net-kingdom/workplans/NK-WP-0048-security-case-types.md

id	type	title	domain	repo	status	flavor	owner	topic_slug	created	updated	depends_on	related_repos	state_hub_workstream_id
NK-WP-0048	workplan	Establish SecurityCaseTypes so that known security cases are light	infotech	net-kingdom	active	implementation	claude-code	netkingdom	2026-10-08	2026-10-10		ops-mason ops-warden key-cape railiance-platform informed-decision	e31f3f9d-0748-5137-b0a3-7b3ca46a66eb

NK-WP-0048 - Establish SecurityCaseTypes so that known security cases are light

Why

The founder's direction (2026-10-08): setting up a security integration of a kind that has been done before should be easy, meaning accept the case, then ops-mason arranges it and ops-warden follows through. Setting up a new kind needs ample documentation and tests and an informed-decision, because its shape is part of the security architecture.

Today every integration is hand-built: per-client helper scripts, per-lane custody, founder checklists. The trigger was KEY-WP-0038 (Forgejo as an OIDC client), whose next step was going to be yet another hand-written rollout script.

This plan continues the pattern work of NK-WP-0008 (pattern infospace), NK-WP-0009 (tutorials) and NK-WP-0030 (scenario composition). It turns patterns into SecurityCaseTypes that ops-mason and ops-warden can execute. Canon: canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md (proposed).

Companion plans: ops-mason MASON-WP-0010 (materialization) and ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0044 (follow-through).

Tasks

id: NK-WP-0048-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "930ac3e9-20ec-5473-98cd-3fe8fddb730f"

T01 — Accept the terminology and the canon

Founder review of canon/standards/security-case-types_v0.1.md, including its section 10 open questions. On acceptance the canon status goes from proposed to accepted.

2026-10-08: accepted by the founder (in session). Canon status accepted; section 10's open questions are carried forward to the first type (T04, T05).

id: NK-WP-0048-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "19c25d96-a55c-58f0-9168-3fdbc4955fc2"

T02 — Inventory the de-facto types already built by hand

Read-only. List every security integration built so far and group them by shape. Known starting points:

• browser OIDC relying parties on key-cape: informed-decision-approver, coulomb-social, user-engine portal, openbao-admin, and Forgejo (pending)
• confidential service clients with client_credentials: secrets-engine approval, requester and openbao clients, approval-engine operator
• workload KV read lanes on OpenBao: the railiance-platform credential lane designs and CCRs, for example railiance-backup-offsite-lane
• short-lived SSH certificates through ops-warden (warden sign)
• tunnelled operator access (ops-bridge)

For each: the repositories involved, the hand-built steps, attended human steps, custody paths, verification evidence, and rollback (if any). Output docs/security-case-type-inventory.md, ranking candidate types by how often the shape recurs and how much manual work each instance costs today.

2026-10-08: done, docs/security-case-type-inventory.md. 36 of 37 CCRs are already request_type: workload-kv-read, a de-facto type reviewed each time as if it were new. Browser clients: 5 hand-built plus Forgejo, each with its own rollout script. Confidential service clients need a registration plus two or three KV-read CCRs each. A forge read identity is needed in bulk by ORGREF-WP-0002-T06. Recommendation: oidc-browser-relying-party first (unblocks the forge), workload-kv-read second (largest payoff), then forge-read-identity.

id: NK-WP-0048-T03
status: done
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T01]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "e487975b-73b1-516c-971d-da4cbbb93063"

T03 — Schema, template and validator

• canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json and security-case_v0.1.schema.json
• security-case-types/_template/ with type.yaml, README.md and tests to copy
• a validator, extending tools/security-scenario-composer/, that checks a type, checks a case against its type, and renders the case into the composer's deterministic plan (still execution.permitted: false)

Acceptance: the validator rejects missing sections, secret-shaped parameter values, unpinned providers and cases against non-implemented types, with tests for each.

2026-10-08: done. canon/schemas/security-case-type_v0.1.schema.json and security-case_v0.1.schema.json; tools/security-case-types/security_case_validator.py (validate-type, validate-case, render, reusing the scenario composer); security-case-types/_template/ (a valid, runnable example type over net-kingdom.local-identity, with README sections, an example case and tests that travel with every copy). 31 tests pass, including the composer's existing suite.

id: NK-WP-0048-T04
status: done
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T02, NK-WP-0048-T03]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "2fffe112-7d55-5680-9952-78d74f44f87f"

T04 — Define the first type: browser OIDC relying party

security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/, version 1.0:

• parameters: client id, display name, exact redirect URIs, scopes, client type (confidential or public), MFA pin, the groups the consuming service maps, custody path for the secret (confidential only), consuming service and its owner
• composition: key-cape client registration (key-cape declares it as a playbook capability), secret minting into custody (railiance-platform), LLDAP group existence and membership (net-kingdom identity-provisioner), handover to the consuming service
• materialization (ops-mason) and follow-through (ops-warden) sections
• verification: discovery lists the redirect URI; a test sign-in returns the expected claims for one human; anonymous access to the custody path is denied
• rollback: remove exactly this client and its custody path
• README: threat model, MFA rationale, why redirect URIs are exact, which steps still need an attended login and how that is minimised
• reference instances: informed-decision-approver, coulomb-social, user-engine portal, openbao-admin

Acceptance: complete per canon section 3, tests green, status proposed.

2026-10-08: done. security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/ 1.0 (proposed): type.yaml with 12 parameters (the custody reference is required only for confidential clients), composition over key-cape's new key-cape.oidc-client-registration declaration (contract PASS, maturity: planned), materialization and follow-through, verification and rollback, all conditional on client type where it matters. One attended step, register-client, justified by the live registry being a Kubernetes Secret. README with threat model, alternatives, an honest fit table (portal and vergabe fit; Forgejo is the first confidential case; openbao-admin, coulomb.social and informed-decision-approver do not fit 1.0), and known limits. Examples: Forgejo (checked against the accepted request) and a public portal. The validator gained when / required_when conditions and provider discovery. 43 tests pass. ops-mason's and ops-warden's sections are drafted in the type. Their owners review them in MASON-WP-0010-T01 and WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 before acknowledgment (T05).

id: NK-WP-0048-T05
status: done
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T04, MASON-WP-0010-T01, WARDEN-WP-0044-T01]
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3d987d3d-0797-538b-86e4-51185a327ae2"

T05 — Acknowledge the type through informed-decision

Prepare the Decision Memo from the type's README and type.yaml and submit it through informed-decision's production intake. On acknowledgment the type moves to acknowledged.

2026-10-08: Decision Memo prepared. Hub decision e418263e-a71f-4f01-a970-c87c9e187c09. security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/: packet.md (question, one act, what acknowledging does not do, the shape, alternatives, attended steps, limits, evidence), build_intake.py and the built intake.json (memo class decision-record, review group net-kingdom-admins, resolves the hub decision on answer). The envelope passes informed-decision's own validate_submission. Queuing it is an attended operator step, a write inside the production dispatcher pod:

kubectl -n state-hub exec -i deploy/state-hub-memo-dispatch -- \
  python -m api.services.memo_dispatch --queue /data/private enqueue --envelope /dev/stdin \
  < security-case-types/oidc-browser-relying-party/decision/intake.json

The answer then appears for review in informed-decision.

2026-10-08: queued by the founder (pending, queued) after one refusal: the first envelope's idempotency key was not State Hub's stable state-hub.<decision>.<memo> form, and the builder now validates against both sides. The dispatcher delivered it to informed-decision (ledger 7 → 8 delivered). T05 waits for the founder's answer in informed-decision, which resolves hub decision e418263e.

2026-10-08: ops-mason's review (MASON-WP-0010-T01) folded into the type, still 1.0 proposed: secret_ref is no longer a parameter, the type derives platform/workloads/keycape/{client_id}; policies are workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-eso and workload-kv-read-keycape-{client_id}-{consuming_service}, each with a templated body (read on that one data path); new openbao_role external-secrets-keycape-{client_id} (Kubernetes auth, ESO service account, 15m, no default policy); catalog entry {consuming_service}-keycape-client; the two rollback steps on the KV path collapse into one metadata delete. The schema and validator now require a body on policy and role items. 105 tests pass. Two consequences: the delivered memo describes the type before these changes (a case-set custody reference, two differently named policies, no ESO role), so the founder answers on a superseded shape unless the memo is re-sent; and Forgejo's custody path moves from the accepted request's proposed platform/workloads/forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client to platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, which key-cape (KEY-WP-0038) and railiance-apps (RAPPS-WP-0016-T02) need to adopt in T06. ops-warden's review (WARDEN-WP-0044-T01) is still in progress.

2026-10-08: revised memo nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r2 built (packet.md, intake.json, packet sha256:af6435e2…); it states that it supersedes the first memo and passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation. It needs a new memo id because the dispatcher refuses new content under a delivered idempotency key (idempotency_conflict). Queuing it is the same attended step as above. Both memos serve hub decision e418263e; the first answer resolves it, so the first memo must not stay open: an accept on it would acknowledge the superseded shape, and a decline would resolve the decision against r2. Close it with return (a reviewer verb that requests a new revision and does not resolve the hub decision; only accept and decline do), commenting that r2 supersedes it, then answer r2. withdraw exists in the vocabulary but is not offered to reviewers, and lifecycle revise only applies to lifecycle-registered memos, not intake-delivered ones.

2026-10-09: the founder reports r2 enqueued and the first memo returned. At close, hub decision e418263e still showed open (not verified whether r2 was answered or the answer is still in transit; the dispatcher ledger was not read). ops-warden's review (WARDEN-WP-0044-T01, ops-warden history/2026-10-08-oidc-rp-follow-through-review.md, d470f2e) arrived at 21:25, before r2 was built, and is not in r2. Required before WARDEN-WP-0044-T02: R1 a per-step lane (missing: identity-provisioner caller credential, railiance-platform broker grant), R2 canon meaning of warden_executes: true (caller proxy, caller identity, no standing ops-warden token; ADR-0002), R3 a per-step value_handling. Refinements R4 (one type-level catalog lane instead of a per-case entry, which conflicts with ops-mason's item 5), R5 (ESO Ready gate before bind-env), R6 (exact accepted memberships), R7 (mfa-pinned and secret-delivered checks). Next: if r2 was accepted, fold R1-R3 and R5-R7 in as a follow-up and settle R4 between ops-warden and ops-mason before T06; if not, hold r2, fold them in and build r3. key-cape and railiance-apps were told about Forgejo's new custody path.

2026-10-09: r2 was not answered (hub decision e418263e open; dispatcher 9 delivered), so r2 is held and r3 replaces it. ops-warden withdrew R4 for R4′ (message a66a9204): one catalog entry per case with its body templated in the type. Folded in:

• Canon section 3: a narrow meaning of warden_executes: true (caller proxy, caller identity, no standing credential; ops-warden ADR-0002), plus per-step lane, value_handling and an optional ready_check. A catalog entry body is now required, like policy and role bodies.
• Schema and validator enforce all of these.
• The type: lanes identity-provisioner-groups and keycape-client-secret-generate (both new) and key-cape-oidc-login; mint-secret is generated_in_custody; a Ready gate on deliver-secret; ensure-groups adds exactly the accepted case's memberships; new checks secret-delivered and mfa-pinned; the catalog-entry body follows R4′.
• 110 tests pass.

Memo r3 (nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r3, packet sha256:726dfc01…) passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation. The founder queues it with the same command, returns r2 with a comment that r3 supersedes it, then answers r3.

Prerequisites for T06, not for T05:

• the two new lanes, each through its owner;
• a founder-approved rollout of an identity-provisioner image containing 630ebfd (the deployed one is main-6c4fcaf from 2026-09-24, without /v1/groups/ensure).

ops-mason's request to create LLDAP group fluid-telegram-operators (message 259ec26d) was answered: not possible from here by that path; the founder creates it in the LLDAP admin UI.

2026-10-09: ops-warden finished its side of WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 (message 58d33f40, commit 0e7ceb8): the revised type conforms to warden case check-type, with no further changes asked of the type. This acknowledges that review. Its later addendum R8 (message af274783, ops-warden history/2026-10-08-oidc-rp-follow-through-review.md) showed that lane identity-provisioner-groups cannot exist as declared: the provisioner's only HTTP credential is user-engine's runtime token, and its NetworkPolicy admits only user-engine pods, so a caller-proxy lane would act as user-engine. Taken option 1 (ops-warden's recommendation): ensure-groups and its rollback are attended, in the register-client session on key-cape-oidc-login, run inside the provisioner pod; no token is read. Option 2 (an operator credential of its own on the provisioner) stays open for a later version. warden case check-type now reports only keycape-client-secret-generate (railiance-platform) as missing. 89 tests pass.

Hub decision e418263e was still open, so memo r4 (nk-wp-0048-t05-oidc-browser-relying-party-r4, packet sha256:452ea421…) replaces r3; it passes informed-decision's and the dispatcher's validation. The founder queues it with the same command, returns r2/r3 if still open with a comment that r4 supersedes them, then answers r4.

Prerequisites for T06 are now: lane keycape-client-secret-generate (railiance-platform), and a founder-approved rollout of an identity-provisioner image containing 630ebfd.

2026-10-09: done. The founder queued r4 (pending, queued), returned r3 as superseded and accepted r4 in informed-decision. informed-decision's hub write-back is off in production (INFD_HUB_WRITEBACK unset), so net-kingdom resolved hub decision e418263e from the founder's report, naming memo r4 in the rationale. The type is acknowledged; it becomes implemented with T06.

id: NK-WP-0048-T06
status: wait
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T05, NK-WP-0048-T08, NK-WP-0048-T09, MASON-WP-0010-T03, WARDEN-WP-0044-T03]
blocking_reason: "Type1.2 architecture has a confirmed source-only founder acknowledgment; canonical1.1 remains unchanged/default and the1.2 reference case stays proposed. Needs explicit version selection/reference-source integration without normal admission bypass, closed owner adapters plus global/native receipt verifier (WARDEN-WP-0044-T03), independently verified six-object structural materialization and CCR42 claims/created-only provenance, exact broker/case/source reconciliation, then separately authorized native mint/delivery and attended registry/consumer verification. Source acknowledgment, a bundle or local tests do not prove implemented/materialized/live status."
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "d9b26bcf-a7c6-59a2-92a0-f913d76a203c"

T06 — First KnownSecurityCase: Forgejo

Write security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml from the parameters the founder accepted in KEY-WP-0038-T01 (key-cape/docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml), so that acceptance carries over as the case acceptance. ops-mason materializes it; ops-warden follows through and verifies it. The type becomes implemented once this reference case is live.

This replaces the hand-built path proposed for KEY-WP-0038-T02.

2026-10-09: case written, security-cases/forgejo-netkingdom-oidc.yaml, status accepted: the example's parameters plus the founder's 2026-10-08 acceptance of the key-cape request (owner and founder), with the custody-path derivation covered by the type's acknowledgment (memo r4). It validates and renders (plan execution.permitted: false; three attended steps on key-cape-oidc-login); it needs --allow-unimplemented until it is live, since it is the case that makes the type implemented. A test keeps it equal to the type's example. Still open before it runs: ops-mason renders and builds it (MASON-WP-0010-T02, T03, unblocked by T05), ops-warden plans and runs it (WARDEN-WP-0044-T02, T03), railiance-platform's keycape-client-secret-generate lane (asked by ops-mason 789feb39 and ops-warden d9f889b1, both unread), and a founder-approved identity-provisioner rollout containing 630ebfd.

2026-10-09: identity-provisioner rolled out, founder-approved in session: main-630ebfd (sha256:bafb4860…, built by the image workflow) replaces main-6c4fcaf (sha256:ffacd5d7…; only change: 630ebfd, additive). Applied with kubectl set image on the Deployment only (generation 17 → 18, 1/1 Ready); the file's Service, NetworkPolicies and Ingress were not reapplied. Verified in the pod: ensure_service_groups and revoke_service_groups present, /readyz 200; no token used, no group changed. Rollback: kubectl -n sso set image deploy/identity-provisioner provisioner=forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/identity-provisioner@sha256:ffacd5d790a5b7800e0535f3aa95b7de52c7a68e4f575b9192c3e1622fa672c2. The pin in sso-mfa/k8s/identity-provisioner/deployment.yaml follows.

2026-10-09: ops-warden closed WARDEN-WP-0044-T01 and shipped warden case plan (T02, message 06303d1d); the accepted Forgejo case is refused until ops-mason materializes it, and a materialized copy plans cleanly once keycape-client-secret-generate exists. Its observation that bind-env carries a literal KEYCAPE_<CLIENT_ID>_CLIENT_SECRET: the validator now renders a {param:env} format spec (upper case, - as _, as keycape-client.py derives the name) and rejects unknown specs, and follow-through and rollback text is now checked for unknown placeholders too (patch-level, canon section 6). The type keeps the literal until ops-warden's planner (text.format) renders the spec as well; asked of ops-warden. 53 tests pass.

2026-10-10: ops-warden rendered {param:env} in warden case plan (23ba584, message c1df14b7; other specs and !conversion refused). The type adopts it as a 1.0 patch (canon section 6): bind-env and its rollback now read KEYCAPE_{client_id:env}_CLIENT_SECRET. ops-mason reports the Forgejo case rendered and built (message 1ebddae9; CCR drafts handed to railiance-platform), so T06 now waits on the platform apply, the mint-secret lane and the attended register-client session.

2026-10-10: key-cape adopted the type's custody path (key-cape ab5cccd, message 88a4559c): docs/forgejo-oidc-client-request.yaml and KEY-WP-0038-T02 name platform/workloads/keycape/forgejo, field CLIENT_SECRET, delivered as sso/keycape-forgejo-client through external-secrets-keycape-forgejo, and the forgejo/netkingdom-oidc-client proposal is withdrawn. This matches the type and the Forgejo example; no change needed here.

2026-10-10: key-cape's type-composition review (key-cape 6038483, message 8e5ed5f6) found the composition sound with two blocking findings, taken as a 1.0 patch (stricter validation and documentation, canon section 6): R1, redirect URIs now refuse ? and # in the type pattern and in keycape-client.py's REDIRECT (KeyCape refuses ? at startup and the single replica would stop); R2, allowed_scopes always includes groups, the renderer refuses access_groups without it, and access_groups now says the consumer enforces the gate because KeyCape has none; R3, mfa_required "false" means the per-user privacyIDEA policy; R4, register-client's justification records the restart for every client, the quiet window, and that the rendered registry must pass KeyCape's client validation before it. The accepted Forgejo case and both examples still validate; 116 tests pass. Open, needs a decision: R2's verification step that the consumer enforces the group gate is a new verification step, hence 1.1 (minor), and the validator pins cases to the exact type version, so the accepted 1.0 Forgejo case would need re-pinning. Also open with key-cape: a KeyCape entry point that validates a rendered client registry without starting the server; until then keycape-client.py mirrors the redirect rule.

2026-10-10: founder go for 1.1, so no 1.0 run overlaps. The type adds verification consumer-enforces-groups, and hand-over now requires the consumer to enforce access_groups (minor, canon section 6; risk class unchanged, no new acknowledgment; history in the type README). The accepted Forgejo case and both examples are re-pinned to oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1 before any apply; the acknowledgment intake keeps @1.0 as the record of what was acknowledged. ops-mason's build and ops-warden's case-ref digest predate this and need a re-render.

2026-10-10: ops-mason re-rendered the Forgejo case from @1.1 (message 22c6bba6; plan digest af1f4f81…, no collisions) and rebuilt the bundle. The rendered OpenBao objects are identical to 1.0, so the already applied CCR-2026-0041 stands; 1.1 changes only consumer-side steps. key-cape shipped keycape check-config (c528daa, message a7b0aeff): KeyCape's startup checks without secret values, including the new duplicate-clientId rule. keycape-client.py --check-config <binary> now runs it on the live and the proposed registry, fed on stdin, and apply refuses a proposed registry that fails; register-client's entry point names the option (1.1 patch). The deployed image predates c528daa, so the binary is built from key-cape source for now. Before the next KeyCape rollout (Forgejo register-client or the CCR-2026-0018 window), the attended operator runs inspect --check-config so the live registry is checked too.

id: NK-WP-0048-T07
status: wait
depends_on: [NK-WP-0048-T06]
blocking_reason: "The next types follow once the first one is proven end to end."
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "c3c9c3ae-4f23-5ba7-9e6f-e63bcf29b9f7"

T07 — Queue the next types

From the T02 ranking, open the next type drafts (likely the confidential service client and the workload KV read lane), each to be acknowledged on its own. Record which existing hand-built instances get adopted as cases, without rewriting them in place.

id: NK-WP-0048-T08
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "8e519082-dc8b-5e46-b660-03d03e55dcf6"

T08 — identity-provisioner: ensure service-access groups

The type's ensure-groups step calls identity-provisioner groups ensure --groups <list> --members <group=user+user;...>. The provisioner already has idempotent _ensure_group and _add_group, but exposes only tenant-scoped operations. Add the general operation (create if absent, add the listed memberships, never remove others), its rollback (remove only this case's memberships), tests, and the ops-warden route for its service identity.

2026-10-08: done. identity-provisioner/provisioner.py gained ensure_service_groups (POST /v1/groups/ensure) and revoke_service_groups (POST /v1/groups/revoke), behind the existing service-token check. Names matching tenant*, netkingdom-* and lldap_* are reserved; members must already exist; everything is validated before any change; memberships are read back before success; nothing else is ever removed; groups are deleted only when asked and empty. 7 new tests (39 in the provisioner suite). The type's ensure-groups step and its rollback now name these endpoints. The ops-warden route for the provisioner's service token belongs to WARDEN-WP-0044-T01.

id: NK-WP-0048-T09
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "0ee12dfc-8260-5038-bd39-cc7fb4113be0"

T09 — The keycape-client entry point and its declaration

Planned first as key-cape KEY-WP-0038-T04. Moved here because the machinery a live registration needs already lives in net-kingdom, where KeyCape is deployed (sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/): the contained kubectl, the cluster-identity pin and the issuer pin. A copy in key-cape would drift.

2026-10-08: done. sso-mfa/k8s/keycape/keycape-client.py derives the KeyCape client record from a case (client-from-case). It adds or removes exactly one client with the existing safeguards (byte-preserving merge, exact match or refuse, shared-reference refusal, compare-and-swap, read-back, contained errors), requires the Deployment env binding first for confidential clients, and requires the case acceptance record for apply instead of a per-client founder decision id. 15 tests, including a regression showing that the vergabe case reproduces its hand-built registration exactly; all 71 helper tests pass. Declaration capabilities/playbooks/net-kingdom.keycape-client-registration.yaml (contract PASS, maturity: implemented) replaces key-cape's draft. The type now pins it, and for confidential clients adds deliver-secret (delivery from custody into the sso namespace) and bind-env (Deployment env), attended in the same session as register-client. The per-client helpers stay until their clients are adopted as cases.

2026-10-10 — NetKingdom owner review of the execution seam, source only: ops-warden/docs/security-case-execution-proposal.md SHA256 78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c was reviewed against INTENT, SecurityCase canon, acknowledged type1.1, current case and owner source. docs/security-case-execution-owner-review.md supports the closed adapter/receipt direction with explicit versioned schema, structural materialization provenance, unchanged caller/session boundaries, safe CAS reconciliation and exact-created-object rollback requirements. This is owner review, not approval. Supporting file digests are in the adjacent sources JSON.

Current source exposes a circular wait: ops-mason T03 waits on mint while Warden and the broker refuse a non-materialized case. Structural acceptance therefore needs its own native pinned receipt before mint, not a successful mint before materialized. The platform broker additionally pins type1.0 while Forgejo is accepted at1.1; platform-owner alignment and tests are required, not an unchecked version bypass. T06 remains wait. No case/type lifecycle status, grant, authority or live runtime changed by this review. A proposed informed-decision would adopt the source contract only; native materialization and execution acceptance stay distinct.

Final proposal re-review: staged Warden proposal SHA256 78ab1439e4c5beb205aeccf15b1b2e706511be55ab195c5a3aa682f326c7c77c adds only the explicitly local reducer appendix, not an accepted wire protocol or executor. The exact-final review and sources JSON supersede the earlier 1035f049... proposal review. Platform staged the exact type1.1 broker correction with ten fake-backend subprocess checks (script SHA256 9576cd211cfc06526ec4cc9bd0a5b06f0f59287a68931bb2d6e3592a951ddc7d). The next source work is the versioned closed adapter/receipt/materialization contract, not another relaxation of the broker's status gate. Native work still requires installed broker provenance, structural reader receipts, exact new materialized-case bytes, caller grant/session revocation and verified execution. No installed/native acceptance is inferred from that staged correction.

2026-10-11 — new source-only type1.2 architecture acknowledgment: Confirmed native founder ACCEPT of infd-20261011-forgejo-type12-source-r1@1 at06:47:39Z, approval8e9332c8-754a-420c-b8b7-445cb4fe6765. Exact frozen packet 0b377d647ca748cd03c92f9792396412048055d4bde9f7bb06ff6d413f7acd68 and submission 585cee731de30d2b37883a57abfd9eb32f023ee694e8d911989109d5caf80569; native receipt retained in docs/evidence/2026-10-11-forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment/. The complete acknowledged1.2 source package is isolated under security-case-type-revisions/1.2/oidc-browser-relying-party; default loader and current accepted1.1 case remain untouched because load_type is single-version. The new proposed1.2 case is NOT accepted/materialized/live and has no acceptance fields. Actual reference-migration design approval is a separate Apps owner receipt; no1.1 approval is inherited. Source-recording review/test proof and exact next gates are in docs/forgejo-type12-source-acknowledgment-followthrough.md. T06 remains wait and T07 remains its existing dependent task; type is NOT implemented and no first-case/native grant or broader workplan finish is asserted.

2026-10-11 — bounded explicit version selection source preparation for T06: The validator now offers optional exact version_roots/--version-root VERSION=PATH selection with duplicate/mismatch/traversal/symlink refusal and no fallback. The default1.1 source and historicalacceptedcase hashes/ordinaryrefusal/preparation render stayunchanged; actual1.1 is acknowledged, not implemented. Acknowledged1.2 ordinaryadmission also refuses; optionalpreparation remains nonexecuting.43local validatorchecks pass and original1.1 CLIrenderbytes match exactly. Makerproof: docs/evidence/2026-10-11-explicit-type-version-selection/source-integration-validation.json. FormalNetownerreview/reference-source integration and all existing native adapter, provenance/broker/materialization/attendedproof gates remain; T06 stayswait, no new residual or firstcase/typeimplementation/native grant is inferred.