tegwick
f2956334bf
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 4515@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 0bf96127-6e04-41be-bfda-d11717c3f354
56 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
56 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
# Crisis custody list
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NK-WP-0054-T07. Drafted 2026-10-24 from repository documents and the founder's statements
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that day. **This list holds no secret value, ever.** It names what unlocks recovery, who
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holds it, where, and whether using it needs the very services being recovered. Anything
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the repository cannot establish is marked `TO CONFIRM`; the founder confirms each one.
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It belongs with the backup documentation:
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[disaster recovery guide](disaster-recovery-storage-share.md),
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[identity restore drill](identity-restore-drill.md) and
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[Credential Management Standard §4](../canon/standards/credential-management_v0.2.md).
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That standard names the custody categories. This list makes them concrete.
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## The one rule
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For every row, answer: **does using this item work when SSO and OpenBao are down?**
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A recovery path that is satisfied only by logging in to something being restored is a
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circular dependency and is recorded as a gap, not as custody.
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## Roles used below
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| Role | Identity | Used for |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Crisis operator | `admin` | Runs recovery and routine validation (founder intent, 2026-10-24) |
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| Authorizer | `platform-root` / king credential | Break-glass authority from offline custody; nothing routine |
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| Developer | `tegwick` | Builds and tests tooling; holds no recovery keys |
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## Items
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| # | Item | Unlocks | Holder and location | Works with SSO and OpenBao down? | Last proven use | Gap or action |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| 1 | Custodian/backup age private key (recipient `age1zvry…50syr3tsz`, labelled `railiance-backup`) | Decrypts the identity backup bundle and the SOPS custody files | Founder, independently held password safe or offline packet (Standard §4) | Yes, offline | Entered by the founder at hidden prompts 2026-10-24 (LLDAP, Authelia, privacyIDEA stages) | `TO CONFIRM`: number of copies, who else could recover if the founder cannot |
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| 2 | Storage Share `Backup` account app password | Downloads the protected ciphertext without OpenBao or SSO | Founder, independent custody `TO CONFIRM` | Yes, provider is outside the platform | Fresh retrieval 2026-10-24 | One provider copy only; residual risk accepted until 2027-01-31 (G1, NK-WP-0053) |
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| 3 | OpenBao unseal shares (2 of 3 required in the restore drill) | Unseals a restored or production OpenBao; with the shares, `generate-root` can mint a root token for break-glass (ceremony not yet documented) | Founder as `platform-root` holds all three shares (single-holder custody: accepted exception, hub decision `37464824`, 2026-10-27) | Yes, offline | Original shares used in the isolated restore RPF-WP-0064-T07, 2026-10-24 | `TO CONFIRM` where the shares are kept and that the place opens with SSO down; single holder = single point of loss (reviewed at NK-WP-0055-T09) |
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| 4 | `platform-root` / king account and factors | Final authority; break-glass | Independently held password safe or offline packet (Standard §4; custody doc) | **No if used through KeyCape**: its login and OTP are validated by the services being recovered | OTP validated against restored privacyIDEA 2026-10-24 (isolated) | `TO CONFIRM` the offline path that works with SSO down (OpenBao shares, item 3) and record it |
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| 5 | Founder admission signing key (SSH, principal `bernd`) | Signs attempt and restore admissions | Founder, workstation key; verifier anchor `/etc/secrets-engine/admission/allowed_signers` | Yes | Signed the T40 admission 2026-10-23 | `TO CONFIRM` which identity this key belongs to; the anchor is workstation-bound, so a backup of key and anchor is needed |
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| 6 | `admin` password and OTP token | Day-to-day platform administration and, per intent, recovery operation | Founder; OTP enrolled 2026-10-24 | **No**: login and token checks need KeyCape, LLDAP and privacyIDEA | Token not yet in any restored backup; first restore proof after the 2026-10-25 03:45 UTC capture | Same account as the directory bind used by Authelia and privacyIDEA until the split in NK-WP-0054-T05 |
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| 7 | `pi-admin` credentials (privacyIDEA internal admin) | Token repair and re-enrolment | Founder's personal password safe (confirmed 2026-10-27) | Custody yes if the safe opens offline; use needs a running privacyIDEA | Not yet drilled | `TO CONFIRM` the safe opens offline and has a second copy; add a pi-admin check to the drill (NK-WP-0053-T04) |
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| 8 | Ops bundle (age-encrypted tar of service secrets, `make creds-bundle`) | Point-in-time service secrets | Offsite location `TO CONFIRM` (Standard §7) | Yes, needs item 1 | Not drilled | Confirm location and age; decide whether it duplicates the identity bundle |
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| 9 | Operator access to the production host or cluster for a real restore | Applying a restore to production | Today (observed 2026-10-27): ops-bridge tunnel `k3s-api-railiance01` (SSH as `tegwick` to `92.205.62.239` with a **static key file**, local port 16444) plus the attended admin kubeconfig `~/.kube/config-railiance01` (route `kubernetes-railiance01-admin`, client-certificate user). Both live only on the founder workstation | Yes for this path: neither the static SSH key nor the kubeconfig client certificate needs KeyCape or OpenBao. **No** for ops-warden SSH certificates: warden's production backend is OpenBao (`backend: vault`) | Used 2026-10-27 (founder deleted two historical Secrets) | Gaps: workstation-only, no second copy; the path runs as the developer identity `tegwick` under an agent-labelled tunnel actor; provider console/rescue access `TO CONFIRM`. Decide the crisis-operator path (NK-WP-0055-T13) |
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## Non-secret recovery assets
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These need no custody but must be reachable: the published recovery kit on Storage Share
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(guide, tools ZIP, checksum; verify the checksum against a trusted copy), the pinned
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container images, and a trusted checkout of this repository. TLS for `kc.coulomb.social`
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has no custody: it is reissued through ACME and needs working public DNS and HTTP-01.
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## Maintenance
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- Review at every restore drill (NK-WP-0053), and record the date each item was last
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proven. An item never proven stays marked as such.
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- Loss or suspected exposure of any item goes to its owner's rotation and revocation
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process (Standard §6); this list rotates nothing.
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- A machine-readable, non-secret record with a freshness check, modelled on
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`tools/custody-record`, is proposed in NK-WP-0054-T07. Until then this document is the list.
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