codex
186fa99f58
These workplans exist only in the retired local hub. Their random pre-ADR-007 identifiers are refused by C-06 as stale references, so they cannot be registered. Deriving from the canonical record id takes no identity from anything: central does not hold them and the old ids die with the cache. Records central already holds were deliberately left untouched. Refs CUST-WP-0068-T06 Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2583210@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: f2bff2d5-e9b2-4338-92ca-10282a927006
261 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
261 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: WARDEN-WP-0026
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type: workplan
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title: "Credential disclosure hygiene + rotation guidance (Strand A)"
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domain: infotech
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repo: ops-warden
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status: finished
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owner: codex
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topic_slug: custodian
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planning_priority: high
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planning_order: 26
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created: "2026-07-16"
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updated: "2026-07-16"
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state_hub_workstream_id: "331c7620-bd34-5acd-9135-591985b568e5"
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---
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# Credential disclosure hygiene + rotation guidance (Strand A)
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## Origin
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Follow-up to a credential-disclosure incident on 2026-07-16 while verifying
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`CCR-2026-0004` (railiance offsite backup lane). A negative policy test was run
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as `BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -policy=default -field=token) bao kv get <path>`.
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The `token create` was denied (workload role lacks it), `BAO_TOKEN` fell back to
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the caller's privileged login token, and `bao kv get` printed all three field
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values (`NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN`, `NC_WEBDAV_URL`, `AGE_PRIVATE_KEY`) into an agent
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session transcript. Buildup mode — exposure accepted, learnings captured.
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**Root causes:** (1) a deny-test that read the secret *data* path at all;
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(2) a silent privileged-token fallback; (3) the read landed in a logged context.
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This is **Strand A** (disclosure hygiene). Tamper-resistant policy governance and
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one-command mass rotation/lockdown (Strand B) are deliberately **deferred** — see
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"Out of scope" below.
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## Goal
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Make accidental secret disclosure structurally hard, and make ops-warden the
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authoritative source for **how each secret is rotated or re-established** —
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advisory knowledge held next to the routing catalog, not in OpenBao.
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## Design guardrails (binding on acceptance)
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- **Verification never reads secret data.** Use `bao token capabilities` (allow/deny)
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instead of `kv get` for positive/negative lane tests.
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- **Masking is defense-in-depth, not a boundary.** Any display filter is a wrapper
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convenience; raw `bao kv get <path>` remains the documented anti-pattern.
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- **Rotation guidance covers both `rotate` (provider re-mint) and `re-establish`
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(regenerate from source, e.g. a new age keypair).**
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- **Coverage gate:** every `active` (and newly promoted) catalog lane must carry
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rotation guidance, enforced by a scorecard check.
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## Out of scope (Strand B — deferred, not built here)
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- Executable one-command rotation of all tainted secrets.
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- Graded lockdown / break-glass seal + re-key with a designed trust-root.
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- Policy time-travel / policy-as-code reconcile-to-past-commit. (Drift *detection*
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may be revisited separately; the reconcile machinery is out.)
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## Task: Capabilities-based lane verification
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0026-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "1cb22a40-b7c6-560a-a805-7766a5786dcc"
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```
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Done 2026-07-16: canonical capabilities-safe verification pattern added to
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`wiki/playbooks/catalog-lane-promotion.md` (fleet promotion checklist criterion 8
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+ dedicated section), and applied to the `railiance-backup-offsite-lane` and
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`forgejo-admin-api-token` playbook verify sections. Positive/negative proven via
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`bao token capabilities` against the KV v2 data path — never `bao kv get`; the
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denied `default` token-create is documented as a pass, not a fallback trigger.
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Live CCR-2026-0004 re-verify carried under T07.
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Replace secret-reading verify flows with capability checks. Positive test:
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approved identity has `read` on the KV data path. Negative test: a `default`-only
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identity is `deny`. Both via `bao token capabilities <token> <path>` (or the
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self endpoint) — **never** `bao kv get`. Update
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`wiki/playbooks/*lane*.md` verify sections and any lane-verify helper.
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**Done when:** the documented and tooled verify path for any lane proves
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allow/deny without reading a secret value, and the CCR-2026-0004 re-verify uses
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it (see T07).
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## Task: Safe access transport (no stdout values)
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0026-T02
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "bcb7da96-0a28-5484-bf3e-06e97acf5873"
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```
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Done 2026-07-16: sanctioned transports added to `warden access` so a value never
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lands on stdout — `--out FILE` (mode-0600 file), `--exec` (child env, pre-existing),
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and `--wrap` (single-use OpenBao response-wrapping token via `bao kv get -wrap-ttl`,
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caller `bao unwrap`s in their own context). Raw `--fetch` to a non-TTY stdout is now
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refused (exit 6) unless `--unsafe-stdout` is passed (interactive human only).
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`proxy_fetch_to_file`/`proxy_fetch_wrapped`/`build_wrapped_fetch` in `proxy.py`; tests
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in `tests/test_proxy.py`. Anti-pattern + transports documented fleet-wide in
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`.claude/rules/credential-routing.md` and `wiki/OperatorAccessAssist.md` (G2).
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`warden access` / fetch paths must emit values only into an env var, a file, or
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a **response-wrapping token** (`bao … -wrap-ttl`), never a stdout table. Add a
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wrapping-token transport for values that must move between processes. Record in
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canon (`credential-routing` rules) that raw `bao kv get <path>` (full table) is
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the anti-pattern; the sanctioned path is `warden access … --field <F>` into env.
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**Done when:** the sanctioned fetch path cannot print a value to a terminal, and
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the anti-pattern is documented fleet-wide.
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## Task: Masking display filter (defense-in-depth)
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0026-T03
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status: done
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "d90b0628-fa1d-527d-99c3-28a7ed933e52"
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```
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Done 2026-07-16: `warden/mask.py` (`fingerprint`/`mask_value` — presence, length,
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8-char sha256 prefix; never the value) + `proxy_fetch_fingerprint` and a
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`warden access … --fingerprint` masked status view (bypasses the stdout guard
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because it emits no value). Lets two parties compare sha256 prefixes to confirm a
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shared value (e.g. rotation landed) without disclosure. Explicitly labelled
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defense-in-depth — raw `bao kv get` bypasses it — in `wiki/OperatorAccessAssist.md`
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and the module docstring. Tests in `tests/test_mask.py` + a CLI test in
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`tests/test_proxy.py`.
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In the warden wrapper, mask KV data values by default when any listing/status is
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shown — display presence, length, and a short non-reversible hash instead of the
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value. Explicitly labelled as defense-in-depth (raw bao bypasses it).
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**Done when:** wrapper-mediated output never shows a raw KV value, with the
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limitation documented.
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## Task: Agent read-boundary on high-risk lanes
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0026-T04
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "827fa67d-5f69-5fac-bdce-9903b1b909fb"
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```
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Done 2026-07-16: Catalog `risk: high|standard` (default standard). High-risk:
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`railiance-backup-offsite-lane`, `forgejo-admin-api-token`, `openrouter-llm-connect`.
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OpenBao policy `agent-high-risk-boundary` (railiance-platform + live write) grants
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metadata/capabilities only and **denies** data-read on those paths — verified with
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minted agent token (data=deny, metadata=read). `warden access` with
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`WARDEN_AGENT_ID` set refuses raw value stream on high-risk lanes (exit 7);
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`--out`/`--exec`/`--wrap`/`--fingerprint` remain. Playbook:
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`wiki/playbooks/agent-read-boundary.md`. Tests in `tests/test_routing.py` +
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`tests/test_proxy.py`.
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**Repo: railiance-platform (OpenBao policy/roles).** Agent identities receive
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`capabilities`/metadata and wrapping tokens on high-risk lanes, not raw data
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reads. Align with the existing credential-routing rule ("ops-warden proxies reads
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as the caller and must not retain values"). Classify which lanes are high-risk
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(recovery escrow like `AGE_PRIVATE_KEY`, upload tokens).
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**Done when:** at least the high-risk lanes deny raw data reads to agent roles
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while still allowing wrapped/proxied access, verified via capabilities checks.
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## Task: EXPOSED taint convention
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0026-T05
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status: done
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "09ef8727-31da-59ac-aac7-2d47924569fe"
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```
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Done 2026-07-16: Convention documented in `wiki/playbooks/exposed-taint.md`
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(`exposed_at`, `exposed_version`, `exposed_reason`, `exposed_ref` on KV v2
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custom_metadata). First worked mark applied to
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`platform/workloads/railiance/backup/offsite-lane` version 2 (disclosure
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incident). `warden taint <id>` (+ `--json`) reports taint via metadata-only
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`bao kv metadata get` — never secret data (`src/warden/taint.py`). Tests in
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`tests/test_taint.py`.
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**Repo: railiance-platform (OpenBao) + ops-warden surface.** Establish a KV v2
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`custom_metadata` convention to mark a tainted secret: `exposed_at=<datetime>`
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and the affected `version`. Identify semi-automatic candidates from the OpenBao
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audit log (reads from agent/shared contexts). `warden` surfaces taint status for
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a lane (advisory; no auto-rotation here).
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**Done when:** a secret can be marked EXPOSED via a documented convention and
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`warden` reports whether a lane is currently tainted.
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## Task: Rotation / re-establishment guidance registry
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0026-T06
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "a2e1544e-e501-57eb-a40e-9a2147cef12a"
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```
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Done 2026-07-16: `rotation:` block (method rotate|re-establish, ordered steps,
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owner, automatable) added to the routing model/parser (`RotationGuide`,
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`RouteEntry.rotation`, `vends_secret`), screened for secret material in a prose-safe
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mode. `warden rotate-guide <id>` (human + `--json`) surfaces the guidance; `warden
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route show --json` carries `has_rotation` + `rotation`. Coverage enforced by the new
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`catalog_rotation_coverage` scorecard check (every active secret-vending lane must
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have a block) and promotion checklist criterion 9. Rotation blocks authored for all
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7 active vending lanes + the draft railiance-backup lane (re-establish example: age
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keypair regen + re-encrypt). Tests in `tests/test_routing.py`. Also fixed a
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pre-existing keyword collision (bare `npm` on the forgejo-admin lane → `forgejo-npm`)
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so "npm token" routes to the generic lane again.
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Give every catalog lane **structured-but-advisory** renewal guidance, held in the
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ops-warden registry (not in OpenBao). Add a `rotation:` block per catalog entry
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capturing: `method` (rotate | re-establish), ordered `steps` (provider re-mint /
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keygen / OpenBao write / re-encrypt-and-reupload where relevant), `owner`, and
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`automatable` (bool, for future Strand-B). Surface via `warden rotate-guide <id>`
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(and/or `warden route … --rotate`). Add a **scorecard coverage check**: every
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`active` lane must have a `rotation:` block; flag any that don't.
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**Done when:** `warden rotate-guide <id>` returns actionable renewal steps for
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every active lane, and the scorecard fails if any active lane lacks guidance.
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## Task: Incident lessons + first worked lane (CCR-2026-0004)
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0026-T07
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status: done
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "62d8286f-7954-52a8-bce6-6a16072e5246"
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```
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Done 2026-07-16: Lessons note present. Capabilities-safe live re-verify on
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`bao.coulomb.social`: lane-policy token → `read` on data path; default + agent
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boundary → `deny`; field keys present (no values printed). Catalog promoted
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`draft`→`active`, `fetch_command` pinned to `NC_WEBDAV_TOKEN` (no placeholders)
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so `resolvable: true`; `risk: high`; rotation guidance + EXPOSED taint on v2.
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CCR-2026-0004 evidence + `access_frontdoor.resolvable: true` / `readiness: ready`.
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Playbook + `wiki/CredentialRouting.md` updated. Operator may still rotate the
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exposed values optionally (buildup) — not a promotion blocker.
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Write a short lessons-learned note (buildup context; exposure accepted; the three
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root causes). Apply T01 + T06 to `CCR-2026-0004` as the first worked lane:
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re-verify it the capabilities-safe way so it can finally promote to
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`resolvable: true` (unblocking `RAILIANCE-WP-0015`), and ensure its `rotation:`
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block (rotate Nextcloud token; re-establish age keypair + re-encrypt artifacts)
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is present. **Rotation of the exposed values is the operator's optional call, not
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a blocker** (buildup).
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**Done when:** the lessons note exists, CCR-2026-0004 has capabilities-based
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verify + rotation guidance, and its promotion path is unblocked.
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## References
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- `CCR-2026-0004-railiance-backup-offsite-lane.yaml` (railiance-platform)
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- `wiki/playbooks/railiance-backup-offsite-lane.md`
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- `.claude/rules/credential-routing.md` (the-custodian, fleet-inlined)
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- `RAILIANCE-WP-0015` (railiance-apps) — cnpg backup coverage, gated on CCR-2026-0004
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- Strand B (deferred): tamper-resistant governance, one-command rotation/lockdown,
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policy time-travel — capture separately if/when justified.
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