factor-renewer	KeyCape	keycape/deployment.yaml, openbao/policies/	Rights unknown; railiance-platform and key-cape confirm
Confidential clients with secrets in the backup profile: secrets-engine-openbao, secrets-engine-approval, secrets-engine-requester, approval-engine-operator, informed-decision-sitting-requester, rapp-qonto	workload	Per client scopes and audiences	one Kubernetes Secret each	their consuming services	identity-backup-profile.json, keycape/deployment.yaml	Names established; scopes unknown except secrets-engine-openbao
Template clients: demo-app, user-engine-portal, netkingdom-bootstrap-console, openbao-admin, rapp-qonto-client	workload	Unknown	registry in keycape-config	various	keycape/bootstrap-config.json	Production registry not read; key-cape confirms which exist

privacyIDEA

Identity	Class	Privilege	Custody	Consumers	Source	Status
pi-admin	service-admin	Local administrator; policy pi-admin-all-rights restricted to adminuser=pi-admin	founder's personal password safe (founder, 2026-10-24)	the founder, for token repair	privacyidea/README.md, bootstrap-admin.py	Established. MFA enrolment for pi-admin is unknown (README requires attended acceptance)
trigger-admin (legacy)	service-admin	Legacy Keycloak-era account, policy and Secret	Kubernetes Secret	none known	privacyidea/README.md	Not deleted; consumers uninventoried; revocation is NK-WP-0049-T22
Resolver lldap-coulomb bind as uid=admin	bind	Directory super-admin	resolver config in the database, encrypted with the enckey	privacyIDEA	privacyidea/realm_bootstrap.py	Established
Database role privacyidea	infrastructure	Owner of privacyidea_db	net-kingdom-pg-privacyidea-app	privacyIDEA	postgresql/cluster.yaml	Established
End-user tokens	human factor	Five tokens in the 2026-10-16 backup (count)	database, encrypted	KeyCape MFA check	restore receipt	admin@coulomb token added 2026-10-24, not yet in any backup

identity-provisioner, user-engine, tenant-engine

Identity	Class	Privilege	Custody	Consumers	Source	Status
LLDAP admin password as LLDAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD	bind + service-admin	Full admin API, used to create users and groups	lldap-secrets	identity-provisioner	identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml	Established
identity-provisioner-token	workload	Service token; only user-engine pods may reach the provisioner	Kubernetes Secret	user-engine	same	Established
user-engine ServiceAccount and database role user-engine-pg-app	workload, infrastructure	Token automount off; database owner	Secrets	user-engine	user-engine/runtime.yaml, backup.yaml	Established
tenant-engine	workload	Owner pointers only in this repository	n/a	n/a	tenant-engine/runtime.yaml	Owner repository holds it; unknown here

OpenBao (owner: railiance-platform; read as files)

Identity or role	Class	Privilege	Source	Status
OIDC role netkingdom-platform-admin	human	Group net-kingdom-admins receives policies platform-admin and operator-custody, one-hour token	openbao/auth/netkingdom-platform-admin-role.json	Established. The role file binds on the group only; it has no aal2 claim bound
OIDC role for credential-broker	human	Group net-kingdom-admins and aal2 receive the credential-broker policy	credential-broker-keycape-client-secret-generate-oidc-role.json	Established
OIDC role for the fluid-telegram operators	human	Group fluid-telegram-operators and aal2	fluid-telegram-hall-of-helix-oidc-role.json	Established
JWT role secrets-engine-openbao	workload	Subject service:secrets-engine, scope openbao:login, policy secrets-engine-login-self, five-minute token	secrets-engine-jwt-role.json	Established
JWT role and AppRole for the coding agent	workload	Subject service:codex:railiance-platform; policies agent-high-risk-boundary, workload-kv-read-issue-core-runtime; fifteen minutes	coding-agent-jwt-role.json, coding-agent-approle.json	Established
ESO roles, backup publisher and retention policies	workload	One policy per delivery, for example net-kingdom-backup-publisher-eso and net-kingdom-backup-retention-eso	openbao/policies/	Established as files; live roles unknown
Root grant, unseal shares	break-glass	Final authority	tools/custody-record, custody docs	Holders unknown; see the crisis custody list

Other consumers

flex-auth (six consumers enforcing caller authentication, per SCOPE.md), the secrets-engine runtime and the platform rapp-* packages hold their own identities in their own repositories. They are unknown here and each owner must supply a declaration (T03).

Observations that change the plan

1. One credential, five consumers. The admin password is used by the human, Authelia, KeyCape, the privacyIDEA resolver and the identity-provisioner. The bind split in T05 therefore needs four service accounts, not two: svc-authelia, svc-keycape and svc-privacyidea as read-only lookups, and a provisioner account that can create users and groups but is not the directory super-admin.
2. The provisioner is the hard case. It uses the admin API, so a read-only group is not enough. What the narrowest working privilege is must be tested against the pinned LLDAP image before T05.
3. Three bind consumers need only read access but hold super-admin today.
4. trigger-admin is an uninventoried legacy admin. It is outside this inventory until its consumers are established (NK-WP-0049-T22).
5. OpenBao platform-admin binds on a group claim alone in the repository file, while the credential-broker and fluid-telegram roles also require aal2. MFA is enforced earlier by KeyCape (requireForAll: true), so this may be intended, but the policy should say whether OpenBao must assert the assurance level itself. This is a question for T02, not a finding of a defect.
6. The backup contains the admin password (the lldap-secrets Secret). That is by design for recovery, and it is another reason the human and service uses must be separated.

What must be confirmed

Unknown	Who confirms
Names of the seven users and seventeen groups; which are in net-kingdom-admins	LLDAP and User Engine owners
Live KeyCape registry, live LDAP bind, factor-reader rights	key-cape and railiance-platform
Scopes of the confidential clients other than secrets-engine-openbao	key-cape
Whether trigger-admin still exists and who uses it	founder (NK-WP-0049-T22)
Live OpenBao roles versus these files	railiance-platform
flex-auth and rapp-* identities	their owners
MFA state of pi-admin	founder