Founder decision 2026-10-18, "build, but never log in": a plan-scoped grant
that writes workload-kv-read-* policies, external-secrets-* and AppRole role
definitions, and create-only placeholder KV under platform/{workloads,suppliers},
and denies role-id, secret-id, token creation and all value reads, so the
MASON-IN-0004 chain stays broken. Adds bao-session.sh build, policy tests,
INTENT/AGENTS alignment and MASON-WP-0015. Not installed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 278674@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 64827407-e196-4ce3-b70c-76e7b537493f
15 KiB
ops-mason — Agent Instructions
Repo Identity
Purpose: Builder of NetKingdom security infrastructure (AppRoles, policies, KV paths) for ops-warden to route to
Domain: infotech
Repo slug: ops-mason
Topic ID: cee7bedf-2b48-46ef-8601-006474f2ad7a
Workplan prefix: MASON-
State Hub Integration
The Custodian State Hub tracks work across all domains. Interact via HTTP REST — there is no MCP server for Codex agents.
| Context | URL |
|---|---|
| Local workstation | http://127.0.0.1:8000 |
| Remote (railiance01, in-cluster) | http://10.43.68.154:8000 |
| Optional local edge relay | http://127.0.0.1:18080 |
When an operator has enabled the edge relay, set API_BASE to the relay URL. Queueable writes return an explicit queued receipt if the central hub is unreachable. Treat that as pending local evidence, then ask the operator to run statehub outbox status/replay after connectivity returns.
Orient at session start
# Offline brief — works without hub connection
cat .custodian-brief.md
# Active workplans for this domain
curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8000/workplans/?topic_id=cee7bedf-2b48-46ef-8601-006474f2ad7a&status=active" \
| python3 -m json.tool
# Check inbox
curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8000/messages/?to_agent=ops-mason&unread_only=true" \
| python3 -m json.tool
Mark a message read:
curl -s -X PATCH "http://127.0.0.1:8000/messages/<id>/read" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'
Log progress (required at session close)
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/progress/ \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"summary": "what was done",
"event_type": "note",
"author": "codex",
"workplan_id": "<uuid>",
"task_id": "<uuid>"
}'
Omit workplan_id / task_id when not applicable.
Update task status
curl -s -X PATCH "http://127.0.0.1:8000/tasks/<task_id>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"status": "progress"}'
# values: wait | todo | progress | done | cancel
Flag a task for human review
curl -s -X PATCH "http://127.0.0.1:8000/tasks/<task_id>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"needs_human": true, "intervention_note": "reason"}'
Session Protocol
Start:
cat .custodian-brief.md— domain goal and open workplans (offline-safe)- Check inbox:
GET /messages/?to_agent=ops-mason&unread_only=true; mark read - Scan workplans:
ls workplans/— notestatus: ready,active, orblockedfiles and open tasks - Check human-needed tasks:
GET /tasks/?needs_human=true
During work:
- Update task statuses in workplan files as tasks progress
- Record significant decisions via
POST /decisions/
Close:
- Update workplan file task statuses to reflect progress
- If finishing a workplan: hand off residuals as live work records first
(intake with
origin: residual+origin_ref: <WP-id>, or a next workplan / decision / engagement). Do not park leftovers only in prose orSCOPE.md. Canon:the-custodian/canon/standards/work-record-types_v0.1.md§ Residuals. - Log:
POST /progress/with a summary of what changed (name handoff ids) - After workplan file changes, run:
Coding agents should run this directly; ask the operator only if the CLI or State Hub API is unavailable. This syncs task status from files into the hub DB.statehub fix-consistency
Credential and access routing
Audience: Codex, Claude Code, Grok, and custodian agents that call llm-connect
for inference. Run this check before requesting secrets, API keys, SSH access,
login tokens, or database passwords — in any repo, not only ops-warden.
ops-warden issues SSH certificates only (warden sign, cert_command). Every
other credential need belongs to another subsystem. Do not message
ops-warden on State Hub expecting a secret value; the reply is a pointer, not a key.
Lookup (do this first)
warden route find "<describe your need>" --json
warden route show <catalog-id> --json
Requires the warden CLI from ~/ops-warden (uv tool install . or uv run warden).
| Agent runtime | How to orient |
|---|---|
| Codex / Grok (shell, HTTP State Hub) | warden route commands above; inbox to_agent=ops-mason is for coordination, not secret vending |
| Claude Code (MCP when available) | get_domain_summary("custodian") for workplans; still use warden route for credential ownership |
| llm-connect (inference service) | Never put secret retrieval in prompts; route custody to OpenBao/operator paths surfaced by warden route |
Quick routing table
| I need… | Owner | ops-warden executes? |
|---|---|---|
SSH cert (adm/agt/atm) |
ops-warden | Yes — warden sign |
| API key, DB password, provider token | OpenBao (railiance-platform) |
No — route only |
| Login / OIDC / MFA | key-cape / Keycloak | No — route only |
| Authorization decision | flex-auth | No — route only |
| activity-core → issue-core emission | activity-core + issue-core | No — warden route show activity-core-issue-sink |
| SSH tunnel | ops-bridge (+ cert_command from warden) |
No — route only |
Anti-patterns (do not do these)
POST /messages/toops-wardenasking forISSUE_CORE_API_KEY,OPENROUTER_API_KEY, etc.- Inventing
warden secret,warden login,warden bao,warden tunnel— they do not exist - Pasting secrets into Git, State Hub, workplans, logs, or chat
Other capabilities (reuse-surface)
Non-credential capabilities are usually discovered through reuse-surface federation
(reuse-surface registry / capability.* indexes). Credential routing is inlined in
every repo's agent instructions because it is high-frequency, high-risk, and easy to
get wrong.
Canon: ~/ops-warden/wiki/CredentialRouting.md · catalog ~/ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml
Secrets practice guide
From 2026-10-11, secrets practice follows SecurityCanon SEC-DSM 1.0.0:
../security-canon/infospace/standards/devops-secrets-management/SecurityCanonDevOpsSecretsManagementStandard.md
Gate House teaches that standard. This repo builds routes inside it. Read these parts before proposing a credential:
- §5 preference hierarchy, highest practical mechanism first
- §37 decision procedure, questions Q1 through Q5, in order
- §35 OpenBao/Vault mapping — a broker is not the default store for every value
- §36 Kubernetes mapping — projected workload identity before a secret broker; Kubernetes Secrets are a delivery copy, not the authority
DSM-ARCH-001throughDSM-ARCH-004,DSM-TRANS-002,DSM-TRANS-003,DSM-K8S-001throughDSM-K8S-004
A new static secret, AppRole, or KV path is allowed when Q1–Q3 are no. The plan
records that answer, the owner, the consumers, the authority, and how the
residual secret is rotated and revoked (DSM-TRANS-002). Do not add an issuance
layer only to look dynamic (DSM-TRANS-003). Do not put secret values in the
plan, the workplan, or chat.
Workplan Convention (ADR-001)
Work items originate as files in this repo — not in the hub. The hub is a read/cache/index layer that rebuilds from files.
File location: workplans/MASON-NNNN-<slug>.md
Archived location: finished workplans may move to
workplans/archived/YYMMDD-MASON-NNNN-<slug>.md. The YYMMDD prefix is
the completion/archive date; the frontmatter id does not change.
Ad Hoc Tasks: small opportunistic fixes discovered during a session use
workplans/ADHOC-YYYY-MM-DD.md with task ids ADHOC-YYYY-MM-DD-T01, etc. Use
this only for low-risk work completed directly; create a normal workplan for
anything needing analysis, design, approval, dependencies, or multiple phases.
Frontmatter:
---
id: MASON-NNNN
type: workplan
title: "..."
domain: infotech
repo: ops-mason
status: proposed | ready | active | blocked | backlog | finished | archived
owner: codex
topic_slug: ...
created: "YYYY-MM-DD"
updated: "YYYY-MM-DD"
state_hub_workstream_id: "<uuid>" # fix-consistency — do not edit (legacy field name; workplan UUID)
---
Use proposed for a new draft, ready after review against current repo
state, and finished after implementation. stalled and needs_review are
derived health labels, not frontmatter statuses.
Terminology: workplan is the fleet term; workstream appears only in legacy
API/MCP/frontmatter bridges until STATE-WP-0069 retires them — see
the-custodian/canon/standards/workplan-terminology-fleet_v0.1.md.
Task block format (one per ## section):
## Task Title
` ` `task
id: MASON-NNNN-T01
status: wait | todo | progress | done | cancel
priority: high | medium | low
state_hub_task_id: "<uuid>" # written by fix-consistency — do not edit
` ` `
Task description text.
Status progression: todo → progress → done; use wait for waiting/blocked work and cancel for stopped work.
Residuals when finishing: actionable leftovers become live work records
before status: finished — usually an intake (origin: residual,
origin_ref: MASON-NNNN) or a spawned workplan. Residual is a role,
not a kind. Fleet list lives on State Hub, not in SCOPE.md.
To create a new workplan:
- Write the file following the format above
- Run
statehub fix-consistencylocally; ask the operator only if the CLI or State Hub API is unavailable.
OpenBao Access — how to grant a session, and what it authorises
ops-mason builds in OpenBao, so it needs a session. Do not hand it your own operator session: that gives everything you have, for as long as you have it, and every action lands in the audit log as you.
./scripts/bao-session.sh status # what session exists, if any
./scripts/bao-session.sh login # refresh YOUR operator session (OIDC)
./scripts/bao-session.sh grant <task> # mint a scoped token for Claude
./scripts/bao-session.sh revoke # end it immediately
With a grant in place, generate a construction plan's section 2 with
./scripts/plan-survey.py --kv-path <path> --policy <name> --approle <role> --consumer <repo> [--keyword <word>] (metadata only; see
docs/construction-plan-format.md § 2).
grant mints a separate token into ~/.claude-bao-token — your own
~/.vault-token is untouched, and the two revoke independently. The agent uses
it as BAO_TOKEN=$(cat ~/.claude-bao-token) bao <cmd>.
What the grant authorises
Policy ops-mason-survey (policies/ops-mason-survey.hcl), 45 minutes, max
one hour, named claude-<task>. Read-only (MASON-IN-0004, 2026-10-07); used
for surveys. Building uses the separate build grant below (MASON-IN-0005).
ops-mason-build stays in policies/retired/, never to be installed.
| Allowed | Denied / not granted |
|---|---|
read/list sys/mounts, sys/auth; list sys/policies/acl, read sys/policies/acl/* — the phase-2 survey |
any policy write (no create/update/delete on sys/policies/acl/*; explicit deny on its own policy) |
read/list role definitions on auth/kubernetes/role/*, auth/netkingdom/role/*, auth/jwt/role/*; list auth/approle/role, read auth/approle/role/<name> |
any auth-role write; AppRole role-id, secret-id, secret-id/*, secret-id-accessor/*, custom-secret-id (explicit deny) |
read/list KV metadata on platform/, operators/ — enough to confirm a delivery landed |
every */data/* on platform, operators, secret (explicit deny); KV metadata writes |
sys/capabilities, sys/capabilities-self (query only), auth/token/lookup-self, auth/token/revoke-self |
token creation of any kind; revoking other tokens; sys/mounts/* |
The grant can show what exists and prove what a token can reach; it cannot change anything. That removes the escalation MASON-IN-0004 described — write a policy without the denies, bind it to an AppRole, read the role-id, mint a secret-id, log in — because none of those steps is granted.
Installing the survey policy (founder act)
ops-mason cannot install its own grant. The founder runs, silently and with an
absolute path (the warden wrapper refuses output and runs with a temporary
HOME):
warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec -- sh -c \
'bao policy write ops-mason-survey /home/worsch/ops-mason/policies/ops-mason-survey.hcl >/dev/null 2>&1'
Silent check — the installed policy's hash into a 0600 receipt, compared with the repo file's hash outside the wrapper:
warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec -- sh -c \
'umask 077; mkdir -p /home/worsch/.local/state/railiance/receipts; bao policy read ops-mason-survey 2>/dev/null | sha256sum > /home/worsch/.local/state/railiance/receipts/ops-mason-survey.sha256'
cat /home/worsch/.local/state/railiance/receipts/ops-mason-survey.sha256
sha256sum < /home/worsch/ops-mason/policies/ops-mason-survey.hcl
The two hashes match only if OpenBao returns the file byte-for-byte; if they differ, compare the stored text against the file before concluding the install is wrong (OpenBao may normalise a trailing newline).
Choosing the task name
grant <task> sets display_name=claude-<task>, so the audit log attributes an
action to a piece of work rather than to a person. Use the workplan task where
there is one — grant MASON-WP-0003-T02 — otherwise something a reader would
recognise later.
The build grant (MASON-IN-0005)
ops-mason is the builder. After a plan is approved, the founder mints the build grant:
./scripts/bao-session.sh build <plan-task> # ops-mason-construct, 45m, claude-<task>
Policy ops-mason-construct (policies/ops-mason-construct.hcl). It
includes everything the survey grant can do, plus:
| Allowed | Still denied |
|---|---|
create/update/delete sys/policies/acl/workload-kv-read-* |
every other policy; default, root, ops-mason-* (explicit deny) |
create/update/delete auth/kubernetes/role/external-secrets-* and AppRole role definitions, with token_policies limited to workload-kv-read-* |
AppRole role-id, secret-id*, custom-secret-id; auth/token/create* |
create (no read or update) on platform/data/{workloads,suppliers}/*, so placeholders only |
reading any */data/*; overwriting an existing value |
full metadata on platform/metadata/{workloads,suppliers}/* (describe, tear down) |
sys/mounts/*, sys/auth/*, operators/ and secret/ writes |
The grant can build a lane but can never log in as one, which keeps the MASON-IN-0004 chain broken. AppRole secret-id delivery stays a founder act; Kubernetes-auth lanes need no secret-id. After every build, compare the written policy text with the plan's policy file (MASON-WP-0015-T04).
Install it the same way as the survey policy, with ops-mason-construct and
its file path.
When a broader grant is genuinely needed
Minting a secret-id or a token, enabling a mount, reading a value, a policy
outside workload-kv-read-*, or another subsystem's paths is outside both
grants on purpose. Do not widen a policy to get past a refusal. Those acts go
through the founder and the railiance-platform delegated applier
(scripts/credential-change.py applier-apply under warden access openbao-platform-admin-login --exec), or need their own named policy and
founder decision.