tegwick
3aedd8f844
Six inbound messages attended, three of them carrying real asks. flex-auth FLEX-DEC-2026-004 answers WARDEN-WP-0034-T05's decision-lifetime question: a decision lifetime shorter than the certificate TTL is meaningful, but only as authority to ISSUE, never to USE an already-issued certificate. The question had mistaken a decision lifetime for a credential lifetime. They declined to move the §9.7.2 revocation residue to their side; that refusal is right and the stance map is unchanged. T05 still waits on ops-mason and railiance-infra. WARDEN-WP-0039-T03 routed to flex-auth: is there an admitted contract for a delegated credential read where caller and resource owner differ? Three outcomes named as equally acceptable, including that there should be no such contract and the interim proxy transport is itself the defect -- which would shorten WP-0033 rather than block it. Two easy fixes ruled out in writing: broadening the caller binding, and relabelling resource.system as ops-warden so the binding matches. The second would make the audit trail assert we own credentials we deliberately do not, by editing a field instead of making an argument. WARDEN-WP-0037: npm path routed to railiance-platform, catalog unchanged pending their answer. secrets-engine refused to resolve it from a coordination message and was right; asserting our own pointer is authoritative because it is ours would route around that. The ask names a location only, and flags that a `bao kv get` answer would be the 2026-07-16 disclosure vector on a risk: high lane. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013EPuTc18FjU5WFqoSEKH3C Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 1276224@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 426ec497-e1c4-4dd3-b417-dfce1ca1dbc3
104 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
104 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: WARDEN-WP-0039
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type: workplan
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title: "Preserve explicit policy caller refusals before credential and CA effects"
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domain: infotech
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repo: ops-warden
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status: blocked
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owner: codex
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topic_slug: custodian
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created: "2026-09-08"
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updated: "2026-09-08"
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origin: residual
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origin_ref: HFACT-WP-0001
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state_hub_workstream_id: "ae44a935-6fca-514c-a385-4550dd2b1fe8"
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---
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The factory critical-path review reproduced a live HTTP 403 from the reachable
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PDP for the configured ops-warden caller and a railiance-platform secret read.
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`check_fetch_policy` treated it as evaluator unavailability and used unknown-zone
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fail-open. Caller-auth rejection is an explicit refusal, not a transport outage.
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## Preserve explicit authentication and binding refusals
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0039-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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assignee: the-custodian
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state_hub_task_id: "eaad08d9-ae47-5f50-8278-ea402a0e2869"
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```
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HTTP 401 and 403 stop signing and credential fetch irrespective of the outage
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profile. Do not expose response bodies or alter system identity to bypass the
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refusal. Preserve configured behavior for genuine evaluator failures. Prove
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both permissive and closed outage profiles and refusal before child execution.
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## Verify and publish the correction
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0039-T02
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status: done
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priority: high
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assignee: the-custodian
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state_hub_task_id: "ac85cf00-391c-5c63-b8f4-ed5bd57684e5"
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```
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Run the policy and proxy suites, retain a value-free live refusal receipt,
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publish the reviewed source, and verify the installed CLI refuses before any
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credential transport. A refusal is not a successful credential-read admission.
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The owner installer initially reused a cached wheel despite `--force`, leaving
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the pre-fix policy code installed. Both Makefile installation targets now use
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`--reinstall-package ops-warden` to refresh this package from the reviewed source.
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Verify the installed module as well as the checkout before the live refusal test.
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## Resolve the credential proxy's admitted policy binding
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0039-T03
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status: wait
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priority: high
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assignee: the-custodian
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blocking_reason: "The configured ops-warden caller represents ops-warden; credential requests name their owner as resource.system. Need the flex-auth/credential-owner contract for that exact delegated read, without broadening caller bindings or relabelling resource ownership."
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state_hub_task_id: "8ca28b63-2e04-5333-b635-011b124c1806"
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```
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Consume the existing native-lane handoff (WARDEN-WP-0033 / SECRETS-WP-0006)
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and flex-auth caller contract. Establish whether this interim transport needs an
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admitted dedicated policy route or must finish its native handoff. Retain the
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refusal until that contract yields positive and wrong-caller/owner/tenant
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negative evidence. No credential read, secret generation, or policy grant is
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authorized by this workplan alone. HFACT-WP-0001-T03 consumes this return.
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Validation: 429 tests passed (4 integration tests deselected by the repository default); Ruff passed for changed Python files. Full tests used the declared phase-memory source and an isolated temporary memory store. The focused policy/proxy suite passed 69 tests. The existing authenticated SSH policy probe still returns HTTP 200/ALLOW, decision:f3f7c88f9585582a; the credential-owner request returns 403. No CA issue or credential read was performed by these probes.
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Installed verification: source guard present after refreshed owner installation (`19bb75c`). `warden access forgejo-admin-api-token --exec --field API_TOKEN -- true` exits 4 with explicit HTTP 403 before credential transport or child execution. The previous fail-open warning is absent. The probe requested no output value; no credential was fetched. T01/T02 are complete; T03 owns the remaining exact policy-binding admission.
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**T03 routed 2026-09-09.** Asked `flex-auth` whether an admitted contract exists
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for a delegated credential read where the caller (ops-warden) and the resource
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owner differ, since that is exactly the shape drawing the live 403. Three outcomes
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were named as equally acceptable answers, with no preference stated between the
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first two: an existing contract to conform to; no contract yet, making this a
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design question they should raise rather than one ops-warden invents a shape for;
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or that there should be **no** such contract — the interim proxy transport is
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itself the defect and the answer is to finish the native handoff
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(`WARDEN-WP-0033` / `SECRETS-WP-0006`).
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The third is a real possibility and was not argued against. Eleven catalog lanes
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are ops-warden proxies with a named intended owner precisely because no owner
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front door exists; if delegated reads should not be made policy-admissible, that
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shortens WP-0033 rather than blocking it.
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Two fixes were explicitly ruled out in the message rather than left unmentioned:
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broadening the ops-warden caller binding so it may read other systems' resources,
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and relabelling `resource.system` as ops-warden so the existing binding matches.
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The second is worse — it would make the audit trail assert ops-warden owns
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credentials it deliberately does not, which is the claim `ADR-0002` exists to
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prevent, achieved by editing a field instead of making an argument.
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The refusal stays in place until an answer yields positive evidence plus
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wrong-caller, wrong-owner and wrong-tenant negatives. No grant was requested.
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`secrets-engine` was told this bears on SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 and on how many lanes
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stay proxied; `gate-house` was told it may reach how the signing lane's
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approval-consume is built (GH-DEC-2026-005).
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