net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model-companion_v0.1.md
tegwick ce2554fdc9 Security Layer Model v0.7 — write the rule v0.6 only announced
Four reviews. kings-guard found that v0.6 claimed a human/agent principal
separation in §1 and §15 while §3.4 was byte-identical to v0.5: a silent edit
failure, and their framing is the right one — a rule stated about a standard in
its own change log is not a rule, which is §11's principle turned on the
standard. The same failure had dropped two §16 entries. Both restored.

§3.4 is now written: no standing credential, conduit or engine API only, agent
memory is not a state plane, every action reconstructable as the caller's, and
the seam with glas-harness for session semantics.

The rest are collisions between rules each written for its own clean case:

- §6.4(1) forbade what §6.4(3) blesses. A PEP may proceed under its declared
  §9.3 stance where the application of that stance is recorded in place of the
  decision — stricter than v0.6, since a fail-open result becomes metadata
  rather than silence. Raised by ops-warden, the reference shape it made a
  violation.
- §6.4(2) forbade the session-bound allow §9.7.1 permits. Now scoped to replay
  outside the decision's own binding and lifetime, with access-engine's
  canonical request digest as the mechanical test. Negative caching ruled
  permitted where the refusal is recorded and the lifetime declared.
- §13.1 now exists: v0.6 mandated a stance-map register and implemented none.
  Its first inventory has one row, which is the finding.
- §9.6 gained a threat decomposition after audit-core corrected its own remedy:
  atomicity prevents accidental omission, cadence and reconciliation detect the
  adversarial case, nothing prevents it at a compromised source. Cadence is now
  MUST for load-bearing sources, with heartbeat or reconciliation required for
  low-volume classes where rate monitoring cannot work.
- §9.7.2 splits by role: per input class at a PDP, one boundary deadline at a
  PEP.
- §17 moves the decision-record schema to access-engine, which argued it against
  its own interest.
- §13 stops attributing the actuation gap to kings-guard; §19 removed, since a
  verdict inside a standard grades the document it lives in.

§20 records the Railiance interaction boundary on railiance-master's own
definitions: the four axes, that a workload is a managed running deployable so
approvals are never one, and that rein-* is not a fifth axis but a glas-harness
concern. What is unsettled is listed as unsettled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2564823@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2a7ed827-4928-4b9f-8613-9135c9cadfe9
2026-08-29 10:44:53 +02:00

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Markdown

---
id: netkingdom-security-layer-model-companion-v0.1
type: standard-companion
title: "NetKingdom Security Layer Model — Agent Companion v0.1"
domain: netkingdom
status: proposed
version: "0.1"
companion_to: canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md
owner: gate-house
publication_owner: net-kingdom
created: "2026-08-29"
updated: "2026-08-29"
review_interval: 3m
standard_token: security-layer-model-companion_v0.1
---
# Security Layer Model — Agent Companion
**This is the operative form of `security-layer-model_v0.7.md`.** Same rules, no
change log, no review history. The statute governs where the two disagree; if you
find a disagreement, report it — that is a finding, not a formatting problem.
Read this if you are an agent or an operator working in a NetKingdom repository,
or if your repository has been asked to declare its layer.
---
## 1. The four layers
| Layer | You are this if you produce | Deterministic |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Taxonomy** | terms, semantic contracts, standards | n/a |
| **Tooling** | state and persistence | yes |
| **Engine** | a deterministic API for one modeled concept | yes |
| **Staff** | specifications, decisions, workplans, tasks | **no** |
One test decides it: **given the same authoritative inputs, do you always return
the same result?** If your core function is inference or judgment, you are Staff
— however much of your work happens at runtime.
Engines carry a role: **PDP** (decides — `access-engine` only), **PIP**
(supplies facts as claims), **Evidence** (`audit-core`), **Lifecycle** (an API
over Tooling it owns). A new engine is a PIP unless the statute says otherwise.
## 2. Declare your layer
Put this in your `INTENT.md` frontmatter. A layer someone else stated about you
is not a declaration.
```yaml
layer: Staff # Taxonomy | Tooling | Engine | Staff
role: null # Engines only: PDP | PIP | Evidence | Lifecycle
```
Then state it in prose, in your own voice, in the body. Contest the proposed
layer if it is wrong — a correction is worth more than a label.
Reference implementation of the machine-readable form: `ops-warden`'s
`layer.yaml`, `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py`, and
`tests/test_layer_conformance.py`.
## 3. The rules that bind everyone
1. **One decision point.** `access-engine` renders authorization decisions. No
other repository, in any layer, renders or caches one.
2. **Compiled data that determines an outcome is still deciding.** A registry,
cache, or schema that resolves a result before the engine runs has decided
early.
3. **Doctrine arrives as a claim.** Anything that changes an outcome — an
authority ceiling, a zone stance, a posture, a maturity level — reaches the
decision as a request claim or a versioned policy rule, never by a side
channel.
4. **Adaptive systems may only tighten.** Reduce authority, require step-up,
request containment — never manufacture authority.
5. **Staff never touches Tooling directly.** It acts through Engine APIs. See §4.
6. **Every allow has a lifetime.** A TTL, or a binding to a session or
obligation that ends.
## 4. If you touch Tooling
"Tooling" means a system catalogued as Tooling in the statute's §4 — today
`key-cape` and `OpenBao`. Uncatalogued infrastructure (the State Hub,
`llm-connect`) is outside this rule, but list it anyway so your check is total.
Three sanctioned shapes. Anything else is a violation:
| Shape | When | You must |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Read-only diagnostic** | no engine exposes the read | declare it; no writes; treat it as a gap to close |
| **Conduit** | you run the *owner's* tool under the *caller's* identity | present no credential of your own, widen nothing, stay reconstructable as the caller |
| **Declared gap** | you must contact Tooling and no engine exposes it | declare `capability`, `intended_owner`, `blocked_on`, `review` — machine-readably |
A conduit that presents its own token is not a conduit. A declared gap is
**tracked non-conformance**, not conformance — but declaring it is always better
than hiding it, and it will never be scored below silence.
## 5. If you cause side effects (you are PEP-shaped)
Being PEP-shaped does not change your layer. `ops-warden` issuing a certificate
and `ops-mason` opening a route are both Staff and both PEP-shaped.
1. **No side effect without a decision record** naming the request it was
rendered for.
2. **Never cache the verdict.** Caching an input claim under its own freshness
rule is fine; caching the answer is a second decision point.
3. **Publish your unreachable-engine stance** — total, per zone or equivalent,
no implicit default, no per-call discretion. Reference shape: `ops-warden`
`ADR-0009`.
4. **Stay reconstructable**, within the bound in §6.
If `access-engine` is reachable but degraded, the fallback is the engine's. If it
is unreachable, the behaviour is necessarily yours — which is why it must be
declared in advance rather than decided in the moment.
## 6. What you may never claim about evidence
An append-only archive with a verified chain proves records were **not altered
or truncated after arrival**. It proves nothing about an event never sent.
- ✗ "the audit record proves it happened"
- ✗ "there is no record, so it did not happen"
- ✓ "the archive proves the records it holds were not altered or truncated after arrival"
The event an adversary most wants missing is the negative one — a revocation, a
denial, a containment action. If a control's soundness depends on an event being
present, that evidence is **load-bearing** and its emission must be atomic with
the state change, queued locally. Otherwise it is **attributive**: seek
atomicity, and if you trade it away deliberately, declare the trade and never
describe the trail as complete.
If you emit adaptive-relevant events, publish an expected cadence. A drop below
it is a finding. Silence is a signal.
## 7. If you are an agent
Same layer as your human colleagues, different blast radius:
1. **No standing credential.** Authority is per task, time-bounded, attributable.
2. **Tool use is a conduit or an Engine API.** There is no third route.
3. **Your memory is not a state plane.** Memory, tool-call traces, and prompt
caches must not become state another layer depends on unless catalogued.
4. **Every action is reconstructable as the caller's action.**
Tool availability is not permission. A tool being callable says the operation
exists, not that you may invoke it.
## 8. Conformance: four states
| State | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| **Conforming** | no Tooling contact, or only declared diagnostic/conduit shapes |
| **Blocked-clean** | the capability does not exist because no engine exposes it, and you make no Tooling contact |
| **Declared gap** | a declared §5.3 contact — tracked non-conformance |
| **Undeclared violation** | anything else |
**Blocked-clean is not worse than conforming.** Declining a shortcut and leaving
a capability at zero is compliance at cost. It will never be ranked below a
repository that quietly opened a client and said nothing.
## 9. Consuming NetKingdom security from outside
Operations is **HelixForge's** responsibility — its reef, rail, rapp, and rein
concepts — and NetKingdom provides the security and approval framework those
operations consume.
**That interface is not specified yet.** What holds today is only what holds for
any consumer: authorization decisions come from `access-engine`, approvals are
objects in `approval-engine` consumed as claims, credentials are materialized by
`secrets-engine` after a decision, and evidence goes to `audit-core` under the
bound in §6. A HelixForge component that causes a protected side effect is
PEP-shaped and §5 applies to it.
What is **not** settled: how a reef, rail, rapp, or rein maps onto the layer
model — whether they are subjects a decision is rendered about, principals that
request, PEP-shaped consumers, or none of these. Until that is written, do not
assume a mapping. Raising it is welcome.
## 10. Two things the estate cannot do yet
Stated so nobody plans around a capability that does not exist:
- **Nothing is observed in production.** `kings-guard` has reported that it has
never seen a real event. Do not cite "observed in operation" as evidence.
- **Nothing can be contained automatically.** There is no actuation surface —
no API to reduce authority, require step-up, or isolate a workload. The
capability is at zero, not degraded.
---
**Statute:** `canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md`.
**Known gap in this version:** §5.3 says publish your stance map but not *where*,
and omits the statute's §6.4 inventory obligation — a repository could satisfy
this document and no register would learn of its stance. Fixed in v0.2; until
then read statute §6.4 and §13.1.
**Owner:** gate-house. **Report a disagreement between this and the statute as a
finding.**