tegwick
c357ce5908
secrets-engine reviewed our catalog metadata while drafting their five entries and graded issue-core-ingestion-api-key and reuse-surface-hub-write-token high. We had both as standard, and had deliberately regraded them DOWN on 2026-08-19. They are right. Both paths carry a second credential our grade never looked at -- GITEA_BACKEND_TOKEN (CCR-2026-0002, a deliberate field-set decision) and a dual-consumer webhook HMAC (CCR-2026-0005). Neither is recovered by rotating the credential the lane is named after. The defect is structural: we graded the lane by its headline field, but a read returns every field at the path. Worse, the evidence was already in the CCRs we cite as authoritative -- not missing, unread -- and a test asserted the wrong answer, so a correct first-pass grade got overruled by it. ADR-0008 records the rule: a grade covers every field its path discloses. ADR-0007 is unchanged and still governs; this says what the grade is of. Six of the remaining standard lanes have no KV path. Two have paths and no field evidence; per ADR-0008 they are stated as unknown rather than assumed, and left for operator-sanctioned grading. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Architecture
Our rules are ADRs — docs/adr/
The decisions that govern this repo live in docs/adr/ as addressable records,
not in wiki prose. Read docs/adr/README.md first; it explains the one
distinction that matters here.
| ADR | Rule |
|---|---|
ADR-0001 |
The routing catalog is a pointer layer, never a second copy of an owner's procedure |
ADR-0002 |
ops-warden is a transparent conduit, never a secret broker |
ADR-0003 |
Cover gaps, but never silently own them |
ADR-0004 |
High-risk lanes refuse raw value streaming to agent sessions |
ADR-0005 |
Implement one lane narrowly, route everything else |
ADR-0006 |
Enforcement is zone-scoped, never a global flag |
ADR-0007 |
Build-stage permissiveness stops at credential disclosure; every lane carries an explicit risk grade |
ADR-0008 |
A lane's risk grade covers every field its path discloses, not just the field it is named after |
Owned versus inherited — check owner: before changing anything
Every ADR carries owner: in its frontmatter, and it decides what you are allowed
to do with the rule:
owner: ops-warden— ours. We are bound by it and we may change it. Changing one means writing a superseding ADR, not editing the decision in place.- any other owner — inherited. We follow it; we do not own it. Dispute it through that owner's process; never amend it here.
Everything in docs/adr/ today is owner: ops-warden. Rules we merely follow —
NetKingdom canon, the IAM profile, the credential-management standard — are cited,
never copied in. Copying them would recreate the second-source-of-truth failure
ADR-0001 exists to prevent.
Naming collision, worth knowing. ADR-001 (three digits) in
workplan-convention.md and session-protocol.md is the-custodian's ADR
establishing the workplan convention across the whole estate. It is inherited and
not ours to change. Our records are four-digit — ADR-0001 … ADR-0005 — and live
in this repo. When writing, say "the-custodian's ADR-001" if that is what you mean.
Precedence
If a wiki page, playbook, or .claude/rules/ file disagrees with an ADR, the ADR
is right and the other file is a defect — fix it rather than working around it.
The rule files are agent-facing operational instructions derived from these
decisions; they should cite an ADR rather than restate its reasoning.
Publication
These ADRs are publishable through policy-nexus at policy.coulomb.social, which
requires title, status and owner, renders owner in the page header and in the
index, and records source repo, path and revision digest in its manifest. Ownership
survives the repo boundary. policy-nexus publishes and never writes back: the file
here is the source of truth.
Quick Reference
~/state-hub/mcp_server/TOOLS.md — MCP tool reference