ops-warden/wiki/playbooks/openbao-shamir-recovery-ceremony.md
tegwick e3b9b1620c fix: route OpenBao recovery ceremonies safely
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-sol
Assistant-Session: 01a0290b-3241-74c3-b868-6049545af836
2026-08-22 20:54:45 +02:00

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# OpenBao Shamir recovery ceremony
This lane routes an attended production seal/unseal or trust-root recovery need
to `railiance-platform`. It does not retrieve, provision, proxy, or transport an
unseal share, recovery value, OpenBao token, snapshot, or console credential.
## Worker checklist
1. Plan the need before drafting an operator step:
```bash
warden plan "attended OpenBao Shamir emergency seal/unseal recovery ceremony" --json
```
The result must select `openbao-shamir-recovery-ceremony`, return
`founder_required`, and name one `approve` act. If it selects
`openbao-api-key`, proposes paste-once provisioning, or requests a raw share,
stop without executing the proposed act.
2. Treat approval as coordination, not secret delivery. The platform owner uses
the existing out-of-band share custody and provider-console paths. Warden
Desk must never receive a share or console credential.
3. Follow the authoritative owner checklist in
`railiance-platform/docs/railiance01-coordinated-reboot.md` and the OpenBao
recovery section of `railiance-platform/docs/openbao.md`. The local consumer
boundary and evidence requirements are in
`docs/credential-governance-break-glass.md`.
4. Stop before the live hold point unless the owner preflight reports
`ready_for_live_execution: true` and the operator gives an explicit go/no-go
for that bounded window.
Allowed records are non-secret approval ids, role attestations, timestamps,
seal-state booleans, hashes, and verification outcomes. Never place shares,
tokens, credentials, Secret data, or decrypted snapshots in Git, State Hub,
logs, shell history, or chat.