tegwick
cbadd359ba
Lane key-cape-oidc-login -> keycape-attended-case-change in the register-client, ensure-groups and bind-env descriptors; deliver-consumer-secret actor agent -> human; verify_consumer reports a value-free, exactly-once probe record list bound into the observation digest. Composition artifacts, type.yaml and admit/compose tests are left for the orchestrator to regenerate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 903097@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: aa320c8f-c3fa-46e7-8541-0b58e1e45d23
43 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Bind-env adapter source candidate (NK-WP-0048-T27)
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Status: **unexercised source candidate**. Not reviewed, pinned, admitted or run.
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`bind-env-adapter.py` adds one `env` entry to the `keycape` container of the
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`sso/keycape` Deployment, binding the helper-derived name
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(`KEYCAPE_<CLIENT>_CLIENT_SECRET`) to `valueFrom.secretKeyRef` on the delivered
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secret reference (`keycape-<client>-client`, key `client-secret`). It handles
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references only: a binding carrying `value`, or an existing entry of that name
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bound to anything else (including a literal), is refused.
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- Case parsing reuses `keycape-client.py` (`client_from_case`, `env_binding`), so
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canonical `oidc-browser-relying-party@1.1` stays the default; public clients
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and `allow_unimplemented` are refused.
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- `read`/`write` are injected capabilities; `write` is compare-and-swap on the
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observed `resourceVersion`. No kubectl, credential or secret value is used.
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- `build(...)` returns a closed Warden v1 `Adapter` (T13 pattern). It pins the
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owner source digest over the full local import closure (`bind-env-adapter.py`,
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`keycape-client.py`, `portal-client-rollout.py`, `openbao-client-config.py`,
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`register-user-engine-portal.py` — closure checked by
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`test_adapter_source_closure.py`), the
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descriptor digest (`Pins.adapter`), case source and acceptance digests, and the
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admitted invocation (step `bind-env`, actor `human`, lane `keycape-attended-case-change`,
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created object `keycape-env-binding`, not retry-safe, `parent-session` scope).
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Every attempt is rebound to that invocation and re-checks source drift.
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- `publish`, `authenticate` and `revoke_session` are mandatory injected
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capabilities. The parent session is revoked in `finally`, also on refusal; a
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missing revocation or invalid/reused evidence identifier is never success.
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Evidence payload is closed metadata (`netkingdom.keycape-bind-env.attempt.v1`:
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invocation, source, outcome, env name, before/after revision) with no values.
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- An identical existing binding is `no-change` and is not rollbackable.
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- Rollback removes only the entry this process created, whose evidence still
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authenticates (a fresh process has no creation authority), and only while the
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Deployment is still at the revision that creation produced; otherwise owner
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reconciliation is required.
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Tests: `PYTHONPATH=~/ops-warden/src ~/ops-warden/.venv/bin/python -m pytest -q
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test_bind_env_adapter.py` (synthetic only).
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Not supplied: kernel-level admission/dispatch tests with fixture trust (as in T13),
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owner confirmation of the proposed step/lane/schema/object names, NetKingdom
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runtime owner source review before pinning, the real owner evidence and
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revocation capabilities, and any native action. Those remain separate gates.
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