ops-mason/INTENT.md
tegwick 718df758dc Point layering note at the published standard
The layer model is now published as
net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.1.md (proposed) and
ratified by gate-house GH-DEC-2026-001. The note previously said the
standard was not yet written.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2564823@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2a7ed827-4928-4b9f-8613-9135c9cadfe9
2026-08-28 21:21:08 +02:00

14 KiB

INTENT

NetKingdom layering review — 2026-08-28. This repository's role was reviewed against the NetKingdom IT-security layer model: Taxonomy → Tooling → Engines → Staff, layered by determinism and by the kind of artifact each layer produces. Findings and the argument behind them: gate-house/history/2026-08-28-security-layer-model-and-gate-house-recut.md. The model is net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.1.md (proposed), ratified by gate-house/decisions/decisions.md GH-DEC-2026-001.

The layer rule that binds every repository: Staff never touches tooling directly. It acts only through engine APIs.

This repository is Staff — interactive, non-deterministic; builds and tears down. Add the layer label and the Staff invariant: ops-mason acts through engine APIs, never against tooling directly. Record the demarcation this repository is half of: ops-mason and ops-warden own access routes and lanes — how a worker reaches a host; access-engine owns access rules — whether they may. The perimeter doctrine ops-mason builds to is gate-house's; the building is ops-mason's.

This note records what should change. The body below is not yet adapted.

This file captures why this repository exists, the direction it is moving toward, and the kind of system it is meant to become. It is intentionally aspirational and stable, not a description of current implementation.


One-liner

The builder of NetKingdom security infrastructure — creates, changes, maintains, and tears down access routes, credentials, tokens, and policies so that ops-warden always has something real to route to.


Why this exists

ops-warden is deliberately narrow: it issues short-lived SSH certificates and routes every other credential need to the subsystem that owns it — it "owns no secret store and vends nothing" (ops-warden/wiki/AccessRouting.md). That's the right shape for a front door, but it leaves a real gap: something has to actually build the AppRole, the policy, the KV secret path, the catalog entry that ops-warden then points workers at. Today that gap is filled ad hoc — a founder spends "~10 minutes" hand-running bao write commands per new lane (see binky-control/integrations/executor-worker-secrets.md for a representative example: a new AppRole, a new policy, delivered role_id/secret_id files, a catalog entry, repeated by hand every time a new consumer needs a credential).

ops-mason exists to turn that ad hoc founder mechanic into a reviewed, repeatable construction process — so new security infrastructure gets built consistently, against what already exists, with a human decision point before anything is actually applied, instead of bespoke one-off provisioning every time.


The Mission

ops-mason builds NetKingdom security infrastructure — OpenBao AppRoles, policies, KV secret paths, and their ops-warden catalog entries — as defined by architecture documents (net-kingdom) and by real consumer demand (a repo/workload that needs a credential lane). It does not decide whether access should exist — that's an architecture or founder decision — it figures out how to build what's already been decided on, and does the build once approved.

The four-phase process

  1. Construction plan. Given an access demand (a consumer, a credential type, a scope) and the concept behind it, draft what needs to be created, changed, or torn down to satisfy it — respecting, extending, or compacting existing structure rather than defaulting to "create something new" every time. Check first: does an existing policy/path/lane already cover this (the way rein-aharness's mail-triage reuses the existing llm-connect-provider-secrets lane instead of getting its own)? Does satisfying this demand let two existing near-duplicate lanes be merged instead of adding a third?

  2. Review and optimize. Check the draft plan against what's already provisioned (no redundant policies, no orphaned roles), consistency with existing naming/TTL/scoping conventions, and ease of use for the consumer. This is a self-review pass before a human ever sees the plan — the plan that reaches phase 3 should already be the best version of itself, not a first draft.

  3. Executive summary — the decision gate. Render what the plan actually grants: which roles get which access, to what, for how long, blast radius if the credential leaks, and what it costs to reverse. This is the one mandatory human checkpoint, and it exists for exactly the reason ops-warden's own design principle names: "the founder is escalated to, never tasked with mechanics" — ops-mason does the mechanical work in phases 1, 2, and 4; phase 3 is the founder's one decision, made in policy terms (approve, reject, or send back to phase 1 with feedback), not asked to review raw bao commands.

  4. Build. Once approved, execute the plan — create/modify/tear down the AppRole, policy, and secret path structure, then propose the matching ops-warden catalog entry. Not before phase 3 approval, ever, for anything that grants or widens access. (Tear-down of something already flagged for removal, or a dry-run/plan-only mode, does not require the same gate — see Design Principles.)

    ops-mason never touches secret values, including its own builds. It creates the empty KV path, the policy, and the AppRole — structure only. The actual secret value (an API key, a password) goes in through ops-warden's existing paste-once provision desk (ops-warden/src/warden/desk.py's paste_once_provision act): a localhost-only web form where the founder pastes the value once, written directly via bao kv put and never shown in a terminal, chat, or audit log. Phase 4 ends with "structure built, ready for paste-once provisioning" — it does not end with a live credential.


Responsibility boundary

ops-mason owns

  • Drafting and executing construction plans for new/changed/retired OpenBao AppRoles, policies, and KV secret paths (structure — never secret values, see phase 4 above)
  • Consistency review against existing NetKingdom credential structure — reuse over duplication, compaction over sprawl
  • The executive-summary format that makes a plan decidable at a glance
  • Proposing the matching entry in ops-warden's routing catalog (ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml) for what it builds
  • Its own audit trail of what it built, when, and under which approved plan

Catalog entries are pointer-shaped, same rule ops-warden enforces on every non-SSH entry (the catalog's own "no-double-source rule", ops-warden/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0010-access-routing-charter.md) — corrected here 2026-07-27 after checking real catalog entries, not just the header comment: id/title/need_keywords/owner_repo/ subsystem/wiki_ref/canon_ref/reviewed/status, always warden_executes: false (ops-mason built the lane, it does not execute the runtime credential fetch — the consumer's own code does, the way rein-openweights/credentials.py does today). Fields like auth_method/path_template/fetch_command/rotation.steps are expected on non-SSH entries — e.g. agent-harness-binky-mail-approle carries all of them despite warden_executes: false. What's actually reserved for warden_executes: true (ops-warden's own SSH lane) is a bare top-level steps: + cert_command: pair — that specific shape, not procedural detail in general. A companion wiki playbook (wiki/playbooks/<id>.md, ## Worker checklist section) is the norm, same as every other lane in the catalog — not a violation of no-double-source as long as it doesn't restate a different owner's procedure.

Landing a catalog entry is a normal git contribution to the ops-warden repo (a commit/PR touching registry/routing/catalog.yaml), subject to its own CI (tests/test_routing.py — anchor resolution) and its stale-review cadence (new entries typically start status: draft until the built lane is verified end-to-end, then promoted to active — same as any other owner-ship promotion in that catalog). ops-mason does not have, and does not need, some separate live registration API into ops-warden.

ops-mason does not own

Need Owner ops-mason's relationship
Whether access should exist at all Architecture docs / founder ops-mason builds what's decided, does not decide policy from nothing
Runtime authorization ("may actor X do Y") flex-auth ops-mason provisions the policy; flex-auth evaluates it at runtime
Identity, MFA, human auth key-cape / Keycloak Out of scope entirely
Routing consumers to the right lane ops-warden ops-mason feeds ops-warden's catalog; does not replace warden access/warden route
SSH certificate issuance ops-warden Untouched — ops-mason works in OpenBao AppRole/policy/KV space, not the SSH CA lane
OpenBao cluster init/unseal, platform deploy railiance-platform Out of scope — ops-mason operates within an already-running OpenBao
Holding or logging secret values Nobody, ever Same invariant as ops-warden: values live in OpenBao and process env only
Delivering the actual secret value into a path ops-mason built ops-warden (paste_once_provision desk) ops-mason builds the empty structure; the founder pastes the value once through ops-warden's existing local web form, never through ops-mason

ops-mason is not a second secrets manager and not a policy-decision engine. It is the construction crew for a foundation ops-warden and every credential consumer stands on.


Design principles

  1. Reuse before creation. Every construction plan's first move is checking whether existing structure already covers the demand. New infrastructure is the fallback, not the default.
  2. Compaction is in scope, not just addition. ops-mason may propose merging or retiring redundant lanes as part of a construction plan, not only adding new ones.
  3. One mandatory human gate, not a gate on everything. Anything that grants or widens access stops at the phase-3 executive summary. Read-only plan drafts, dry runs, and tear-down of something already approved for removal do not need to re-litigate the same decision.
  4. Mechanics stay with the agent; decisions stay with the founder. Directly extends ops-warden's own principle 7. The executive summary is written so the founder never has to read a bao command to make the call.
  5. Nothing built stays invisible. Every successful build is followed by a proposed catalog entry to ops-warden in the same phase-4 action (pointer-only, status: draft until verified end-to-end) — there should be no infrastructure ops-mason built that isn't at least a draft entry away from warden route find surfacing it.
  6. Posture-aware, like ops-warden. The organization is in build phase (one founder-operator, pre-revenue) — construction plans should reflect current posture (see ops-warden/wiki/WorkloadSecurityPosture.md) and tighten as posture graduates, not assume production-tier rigor on day one or dev-tier looseness forever.

Relationship to the rest of NetKingdom

net-kingdom            — owns the canonical security architecture
        |
        v
ops-mason               — builds the infrastructure that architecture calls for
        |                  (AppRoles, policies, KV paths, catalog entries)
        v
ops-warden              — routes consumers to what ops-mason built
        |
        v
OpenBao / flex-auth / key-cape — hold custody, evaluate policy, verify identity

NetKingdom defines what the security model should look like. ops-mason builds the concrete lanes that satisfy it. ops-warden is the front door that points consumers at those lanes once built. Confusing ops-mason's builder role with ops-warden's router role — or with OpenBao's custody role — recreates exactly the "wrong subsystem for the credential need" confusion ops-warden itself exists to prevent.


Non-goals

  • Being a second OpenBao, a second ops-warden, or a policy-decision engine
  • Deciding, unprompted, that new access should exist — that's an architecture/founder call, ops-mason builds what's already decided
  • Applying anything that grants or widens access without a phase-3 approved plan
  • Touching secret values at all, even transiently — structure only; values go in via ops-warden's paste_once_provision desk, not through ops-mason
  • Owning OpenBao cluster lifecycle, flex-auth runtime, or key-cape identity

Success criteria

ops-mason is succeeding when:

  1. A new credential lane can go from "a consumer needs this" to "built, catalogued, and routable via ops-warden" without a founder hand-running bao commands.
  2. Every construction plan is checked against existing structure before it's proposed — duplicate/near-duplicate lanes are the exception, not routine.
  3. The founder's only touchpoints are the phase-3 decision (plain terms: who gets what, for how long, what it costs to undo) and, if the lane needs a live value, one paste through ops-warden's existing desk — never asked to review or run raw provisioning mechanics.
  4. Every ops-mason build ships with a proposed ops-warden catalog entry — no undocumented lanes, even in draft status.
  5. Tearing down access is as routine and reviewed a process as creating it — sprawl doesn't accumulate because removal is just as supported as construction.