Found two things in ops-warden's own code/docs that sharpen the boundary beyond what INTENT.md originally said: 1. registry/routing/catalog.yaml enforces a real "no-double-source rule": non-SSH entries are pointer-only (id/title/need_keywords/ owner_repo/subsystem/wiki_ref/canon_ref/reviewed/status), never an authored steps/cert_command block -- that's reserved for warden_executes: true (ops-warden's own SSH lane). ops-mason's catalog contributions must follow the same rule: warden_executes: false always, status: draft until verified, and it's a normal git contribution to ops-warden's repo, not a live registration API. 2. ops-warden already ships a founder-facing "paste-once provision" desk (src/warden/desk.py's paste_once_provision act) that writes a secret VALUE into an EXISTING KV path via a localhost-only web form, never through a terminal/chat/audit log. It does not create AppRoles, policies, or paths -- that gap is exactly what ops-mason fills. Clean split: ops-mason builds structure only and never touches a secret value, even transiently; the founder delivers the actual credential through ops-warden's existing desk once the structure exists. Updated INTENT.md/SCOPE.md/MASON-WP-0001 accordingly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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INTENT
This file captures why this repository exists, the direction it is moving toward, and the kind of system it is meant to become. It is intentionally aspirational and stable, not a description of current implementation.
One-liner
The builder of NetKingdom security infrastructure — creates, changes, maintains, and tears down access routes, credentials, tokens, and policies so that ops-warden always has something real to route to.
Why this exists
ops-warden is deliberately narrow: it issues short-lived SSH certificates and
routes every other credential need to the subsystem that owns it — it
"owns no secret store and vends nothing" (ops-warden/wiki/AccessRouting.md).
That's the right shape for a front door, but it leaves a real gap: something
has to actually build the AppRole, the policy, the KV secret path, the
catalog entry that ops-warden then points workers at. Today that gap is
filled ad hoc — a founder spends "~10 minutes" hand-running bao write
commands per new lane (see binky-control/integrations/executor-worker-secrets.md
for a representative example: a new AppRole, a new policy, delivered
role_id/secret_id files, a catalog entry, repeated by hand every time a new
consumer needs a credential).
ops-mason exists to turn that ad hoc founder mechanic into a reviewed, repeatable construction process — so new security infrastructure gets built consistently, against what already exists, with a human decision point before anything is actually applied, instead of bespoke one-off provisioning every time.
The Mission
ops-mason builds NetKingdom security infrastructure — OpenBao AppRoles,
policies, KV secret paths, and their ops-warden catalog entries — as defined
by architecture documents (net-kingdom) and by real consumer demand (a
repo/workload that needs a credential lane). It does not decide whether
access should exist — that's an architecture or founder decision — it
figures out how to build what's already been decided on, and does the
build once approved.
The four-phase process
-
Construction plan. Given an access demand (a consumer, a credential type, a scope) and the concept behind it, draft what needs to be created, changed, or torn down to satisfy it — respecting, extending, or compacting existing structure rather than defaulting to "create something new" every time. Check first: does an existing policy/path/lane already cover this (the way
rein-aharness's mail-triage reuses the existingllm-connect-provider-secretslane instead of getting its own)? Does satisfying this demand let two existing near-duplicate lanes be merged instead of adding a third? -
Review and optimize. Check the draft plan against what's already provisioned (no redundant policies, no orphaned roles), consistency with existing naming/TTL/scoping conventions, and ease of use for the consumer. This is a self-review pass before a human ever sees the plan — the plan that reaches phase 3 should already be the best version of itself, not a first draft.
-
Executive summary — the decision gate. Render what the plan actually grants: which roles get which access, to what, for how long, blast radius if the credential leaks, and what it costs to reverse. This is the one mandatory human checkpoint, and it exists for exactly the reason ops-warden's own design principle names: "the founder is escalated to, never tasked with mechanics" — ops-mason does the mechanical work in phases 1, 2, and 4; phase 3 is the founder's one decision, made in policy terms (approve, reject, or send back to phase 1 with feedback), not asked to review raw
baocommands. -
Build. Once approved, execute the plan — create/modify/tear down the AppRole, policy, and secret path structure, then propose the matching ops-warden catalog entry. Not before phase 3 approval, ever, for anything that grants or widens access. (Tear-down of something already flagged for removal, or a dry-run/plan-only mode, does not require the same gate — see Design Principles.)
ops-mason never touches secret values, including its own builds. It creates the empty KV path, the policy, and the AppRole — structure only. The actual secret value (an API key, a password) goes in through ops-warden's existing paste-once provision desk (
ops-warden/src/warden/desk.py'spaste_once_provisionact): a localhost-only web form where the founder pastes the value once, written directly viabao kv putand never shown in a terminal, chat, or audit log. Phase 4 ends with "structure built, ready for paste-once provisioning" — it does not end with a live credential.
Responsibility boundary
ops-mason owns
- Drafting and executing construction plans for new/changed/retired OpenBao AppRoles, policies, and KV secret paths (structure — never secret values, see phase 4 above)
- Consistency review against existing NetKingdom credential structure — reuse over duplication, compaction over sprawl
- The executive-summary format that makes a plan decidable at a glance
- Proposing the matching entry in ops-warden's routing catalog
(
ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml) for what it builds - Its own audit trail of what it built, when, and under which approved plan
Catalog entries are pointer-only, same rule ops-warden enforces on every
non-SSH entry (the catalog's own "no-double-source rule",
ops-warden/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0010-access-routing-charter.md):
id/title/need_keywords/owner_repo/subsystem/wiki_ref/canon_ref/
reviewed/status, always warden_executes: false (ops-mason built the
lane, it does not execute the runtime credential fetch — the consumer's own
code does, the way rein-openweights/credentials.py does today). Never
an authored steps/cert_command block — those are reserved for
warden_executes: true entries, i.e. ops-warden's own SSH lane. The actual
"how a consumer uses this credential" doc lives with the consumer (e.g.
rein-openweights/INTENT.md/credentials.py), referenced via wiki_ref,
not restated inside the catalog.
Landing a catalog entry is a normal git contribution to the ops-warden
repo (a commit/PR touching registry/routing/catalog.yaml), subject to
its own CI (tests/test_routing.py — anchor resolution) and its stale-review
cadence (new entries typically start status: draft until the built lane
is verified end-to-end, then promoted to active — same as any other
owner-ship promotion in that catalog). ops-mason does not have, and does
not need, some separate live registration API into ops-warden.
ops-mason does not own
| Need | Owner | ops-mason's relationship |
|---|---|---|
| Whether access should exist at all | Architecture docs / founder | ops-mason builds what's decided, does not decide policy from nothing |
| Runtime authorization ("may actor X do Y") | flex-auth | ops-mason provisions the policy; flex-auth evaluates it at runtime |
| Identity, MFA, human auth | key-cape / Keycloak | Out of scope entirely |
| Routing consumers to the right lane | ops-warden | ops-mason feeds ops-warden's catalog; does not replace warden access/warden route |
| SSH certificate issuance | ops-warden | Untouched — ops-mason works in OpenBao AppRole/policy/KV space, not the SSH CA lane |
| OpenBao cluster init/unseal, platform deploy | railiance-platform | Out of scope — ops-mason operates within an already-running OpenBao |
| Holding or logging secret values | Nobody, ever | Same invariant as ops-warden: values live in OpenBao and process env only |
| Delivering the actual secret value into a path ops-mason built | ops-warden (paste_once_provision desk) |
ops-mason builds the empty structure; the founder pastes the value once through ops-warden's existing local web form, never through ops-mason |
ops-mason is not a second secrets manager and not a policy-decision engine. It is the construction crew for a foundation ops-warden and every credential consumer stands on.
Design principles
- Reuse before creation. Every construction plan's first move is checking whether existing structure already covers the demand. New infrastructure is the fallback, not the default.
- Compaction is in scope, not just addition. ops-mason may propose merging or retiring redundant lanes as part of a construction plan, not only adding new ones.
- One mandatory human gate, not a gate on everything. Anything that grants or widens access stops at the phase-3 executive summary. Read-only plan drafts, dry runs, and tear-down of something already approved for removal do not need to re-litigate the same decision.
- Mechanics stay with the agent; decisions stay with the founder.
Directly extends ops-warden's own principle 7. The executive summary is
written so the founder never has to read a
baocommand to make the call. - Nothing built stays invisible. Every successful build is followed by
a proposed catalog entry to
ops-wardenin the same phase-4 action (pointer-only,status: draftuntil verified end-to-end) — there should be no infrastructure ops-mason built that isn't at least a draft entry away fromwarden route findsurfacing it. - Posture-aware, like ops-warden. The organization is in build phase
(one founder-operator, pre-revenue) — construction plans should reflect
current posture (see
ops-warden/wiki/WorkloadSecurityPosture.md) and tighten as posture graduates, not assume production-tier rigor on day one or dev-tier looseness forever.
Relationship to the rest of NetKingdom
net-kingdom — owns the canonical security architecture
|
v
ops-mason — builds the infrastructure that architecture calls for
| (AppRoles, policies, KV paths, catalog entries)
v
ops-warden — routes consumers to what ops-mason built
|
v
OpenBao / flex-auth / key-cape — hold custody, evaluate policy, verify identity
NetKingdom defines what the security model should look like. ops-mason builds the concrete lanes that satisfy it. ops-warden is the front door that points consumers at those lanes once built. Confusing ops-mason's builder role with ops-warden's router role — or with OpenBao's custody role — recreates exactly the "wrong subsystem for the credential need" confusion ops-warden itself exists to prevent.
Non-goals
- Being a second OpenBao, a second ops-warden, or a policy-decision engine
- Deciding, unprompted, that new access should exist — that's an architecture/founder call, ops-mason builds what's already decided
- Applying anything that grants or widens access without a phase-3 approved plan
- Touching secret values at all, even transiently — structure only; values
go in via ops-warden's
paste_once_provisiondesk, not through ops-mason - Owning OpenBao cluster lifecycle, flex-auth runtime, or key-cape identity
Success criteria
ops-mason is succeeding when:
- A new credential lane can go from "a consumer needs this" to "built,
catalogued, and routable via ops-warden" without a founder hand-running
baocommands. - Every construction plan is checked against existing structure before it's proposed — duplicate/near-duplicate lanes are the exception, not routine.
- The founder's only touchpoints are the phase-3 decision (plain terms: who gets what, for how long, what it costs to undo) and, if the lane needs a live value, one paste through ops-warden's existing desk — never asked to review or run raw provisioning mechanics.
- Every ops-mason build ships with a proposed ops-warden catalog entry —
no undocumented lanes, even in
draftstatus. - Tearing down access is as routine and reviewed a process as creating it — sprawl doesn't accumulate because removal is just as supported as construction.