Nine private repositories are invisible to the hub's derivation: the pod clones Forgejo anonymously, so ADR-012's premise that the forge is the projection source holds only for repositories central can read. warden route find returns no lane for this need, and the nearest entry is an operator admin PAT owned by railiance-platform — more authority than derivation requires. ops-mason owns AppRoles, policies and KV paths, which is what is missing. Six tasks: settle scope and breadth, create the AppRole and KV path, register the routing entry, deliver the credential to the pod, teach the derivation to use it, and confirm the nine. Token creation stays operator-executed; this workplan describes the lane rather than performing it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2583210@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: f2bff2d5-e9b2-4338-92ca-10282a927006
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| id | type | title | domain | repo | status | owner | topic_slug | created | updated | related | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MASON-WP-0003 | workplan | Forge read lane so central can derive private repositories | infotech | ops-mason | proposed | codex | custodian | 2026-08-26 | 2026-08-26 |
|
Forge read lane so central can derive private repositories
Goal
Give the State Hub read-only access to Forgejo so it can derive projections for
private repositories, and register the lane so warden route find answers this
question the next time someone asks it.
Why this exists
ADR-012 makes the forge the projection source: central clones a repository's
default branch and derives its work records from what Forgejo holds. That works
today because the pod clones anonymously.
It does not work for private repositories. The first fleet-wide reset
(STATE-WP-0083-T04, 2026-08-26) covered 121 repositories and nine failed
identically:
fatal: could not read Username for 'https://forgejo.coulomb.social'
rapp-core-hub, rapp-issue-core, rapp-openbao, rapp-policy-nexus and five
others are invisible to the hub's derivation entirely.
This is a limit on the ADR's own premise. The forge is the projection source holds only for repositories central can read, and nothing in the current design says so. Worse, the failure is indistinguishable from a broken repository: the pass records an error, not a policy, so "cannot read" and "does not exist" look the same from the outside.
Why ops-mason owns it
warden route find returns no lane for this need. The nearest entry is
forgejo-admin-api-token — an operator PAT owned by railiance-platform — which
is far more authority than derivation requires and the wrong thing to reuse.
This repository builds "OpenBao AppRoles, policies, and KV secret paths so ops-warden always has something real to route to", which is exactly what is missing. ops-warden issues SSH certificates only and routes everything else; a Forgejo token is not its to vend.
Decide the token's scope and breadth
id: MASON-WP-0003-T01
status: todo
priority: high
Two choices to settle before anything is created, because they determine what the credential can do if it leaks.
Permission. Derivation performs git clone --depth 1 and nothing else, so
the token needs repository read and no other scope. It must not be able to
push, administer, or read other Forgejo resources. Reusing the existing admin PAT
is explicitly rejected: a projection that only reads should not hold an
identity that can write.
Breadth. Organisation-wide read means new private repositories derive without further work and no one has to remember this lane exists. A per-repository grant is tighter but needs maintenance every time a repository is added, and a forgotten grant reappears as the same silent "cannot read" this workplan exists to remove. Recommend organisation-wide read, on the grounds that the failure mode of the narrow option is invisible.
Acceptance: scope and breadth recorded as a decision with the reasoning, not just a value.
Create the AppRole, policy, and KV path
id: MASON-WP-0003-T02
status: todo
priority: high
Create the read-only Forgejo token, an OpenBao policy granting read on exactly one KV path, and an AppRole for the State Hub workload to authenticate with.
The token value never appears in Git, State Hub, a workplan, a log, or a chat message. This task records where the credential lives and who may read it — never what it is.
Operator-executed. This workplan describes the lane; it does not perform the creation.
Acceptance: the KV path exists and holds a working read-only token; the policy grants read on that path alone; the AppRole authenticates and cannot read anything else.
Register the lane in the routing catalog
id: MASON-WP-0003-T03
status: todo
priority: high
Add an entry so warden route find "state hub read private repository" resolves.
Its absence is why this had to be reasoned out from first principles rather than
looked up.
The entry should name the owner, the subsystem, the KV path, the rotation method, and state plainly that ops-warden routes but does not execute it.
Acceptance: warden route find returns the lane; warden route show gives an
operator enough to act without reading this workplan.
Deliver the credential to the pod
id: MASON-WP-0003-T04
status: todo
priority: medium
Make the token available to the state-hub deployment as a Kubernetes Secret,
mounted or injected, and referenced by the chart the same way state-hub-env
already is.
It must not be baked into the image, and it must not be committed to the chart. Rotation must not require a chart change.
Acceptance: the pod can read the credential; nothing in the repository contains it; rotating the token does not require a redeploy.
Teach the derivation to use it
id: MASON-WP-0003-T05
status: todo
priority: medium
derive_from_forge() in state-hub clones anonymously. It should use the
credential when present and continue working without it — a hub with no token
must still derive public repositories rather than failing wholesale.
Credentials must never reach the clone URL in a way that lands in logs or process listings; use a credential helper or header, not an embedded userinfo URL.
Distinguish "cannot read" from "does not exist". A repository the hub is not
permitted to read must be reported as unreadable, not as a repository whose
records no longer derive. Today the reset treats a failed clone as an error,
which is correct only by accident: if a clone ever returned empty instead of
failing, every record in that repository would be proposed for retirement. That
is the failure that nearly retired vergabe-teilnahme, and it must be impossible
here by construction rather than by luck.
Acceptance: private repositories derive; a hub without the credential still derives public ones; an unreadable repository is reported as unreadable and never as retirement work.
Confirm the nine
id: MASON-WP-0003-T06
status: wait
priority: medium
Re-run the fleet reset and confirm the nine repositories derive rather than error. Expect them to arrive with a real diff — quite possibly a large one, since none has ever been reconciled against its files.
Treat the first diff for each as review material, not as work to apply. Every repository examined this way for the first time has produced findings.
Acceptance: fleet errors fall from nine to zero; each newly readable repository has its first diff reviewed before anything is applied.