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ops-mason/plans/reuse-surface-private-source-reader.md
tegwick 7af68f2af4 MASON-WP-0013-T04: cite the reader-scope denial journal 
cust81-forge-reader-r1.jsonl records reader_scope seven_exact_no_extra_private_grants for attempt bb2693a7640f00b4e401467e. That status is written only after the excluded private repo, admin route, and Actions routes are refused. The workplan is finished. The plan stays reviewed.

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Assistant-Session: 01a16071-5425-78d3-80b4-20fe2ee30f0a
2026-10-22 00:35:58 +02:00

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---
id: reuse-surface-private-source-reader
revision: 2
proposal_id: MASON-CUST81-PRIVATE-READER-R1
demand_source: the-custodian/workplans/CUST-WP-0081-netkingdom-architecture-review-and-reuse.md
consumer_repo: reuse-surface
credential_type: forgejo-restricted-source-read-with-existing-kubernetes-eso
status: reviewed
approved_by: null
approved_at: null
created: "2026-10-15"
updated: "2026-10-22"
construction_inputs: builds/reuse-surface-private-source-reader/construction-inputs.json
candidate_spec_sha256: 59a7334eb58135790547fab0a8c8e8debb94cc7acaae88d30654c9ae887d6732
approved_spec_sha256: null
filed_as: null
---
# Construction plan: seven-repository hosted capability reader
## 1. Demand
The reuse-surface hub has established 63 of the 70 reviewed security capabilities.
It needs authenticated reads of the seven remaining private repository indexes.
The founder explicitly approved only public disclosure of the exact capability
metadata in CUST81-PRIVATE-METADATA-DISCLOSURE-R1; repository source remains
private. This plan proposes a dedicated repository reader for the hosted process
and delivery through its existing namespace-bound ESO identity. Credential access
and live changes require their own reviewed exact-revision approval.
Preparation source is CUST81-PRIVATE-READER-PROVISIONING-PREPARATION-R1, SHA256
`7819eb51d249f5c7aff4df9fb520afcfb76603b05a4104439499102b6c20af99`.
Consent receipt SHA256 is
`4a4602ad926e3af855d6ddba4731430d33e4a7432c507ba0a5193b9f43056b52`;
disclosure packet SHA256 is
`46ac4fe49a08054cc215aade2fbaf3b36ee334520997857ed84f530b52da9d35`.
The bundled construction-inputs retain all seven consented commits, index hashes
and native raw API URLs. These references contain no credential values.
The 2026-10-15 preparation did not survey OpenBao. Section 2 now records the
2026-10-21T22:15:21Z metadata survey under grant
`token-claude-MASON-WP-0014-T04` (policies `default`, `ops-mason-survey`).
This file is `reviewed`. It is not an ops-mason approval to mint or apply.
## 2. Existing-structure survey
Generated by `scripts/plan-survey.py` at 2026-10-21T22:15:21Z against `BAO_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:18200`, token display_name `token-claude-MASON-WP-0014-T04` (policies: default, ops-mason-survey). Metadata only: no `kv get` and no `*/data/*` read was issued; policy bodies were read with `bao policy read` for name-matched candidates only.
Demand: KV path `platform/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read`, proposed policy `workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime-eso`, AppRole `-`, Kubernetes role `reuse-surface-runtime-eso`, consumer `reuse-surface`. Match terms: `reuse-surface`, `reuse-surface-runtime-eso`, `forgejo`, `reuse-surface-source`, `reuse`, `forgejo-source-read`.
### `bao secrets list` (10 mounts, 1 relevant)
```text
platform/ kv version=2
```
### `bao auth list` (6 auth mounts, 2 relevant)
```text
approle/ approle
kubernetes/ kubernetes
```
### `bao policy list` (95 policies, 9 relevant)
```text
workload-kv-read-agent-harness-forgejo matches: forgejo
workload-kv-read-core-hub-forgejo-source matches: forgejo
workload-kv-read-forgejo-admin matches: forgejo
workload-kv-read-forgejo-mailer matches: forgejo
workload-kv-read-forgejo-mailer-eso matches: forgejo
workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso matches: forgejo
workload-kv-read-policy-nexus-forgejo-source matches: forgejo
workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime matches: reuse-surface, reuse
workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime-eso matches: reuse-surface, reuse-surface-runtime-eso, reuse, proposed name
```
### `bao list auth/approle/role` (approle) (14 roles, 0 relevant)
```text
(no relevant entries)
```
### `bao list auth/kubernetes/role` (kubernetes) (36 roles, 5 relevant)
```text
external-secrets-core-hub-forgejo-source matches: forgejo
token_policies=['workload-kv-read-core-hub-forgejo-source']
policies=['workload-kv-read-core-hub-forgejo-source']
token_ttl=900
token_max_ttl=0
token_num_uses=0
bound_service_account_names=['external-secrets']
bound_service_account_namespaces=['external-secrets']
external-secrets-keycape-forgejo matches: forgejo
token_policies=['workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso']
policies=['workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso']
token_ttl=900
token_max_ttl=900
token_num_uses=0
bound_service_account_names=['external-secrets']
bound_service_account_namespaces=['external-secrets']
audience=openbao
external-secrets-reuse-surface matches: reuse-surface, reuse
token_policies=['workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime']
policies=['workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime']
token_ttl=900
token_max_ttl=0
token_num_uses=0
bound_service_account_names=['external-secrets']
bound_service_account_namespaces=['external-secrets']
forgejo-mailer-eso matches: forgejo
token_policies=['workload-kv-read-forgejo-mailer-eso']
token_ttl=900
token_max_ttl=900
token_num_uses=0
bound_service_account_names=['forgejo-mailer-eso']
bound_service_account_namespaces=['forgejo']
audience=openbao
reuse-surface-runtime-eso matches: reuse-surface, reuse-surface-runtime-eso, reuse, proposed name
token_policies=['workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime-eso']
token_ttl=900
token_max_ttl=900
token_num_uses=0
bound_service_account_names=['reuse-surface-eso']
bound_service_account_namespaces=['reuse']
audience=openbao
```
### `bao policy read` of name-matched candidates (target `platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read`)
```text
workload-kv-read-agent-harness-forgejo: no stanza covers platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read
workload-kv-read-core-hub-forgejo-source: no stanza covers platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read
workload-kv-read-forgejo-admin: no stanza covers platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read
workload-kv-read-forgejo-mailer: no stanza covers platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read
workload-kv-read-forgejo-mailer-eso: no stanza covers platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read
workload-kv-read-keycape-forgejo-eso: no stanza covers platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read
workload-kv-read-policy-nexus-forgejo-source: no stanza covers platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read
workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime: no stanza covers platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read
workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime-eso: path "platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read" capabilities=['read']
```
### `bao kv metadata get` / `bao kv list` (metadata only)
```text
platform/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read: exists, current_version=1, created=2026-10-15, updated=2026-10-15
platform/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/: forgejo-source-read, runtime-secrets
```
### ops-warden routing catalog `/home/worsch/ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml` (49 entries, 8 relevant)
```text
whynot-design-npm-publish owner=railiance-platform status=active matches: forgejo
path_template: platform/workloads/coulomb/whynot-design/npm-publish
policy_ref: flex-auth check secret.read:whynot-design
auth_method: bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=whynot-design-workload-kv-read
policy-nexus-forgejo-source-read owner=railiance-platform status=active matches: forgejo, forgejo-source-read
path_template: platform/workloads/policy-nexus/forgejo-source-read
policy_ref: flex-auth check secret.read:policy-nexus
auth_method: bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=policy-nexus-forgejo-source-workload-kv-read
core-hub-forgejo-source-read owner=railiance-platform status=active matches: forgejo, forgejo-source-read
path_template: platform/workloads/core-hub/forgejo-source-read
policy_ref: workload-kv-read-core-hub-forgejo-source
auth_method: Kubernetes auth (mount kubernetes) role=external-secrets-core-hub-forgejo-source, bound to external-secrets/external-secrets; ESO delivery only (ClusterSecretStore openbao-core-hub-forgejo-source → ExternalSecret core-hub/repo-manager-forgejo-source)
reuse-surface-hub-write-token owner=railiance-platform status=active matches: reuse-surface, forgejo, reuse
path_template: platform/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets
policy_ref: flex-auth check secret.read:reuse
auth_method: bao login -method=oidc -path=netkingdom role=reuse-surface-hub-writer-workload-kv-read
railiance-backup-offsite-lane owner=railiance-platform status=active matches: forgejo
path_template: platform/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane
auth_method: caller's own OpenBao token (OIDC netkingdom role railiance-backup-workload-kv-read)
state-hub-forge-derivation-read owner=ops-mason status=active matches: forgejo
path_template: platform/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation (field FORGE_READ_TOKEN)
auth_method: Kubernetes auth (role state-hub-forge-derivation, ServiceAccount state-hub/state-hub) from the in-cluster state-hub workload
forgejo-admin-api-token owner=railiance-platform status=active matches: forgejo
path_template: platform/workloads/forgejo/forgejo-admin
auth_method: caller's own OpenBao token (OIDC netkingdom role forgejo-admin-workload-kv-read)
agent-harness-forgejo-deploy owner=railiance-platform status=active matches: forgejo
path_template: platform/workloads/agent-harness/forgejo-deploy-key
policy_ref: flex-auth check secret.read:agent-harness-forgejo
auth_method: caller's own OpenBao token (policy workload-kv-read-agent-harness-forgejo) or host-local key at ~/.local/agent-harness/ssh/forgejo-deploy
```
### Does an existing lane already satisfy this demand?
**Decision (survey 2026-10-21T22:15:21Z): the OpenBao delivery lane already matches.** Edited from the generated "yes".
- KV `platform/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read` exists, `current_version=1`, created and updated 2026-10-15. No data body was read.
- Policy `workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime-eso` is the only name-matched policy that grants `read` on `platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read`.
- Kubernetes role `reuse-surface-runtime-eso` exists: `token_policies=['workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime-eso']`, SA `reuse-surface-eso`, namespace `reuse`, audience `openbao`, ttl and max ttl 900.
- The caller writer policy `workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime` has no stanza for that path. The other name-matched Forgejo policies do not either. Catalog entries `core-hub-forgejo-source-read`, `policy-nexus-forgejo-source-read`, `reuse-surface-hub-write-token`, and `forgejo-admin-api-token` are different paths.
- The survey grant's own capabilities on that data path and on `platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/runtime-secrets` are `deny`. Metadata read on the reader path is `list, read`.
- One grant file was present, display name `token-claude-MASON-WP-0014-T04`. It is an `ops-mason-survey` grant. It is not an operator or admin token. A second file named for MASON-WP-0013-T02 was not minted.
### Forgejo-owner Q1–Q3
`the-custodian` `owner-assembly/forge-final-r2/review/forge-owner-review-r2.json`, reviewer `railiance-forge-owner (agent railiance-forge, codex)`, `reviewed_at` 2026-10-14T23:08:34Z, `sec_dsm_order`:
- Q1: no direct Kubernetes identity accepted by the current raw HTTP route is demonstrated.
- Q2: KeyCape human login does not establish machine API federation; no installed workload JWT trust is demonstrated.
- Q3: upstream Forgejo OAuth can issue expiring access tokens, but only `authorization_code` and `refresh_token`; no viable workload `client_credentials` or token exchange is demonstrated. A static fallback is conditional.
That review is the Forgejo owner's hierarchy text. It is not founder authorization. Disclosure consent is a different record.
## 3. Proposed changes
### SEC-DSM §37 decision procedure, in order
1. **Q1 — native identity:** the current native raw HTTP fetch uses an
Authorization credential; Kubernetes SA identity alone is not demonstrated
as accepted by this Forgejo route. Candidate answer: no for the current
consumer interface, subject to Forgejo/reuse owner confirmation. Anonymous
access would require private visibility change and does not satisfy demand.
2. **Q2 — federation:** human KeyCape OIDC login does not prove a machine-token
exchange for these raw API requests. No workload federation exchange for this
target is evidenced by the local source review. Candidate answer: no viable
installed interface demonstrated; Forgejo owner must confirm or supply a
higher mechanism. If supported reliably, revise to federation before approval.
3. **Q3 — ephemeral target credential:** the local CCR-0031 precedent states PATs
have no server-side expiry. No usable ephemeral Forgejo issuance/revocation
service is evidenced. Candidate answer: no mechanism demonstrated, pending
target-owner confirmation. Do not add a broker just to label a static PAT
dynamic (DSM-TRANS-003). ESO's 15-minute Bao token does not expire the PAT.
4. **Q4 — automatic rotation:** do not reuse an existing broader PAT. No automated
rotation job for this proposed dedicated identity is evidenced. Provisioning
capability is not automatic lifecycle enforcement. Answer: not demonstrated;
proposed attended rotation is explicitly manual, owned and dated.
5. **Q5 — residual static credential:** conditional on Q1–Q3 owner confirmation,
use a centrally governed dedicated PAT, OpenBao as custody authority, Forgejo
as grant/revocation authority, ESO/Kubernetes/env as delivery copies. Level 5
in §5, **centrally managed static secret**, not level 3 or 4. No AppRole is
needed: the existing ESO projected workload identity authenticates to Bao.
These answers follow DSM-ARCH-001–004, DSM-TRANS-002/003, DSM-K8S-001–004 and
§35/36: use existing projected SA identity for delivery, avoid adding a static
ESO token or broker, and distinguish central custody from delivery copies.
Unconfirmed Q1–Q3 are explicit review gates, not asserted facts.
### Exact object changes and boundaries
- **create** restricted private non-admin Forgejo user `reuse-surface-source`;
**create** org team `coulomb/reuse-surface-source-readers`. Dedicated target
identity replaces unsuitable broad readers identified in §2. Team permission
`read`, `includes_all_repositories=false`, `can_create_org_repo=false`, only
`repo.code=read`; all non-code units `none`. Team members exactly this user.
- **create** team membership for exactly `coulomb/rapp-openbao`,
`coulomb/rapp-policy-nexus`, `coulomb/rapp-postgres`, `coulomb/rapp-sbom-nexus`,
`coulomb/rapp-telemetry`, `coulomb/rapp-tenant-engine`, `coulomb/rapp-user-engine`.
Follow all API pages and inspect effective user grants, other teams, direct
collaborator access, organisation membership and repository ownership. Adding
seven repositories without checking extra effective grants is insufficient.
Existing identity/team with differing configuration is a conflict, not permission
to remove unrelated access silently. Reconciliation needs a revised plan.
- **create** dedicated PAT named `reuse-surface-source-read-<UTC-attempt>` with
scopes exactly `[read:repository]`. Platform-owned attended helper holds values
in memory, suppresses every raw response/error and returns token IDs only.
Password used for service bootstrap is random memory-only, never persisted
in evidence or reused as workload authentication. Prevent unattended password
login and recovery escalation according to Forgejo owner review.
- **create** KV-v2 entry `platform/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read`,
field `FORGEJO_SOURCE_TOKEN`. Platform alone provisions value through its
reviewed silent custody route from stdin; ops-mason does not handle the value.
It must retain accessor/token ID and custody version in sanitized lifecycle
inventory. A new path separates private reader from attended writer callers.
- **modify** only existing policy `workload-kv-read-reuse-surface-runtime-eso` by
adding `read` on exact
`platform/data/workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read`.
Candidate full file is bundled, SHA256
`788bb9c49ab571e522beeecf7a5e29d1c79c842a84fe6d801978655facd3b5bd`.
No glob, metadata grant, other sibling, caller writer policy, OIDC binding,
AppRole or Kubernetes auth role change. Verify role/token is still 15m and
bound to exact SA/namespace/audience; source configuration is not live proof.
- **modify** existing `reuse/reuse-surface-runtime` ExternalSecret by one data
item: secretKey `REUSE_SURFACE_FORGEJO_SOURCE_READ_TOKEN`, remoteRef key
`workloads/reuse/reuse-surface/forgejo-source-read`, property
`FORGEJO_SOURCE_TOKEN`. Bundled JSON item is a proposal for apps integration,
not a standalone apply object. Preserve existing writer and webhook fields.
- **modify** native fetch code/image through reuse and apps review: reuse owner
identified both Authorization header forwarding on redirects and registration-
controlled auth_env/URL credential exfiltration in the current native fetch.
Do not project the PAT until the full reviewed fix is image-digest pinned and
runtime authorization plus redirect credential isolation are verified.
Then deliver through existing envFrom and an apps-approved controlled rollout.
Image change is explicit; preserve resource bounds unless separately reviewed.
Rollout must account for SQLite/PVC and single-node headroom before approval.
- **modify** owner-controlled runtime config `REUSE_SURFACE_AUTH_SOURCE_ALLOWLIST`
to map `REUSE_SURFACE_FORGEJO_SOURCE_READ_TOKEN` to the exact fourteen consented
pinned API URL strings: seven indexes and seven capability entries. Candidate
config is `builds/reuse-surface-private-source-reader/auth-source-allowlist.json`;
registrations cannot set or widen this runtime authority. The patched consumer
checks exact URL membership **before credential lookup**, requires HTTPS and
refuses authenticated redirects including same-origin path changes. Apps/reuse
must safely inventory existing authenticated registrations (auth_env and URL
metadata only), review which destinations remain legitimate, and migrate their
mappings before fail-closed rollout. Inventory is not blanket consent. The new
reader mapping stays exact14; any existing legitimate other mapping needs its
own owner-reviewed authorization. Missing/invalid mappings fail closed.
- **create** proposed ops-warden pointer `reuse-surface-forgejo-source-read` in
draft status after construction, owner `railiance-platform`, non-SSH route
only (`warden_executes:false`). Runtime reader is the hub, not warden.
Activation remains ops-warden's independent verified catalog review.
### Full consumer candidate pins
Reuse owner provided full patch SHA256
`f707ddfd36d5d470c176530671bb30ff6a3af2dfff86937aa8a5618bcb79768e`,
fixed `federation.py` SHA256
`dbaa40f25cc0f090143578cd1c7068cb2cb00960fafd17d5239bf8a5bac514dd`,
native verification helper `private_source_verify.py` SHA256
`c67a284091cc4dd62dca56658a14b8ea1357e2b3df1518120da4c51e0ee8d85c`,
and owner runtime allowlist SHA256
`e1948c537e206b30fc72b9e4732a3f600d92e131813e6f7ecfd4bfbb18c27286`.
The ops-mason bundled compact allowlist has the same exact env and fourteen URL
sets; serialization/order differs. The construction inputs retain absolute
isolated-owner artifact references for integration. Owner reports focused30pass
and whole226pass with one isolated-relative-path failure; this is not native
runtime proof. Fixed image digest and owner execution review remain pending.
### Revision preservation
R2 refines the same proposal and trial; R1 is preserved under custodian
`owner-assembly/mason-r1/` and `/tmp/cust81-mason-reader-r1-snapshot`. R1 candidate
spec digest was `0d1f604c76e086c82675dc535004cf4da51ef5dc247959fab50295a673407980`.
Neither revision was approved or executed. The full consumer fix and runtime
allowlist supersede the earlier redirect-only image gate. Approval, when sought,
must bind this final reviewed revision, its consumer patch, runtime config and
image; do not create another scored trial from this refinement.
### Residual-secret lifecycle and elimination
Credential owner is railiance-platform; Forgejo owns target grants; reuse-surface
is the only workload consumer. Authority exposes **entire source code of the
seven repositories**, not just registry files. Metadata disclosure approval
alone does not authorize this larger repository-read grant.
Known intended copies: OpenBao KV current version and retained versions/backups;
Kubernetes Secret in `reuse` and etcd backups; hub process environment; transient
minting/delivery memory. Every namespace actor allowed to attach the ESO store or
reference the materialized Secret is an indirect consumer/exposure path and must
be reviewed; namespace conditions are not per-pod isolation. No CI/chat/local
credential file copy is allowed. Avoid Secret last-applied annotation copies.
Proposed lifetime policy is attended rotation **every 90 days**, and immediately
on compromise, owner change, consumer retirement or scope drift. This is a
recommended stricter policy than CCR-0031's 180-day precedent; it is not a claim
of automated enforcement or PAT native expiry. Record issuance and next-due UTC
in platform inventory, with an assigned owner reminder before activation.
Rotation: mint one replacement with the same checked grant; compare scopes and
all effective grants; write it as a new KV version without changing other fields;
wait for ESO, roll the reviewed fixed image, verify all seven native fetches, then revoke old
PAT by recorded ID. Replacement overlap must end within 24 hours. Failed or
ambiguous replacement issuance is reconciled by token-name/ID inventory before
retry; no blind minting. Review retained KV versions/backups under platform's
retention policy; obsolete token copies are harmless only after target revocation.
Immediate revocation deletes the dedicated PAT by ID, then removes/disables only
this identity's team grants as approved. Compromise response reviews Forgejo
access/audit metadata and scans owned repositories and approved logs for leaks
without placing tokens in prompts. Use secret scanners/redactors and suppressed
negative probes. Availability strategy fails private refresh closed and marks
consented cache stale; public discovery continues. Never substitute privileged
personal/admin/core-hub credentials during issuer outage.
Elimination depends on Forgejo/native federation or an operationally viable
short-lived service credential, plus native consumer support. Revisit at rotation
and at target upgrades; retain a live owner record for that engineering debt.
## 4. Review notes (ops-mason phase 2, incomplete)
Reuse existing delivery identity and stores rather than introduce AppRole/static
ESO authority. The new PAT is isolated; caller writer policy stays byte-identical.
The proposed full ESO policy preserves every original byte before one added exact
read stanza; integration must compare current live and source digests. If policy
changed, rebase, review and pin a fresh digest rather than overwrite it.
Existing `ops_mason.executor` engines do not express Forgejo user/team/PAT and
shared-policy extension. Do not mislabel this JSON as a supported build_spec or
pass it to a single-KV builder: that could replace existing policy. Candidate
spec digest is SHA256 of UTF-8 sorted compact JSON with allow_nan=false. It
binds scope; it is neither approval nor an executable adapter. Platform must
allocate CCR, own a silent idempotent provisioner and pin all execution/artifact
inputs before phase 3. Approval of a construction plan does not supply a token.
The OpenBao structure survey and the Forgejo-owner Q1–Q3 citation are in §2.
Platform CCR-2026-0046 and founder decision
`9833715e-a22a-45c0-ab6c-881f0f4f1a0e` are recorded on MASON-WP-0013-T03.
ops-mason does not mint, approve, or apply from this file.
## 5. Executive summary (candidate; not yet ready for approval)
1. **One-line ask.** Give the hosted capability hub a dedicated read-only account
for the seven private repositories whose capability metadata you consented
to publish, delivered using the existing workload-identity path.
2. **Who/what gets access.** Forgejo user `reuse-surface-source` obtains the
seven-repository read grant; the existing `reuse-surface-runtime-eso` identity
reads one additional exact custody entry for the hub. Namespace actors able
to reuse the delivery store/Secret remain an exposure consideration to review.
3. **To what.** Read-only source access across the seven named private repositories,
with no write/admin/non-code-unit grants. The hub publishes only the pinned
consented capability metadata; repository visibility stays private.
4. **For how long.** Bao delivery tokens remain 15 minutes, but the Forgejo PAT
has no expiry demonstrated. Proposed attended rotation is every 90 days with
immediate revocation on compromise; this distinction must be accepted explicitly.
5. **Blast radius if the credential leaks.** Entire private source of those seven
repositories can be read. The token must have no additional private-repository
access and cannot write. Metadata disclosure consent is narrower than that read
grant. Availability impact of controlled rollout remains owner-reviewed.
6. **Cost to reverse.** Revoke one PAT, remove only its dedicated grants, remove
one new ESO data item and one new policy stanza, and roll the reviewed fixed image.
Reconcile private registrations from the exact attempt; preserve the existing
public capabilities and writer/webhook keys. No additional paid infrastructure
is proposed (incremental estimate EUR 0); labor and credible loss remain unpriced,
so this stays supervised.
Founder decision `9833715e-a22a-45c0-ab6c-881f0f4f1a0e` (resolved 2026-10-15,
Bernd Worsch) binds execution revision SHA256
`704a9c932202fc14456652ea4dfdb3acb8b1db0ab3bbf5fff50e92b2c517c380`.
Disclosure-consent digest
`4a4602ad926e3af855d6ddba4731430d33e4a7432c507ba0a5193b9f43056b52` is a
different record. This file stays `reviewed`. ops-mason does not set it
`approved` and does not apply it.
## 6. Proposed verification and rollback contract
The contract below is the acceptance rule. The platform path already ran.
ops-mason's 2026-10-21 metadata receipt, the seven-index receipt, the 70-id
receipt, and the reader-scope journal are on MASON-WP-0013-T04. The draft
catalog proposal is not activated. No secret value is in those records.
Before changes: exact CCR/plan/script/manifest digests, owner reviews and founder
approved revision must match; metadata survey proves current path/policy/role;
source/consent pins match; all existing user/team conflicts resolved; previous
policy and deployment revision retained; apps runs dry-run and client diff,
confirms target node and headroom/PVC strategy. Never read or print Secret objects.
Before projecting any PAT into the hub: reuse owner patch must close native
both redirect Authorization forwarding and registration-controlled auth_env/URL
exfiltration. Tests must prove unlisted URL refusal before credential lookup and
no redirect credential forwarding. Apps must pin the full fixed image and exact
runtime allowlist configuration; review/migrate existing authenticated sources
before rollout. The earlier same-image and redirect-only assumptions are
superseded; full fixed image/source/patch and owner-runtime config approval remain
pending. The candidate allowlist encodes the consent packet exact fourteen URLs.
After target issuance, scope metadata must be exactly read:repository, team repo
set exactly seven and complete effective grants enumerated. Choose a known private
outside repo by target-owner metadata and prove denial without body retention.
Use safe read-only negative admin/non-code routes; never try writes as a negative
probe because unexpected privilege could make them succeed. Verify absence of
write authority through scope and effective permissions. Missing auth/anonymous
private raw reads fail closed, never cached as fresh successes.
Bao positive receipt proves ESO role exact path read; negative receipts prove
default identity and dedicated caller writer cannot read the new path, ESO cannot
read an unrelated sibling, and wrong SA/namespace/audience cannot authenticate.
These are effective token-specific checks, not a test on an admin session.
Owner suppressing helper checks ESO Ready and materialized key presence only.
In the actual running hub, native `fetch_remote_index_text` must fetch all seven
pinned URLs using `REUSE_SURFACE_FORGEJO_SOURCE_READ_TOKEN` and native header code;
validate schema, exact index hashes, exact expected IDs and relative entry handling
without printing private bodies. Local curl success is insufficient for native
runtime verification. Then register seven pinned sources with the approved writer
lane and force fresh composition; prove all 70 reviewed IDs exactly once, no stale
private fallback and matching metadata. Public URLs/entries and source bytes must
stay inside disclosure consent; new commits need renewed metadata review.
Rollback order: immediately revoke dedicated PAT; disable only new private
registrations after reconciling ambiguous requests; remove/revert exact new
ESO data item and policy stanza through owner paths; remove only the new
materialized token key with a suppressing helper, preserve writer/webhook keys;
controlled approved-image rollout. A previously vulnerable image must never
receive the new reader key; verify key removal before restoring such an image.
Restore previous pinned policy/deployment revision
when applicable. Retain partial, failed and unverified outcomes and token IDs.
Do not delete the shared Secret/store/role, overwrite unrelated policy changes,
or remove all public registrations. Restore only the new reader runtime mapping,
preserving separately reviewed existing authenticated-source mappings. No transactional rollback is claimed.
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