Open security core for dev sec ops on kubernetes
Three gaps from NK-WP-0033, none of them the fault we set out to fix. Operator custody (platform-root-custody.md). This document named a password-safe entry that had never been created, so the 2026-08-23 rotation had nowhere to put the new LLDAP admin value and the outgoing one survived only in a browser entry that was overwritten on 2026-08-27. Decided: operators/<subsystem>/<account> in OpenBao for everything reachable once logged in, plus a short closed offline list for what you need when OpenBao is not — platform-root's own password, unseal shares, break-glass. Anything on that list in OpenBao would be circular; anything not on it does not belong in the packet. The rule that closes it: every rotation names, as a numbered step, where the outgoing and incoming values go. NK-WP-0033-T04 rotated four classes with no such step, and that is the root cause of the session that followed — not the four software defects it also surfaced. Secret disclosure by trust stage, tied to the existing S0-S6 table. A fingerprint may be spoken to confirm two parties hold the same credential; the whole value never may. Used ad hoc throughout 2026-08-27 and worth writing down. Attended procedures (new standard). reconcile-lldap-resolver-live.sh was approved, documented, revision-pinned and had never run; its first execution found four defects, two of which meant it could never have completed. verify-t06.sh passed throughout. An unexecuted procedure is unfinished work and must say so in its runbook header. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 3377672@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 15463ccf-238f-4e13-b163-93aa25c6d166 |
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|---|---|---|
| .claude | ||
| .forgejo/workflows | ||
| .githooks | ||
| canon | ||
| capabilities/playbooks | ||
| docs | ||
| examples | ||
| history | ||
| identity-provisioner | ||
| keys | ||
| local-identity | ||
| registry | ||
| sso-mfa | ||
| tests | ||
| tools | ||
| wiki | ||
| workplans | ||
| .custodian-brief.md | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .repo-classification.yaml | ||
| .sops.yaml | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| CLAUDE.md | ||
| CONFIG.md | ||
| DECISIONS.md | ||
| INTENT.md | ||
| LICENSE | ||
| Makefile | ||
| README.md | ||
| SCOPE.md | ||
| WORK-RECORDS.md | ||
NetKingdom
NetKingdom is the canonical security architecture, integration boundary, and bootstrap/reference implementation for NetKingdom environments. It defines identity, tenancy, credential, workload-zone, and security-composition contracts while leaving provider and Railiance execution in their owning repositories.
The dynamic, self-optimizing security platform is the long-term direction in INTENT.md, not a claim about current delivery.
Orientation
- SCOPE.md — what this repo owns, current state, and when it is relevant
- Security scenario composition — deterministic, plan-only capability and trust composition
- Posture feedback — deterministic, proposal-only posture and evidence remediation findings
Security Infrastructure Documents
- secrets-engine security infrastructure boundary defines how secrets-engine participates in the NetKingdom security infrastructure and how it interacts with OpenBao, flex-auth, user-engine, ops-warden, ops-bridge, info-tech-canon, State Hub, and agents.