feat(workplan): open MASON-WP-0003 for the state-hub forge read lane

Nine private repositories are invisible to the hub's derivation: the pod clones
Forgejo anonymously, so ADR-012's premise that the forge is the projection
source holds only for repositories central can read.

warden route find returns no lane for this need, and the nearest entry is an
operator admin PAT owned by railiance-platform — more authority than derivation
requires. ops-mason owns AppRoles, policies and KV paths, which is what is
missing.

Six tasks: settle scope and breadth, create the AppRole and KV path, register
the routing entry, deliver the credential to the pod, teach the derivation to
use it, and confirm the nine. Token creation stays operator-executed; this
workplan describes the lane rather than performing it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
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codex 2026-08-26 21:09:34 +02:00
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---
id: MASON-WP-0003
type: workplan
title: "Forge read lane so central can derive private repositories"
domain: infotech
repo: ops-mason
status: proposed
owner: codex
topic_slug: custodian
created: "2026-08-26"
updated: "2026-08-26"
related:
- CUST-ADR-012
- STATE-WP-0083
---
# Forge read lane so central can derive private repositories
## Goal
Give the State Hub read-only access to Forgejo so it can derive projections for
private repositories, and register the lane so `warden route find` answers this
question the next time someone asks it.
## Why this exists
`ADR-012` makes the forge the projection source: central clones a repository's
default branch and derives its work records from what Forgejo holds. That works
today because the pod clones anonymously.
It does not work for private repositories. The first fleet-wide reset
(`STATE-WP-0083-T04`, 2026-08-26) covered 121 repositories and nine failed
identically:
```text
fatal: could not read Username for 'https://forgejo.coulomb.social'
```
`rapp-core-hub`, `rapp-issue-core`, `rapp-openbao`, `rapp-policy-nexus` and five
others are invisible to the hub's derivation entirely.
This is a limit on the ADR's own premise. *The forge is the projection source*
holds only for repositories central can read, and nothing in the current design
says so. Worse, the failure is indistinguishable from a broken repository: the
pass records an error, not a policy, so "cannot read" and "does not exist" look
the same from the outside.
## Why ops-mason owns it
`warden route find` returns no lane for this need. The nearest entry is
`forgejo-admin-api-token` — an operator PAT owned by `railiance-platform` — which
is far more authority than derivation requires and the wrong thing to reuse.
This repository builds "OpenBao AppRoles, policies, and KV secret paths so
ops-warden always has something real to route to", which is exactly what is
missing. ops-warden issues SSH certificates only and routes everything else; a
Forgejo token is not its to vend.
## Decide the token's scope and breadth
```task
id: MASON-WP-0003-T01
status: todo
priority: high
```
Two choices to settle before anything is created, because they determine what
the credential can do if it leaks.
**Permission.** Derivation performs `git clone --depth 1` and nothing else, so
the token needs repository *read* and no other scope. It must not be able to
push, administer, or read other Forgejo resources. Reusing the existing admin PAT
is explicitly rejected: a projection that only reads should not hold an
identity that can write.
**Breadth.** Organisation-wide read means new private repositories derive without
further work and no one has to remember this lane exists. A per-repository grant
is tighter but needs maintenance every time a repository is added, and a
forgotten grant reappears as the same silent "cannot read" this workplan exists
to remove. Recommend organisation-wide read, on the grounds that the failure mode
of the narrow option is invisible.
Acceptance: scope and breadth recorded as a decision with the reasoning, not
just a value.
## Create the AppRole, policy, and KV path
```task
id: MASON-WP-0003-T02
status: todo
priority: high
```
Create the read-only Forgejo token, an OpenBao policy granting read on exactly
one KV path, and an AppRole for the State Hub workload to authenticate with.
The token value never appears in Git, State Hub, a workplan, a log, or a chat
message. This task records *where* the credential lives and *who* may read it —
never what it is.
Operator-executed. This workplan describes the lane; it does not perform the
creation.
Acceptance: the KV path exists and holds a working read-only token; the policy
grants read on that path alone; the AppRole authenticates and cannot read
anything else.
## Register the lane in the routing catalog
```task
id: MASON-WP-0003-T03
status: todo
priority: high
```
Add an entry so `warden route find "state hub read private repository"` resolves.
Its absence is why this had to be reasoned out from first principles rather than
looked up.
The entry should name the owner, the subsystem, the KV path, the rotation
method, and state plainly that ops-warden routes but does not execute it.
Acceptance: `warden route find` returns the lane; `warden route show` gives an
operator enough to act without reading this workplan.
## Deliver the credential to the pod
```task
id: MASON-WP-0003-T04
status: todo
priority: medium
```
Make the token available to the `state-hub` deployment as a Kubernetes Secret,
mounted or injected, and referenced by the chart the same way `state-hub-env`
already is.
It must not be baked into the image, and it must not be committed to the chart.
Rotation must not require a chart change.
Acceptance: the pod can read the credential; nothing in the repository contains
it; rotating the token does not require a redeploy.
## Teach the derivation to use it
```task
id: MASON-WP-0003-T05
status: todo
priority: medium
```
`derive_from_forge()` in `state-hub` clones anonymously. It should use the
credential when present and continue working without it — a hub with no token
must still derive public repositories rather than failing wholesale.
Credentials must never reach the clone URL in a way that lands in logs or process
listings; use a credential helper or header, not an embedded userinfo URL.
**Distinguish "cannot read" from "does not exist".** A repository the hub is not
permitted to read must be reported as unreadable, not as a repository whose
records no longer derive. Today the reset treats a failed clone as an error,
which is correct only by accident: if a clone ever returned empty instead of
failing, every record in that repository would be proposed for retirement. That
is the failure that nearly retired `vergabe-teilnahme`, and it must be impossible
here by construction rather than by luck.
Acceptance: private repositories derive; a hub without the credential still
derives public ones; an unreadable repository is reported as unreadable and never
as retirement work.
## Confirm the nine
```task
id: MASON-WP-0003-T06
status: wait
priority: medium
```
Re-run the fleet reset and confirm the nine repositories derive rather than
error. Expect them to arrive with a real diff — quite possibly a large one, since
none has ever been reconciled against its files.
Treat the first diff for each as review material, not as work to apply. Every
repository examined this way for the first time has produced findings.
Acceptance: fleet errors fall from nine to zero; each newly readable repository
has its first diff reviewed before anything is applied.