tegwick
c24d67bb85
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol Assistant-Session: 01a02929-244b-7391-b933-c04010e8eedb
143 lines
5.7 KiB
Markdown
143 lines
5.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: NK-WP-0033
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type: workplan
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title: "Contain and rotate the exposed KeyCape credential bundle"
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domain: infotech
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repo: net-kingdom
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status: active
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owner: codex
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topic_slug: net-kingdom
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planning_priority: P0
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created: "2026-08-23"
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updated: "2026-08-23"
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origin: routed
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origin_ref: "State Hub message 8cc44a39-683c-4fab-80dd-b2275d0728e0"
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related:
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- NK-WP-0032
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state_hub_workstream_id: "63665674-6880-593e-96e6-bab3211b1352"
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---
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# NK-WP-0033 — KeyCape credential exposure containment and rotation
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KeyCape reported that an agent tool rendered the base64 data map of the live
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`sso/keycape-config` Secret. Base64 is encoding, not protection. Treat the
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carried RS256 signing private key, LLDAP bind credential, Authelia client
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credential, and privacyIDEA admin token as exposed even though no value was
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decoded, reused, or intentionally repeated.
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No task in this workplan authorizes a credential value in Git, State Hub,
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agent output, command arguments, or non-secret evidence. Live mutation requires
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the exact provider/custody owners, a reviewed sequence, abort and rollback
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conditions, and the authority stated by the owning execution path.
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## T01 — Contain, classify, and route the exposure
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```task
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id: NK-WP-0033-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "28a655da-7cd6-58e2-8ca8-64d192de63a6"
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```
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Mark every credential class in the rendered bundle exposed, stop further
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rendering, consult credential routing, notify custody and issuer owners, and
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publish a sanitized risk notice.
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Completed 2026-08-23. State Hub decision
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`c43eef14-a209-41b1-ba67-781ca14c5ea2` requires governed rotation. Coordination
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was routed to railiance-platform in `acf98be3-ff6b-4270-bd21-0193bebd806b`
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and KeyCape in `c774f748-6240-4733-89c7-518079a30f61`; risk-nexus received
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sanitized notice `c5d67801-1bc3-4e66-98c9-e08a58313970`. No value was inspected
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or copied.
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## T02 — Agree the value-safe rotation and issuer-continuity contract
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```task
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id: NK-WP-0033-T02
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status: progress
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "c5ca817c-d601-5172-a106-1546c0743635"
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```
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KeyCape and railiance-platform must name the authoritative provider, custody,
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and consumer update for all four classes; select one revision-pinned bundle or
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field-safe sequence that cannot replay a stale exposed value; specify positive
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and predecessor-negative verification; and state abort, rollback, and evidence
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rules.
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KeyCape currently loads one private key and signs under static `kid=key-1` even
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though its JWKS type can serve multiple keys. The contract must either add and
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verify an active-key plus retained-public-key overlap or deliberately accept
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immediate token invalidation and verifier refresh. Evidence was routed in
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`2b24ccc2-c031-453e-ac70-52f0aaa127d5` and
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`9277d962-b511-4da7-9fc6-2c79bac448c1`.
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Railiance-platform published its forward-only owner contract at revision
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`453fed3`. NetKingdom review is recorded in
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`history/2026-08-23-keycape-exposure-dependency-map.md`. The review found that
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the LLDAP credential also feeds identity-provisioner and privacyIDEA's
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persisted LDAP resolver. It also found that privacyIDEA `/auth` issues an
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expiring administrative session JWT with no individual revocation operation;
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`/token/revoke` applies to MFA authenticators, not that JWT. T02 therefore
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remains in progress until the contract chooses expiry-based predecessor denial
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or separately authorizes wider JWT-signing-secret invalidation.
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Warden routing has no concrete entries for these four KeyCape lanes. Catalog
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repair was requested in `e5794329-cda5-4a6f-8234-a6eaa1fc318c`; generic or
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unrelated routes do not authorize execution.
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## T03 — Implement a non-printing, non-stale rotation path
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```task
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id: NK-WP-0033-T03
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status: wait
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "f0f6d6c3-9c45-56b7-9fd6-52fb0ea9054a"
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```
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After T02 review, implement or select an owner-controlled path that receives
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replacement material through hidden input or mode-0600 files, updates every
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provider and consumer in the agreed order, never reconstructs the bundle from
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stale local inputs, and retains no plaintext artifact after verification.
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Provider-specific helpers must cover field-safe updates for `lldap-secrets`
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and `authelia-secrets`, the persistent LLDAP admin password, the
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identity-provisioner restart, privacyIDEA resolver `lldap-coulomb`, the
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Authelia client hash, and the privacyIDEA JWT expiry disposition. Static or
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dry-run tests must prove replacements do not enter argv or stdout.
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Do not use `sso-mfa/bootstrap/creds-rotate.sh` through an agent as currently
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written: it prints generated replacement values and its signing-key path
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causes immediate invalidation. Do not use a helper that reads the live Secret
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unless its output and temporary-state behavior have been independently
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reviewed for this incident.
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## T04 — Execute the governed replacement cutover
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```task
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id: NK-WP-0033-T04
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status: wait
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "751cca48-2bc9-5d44-80a0-60478717e99e"
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```
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Under the separately approved authority/window, replace the signing material,
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LLDAP bind credential, Authelia client credential, and privacyIDEA admin token;
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roll or reload every affected provider/consumer; preserve or explicitly end
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JWT continuity according to T02; and abort on partial-bundle or stale-source
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evidence. This task is not authorized until T02 and T03 are done.
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## T05 — Prove replacement, predecessor rejection, and cleanup
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```task
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id: NK-WP-0033-T05
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status: wait
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "41e55d5c-ae28-5ee2-be25-b9a3758428f7"
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```
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Record only sanitized identifiers, public-key fingerprints, revisions,
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rollout status, positive authentication/MFA outcomes, predecessor rejection or
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expiry, cleanup receipts, and residual limitations. Close the incident only
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after all four credential classes have an authoritative disposition and no
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temporary plaintext or stale bundle remains.
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