ops-warden/INTENT.md

---
# THE layer declaration (§11, GH-DEC-2026-017 §1). `layer.yaml` is derived from
# this frontmatter and must agree with it; it does not govern. Comparison of the
# §3 vocabulary is ASCII case-insensitive, so `Staff` here and `staff` there are
# the same value and neither is re-spelled (GH-DEC-2026-017 §2).
layer: Staff
role: null                    # Engines only: PDP | PIP | Evidence | Lifecycle
pep_shaped: true              # §6.4 — issuing a certificate is a protected side effect
# No `standard_version` here or in the sidecar: GH-DEC-2026-017 §5 / A12 —
# the declared layer is a standing property that does not change when the
# standard is revised, so a version in the declaration reads as a validity
# condition it is not. Version-scoped state belongs in the derived conformance
# record. The version ops-warden assented at is recorded with the assent
# (ADR-0010), which is where a version-at-a-boundary belongs.
standard: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model
companion: net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md
declaration: layer.yaml       # derived form; this frontmatter governs
pep_stance: pep-stance.yaml
assent: docs/adr/ADR-0010
---

# INTENT

> **ops-warden is Staff, and PEP-shaped.** Declared here in its own voice, per
> `security-layer-model_v0.7` §11 — a layer stated *about* a repository by another
> repository is not a declaration. The standard is **accepted**; its operative form
> is `net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md`. ops-warden's assent is `ADR-0010`, and its
> reviews of v0.4, v0.6 and v0.7 are in `history/`.
>
> **Staff** because ops-warden's core function is judgement, not computation: it
> decides which lane a need belongs to and stewards the paths through the estate's
> rules. Its artifacts are runbooks, routing decisions, workplans. **PEP-shaped**
> because issuing a certificate is a protected side effect — a shape, not a layer
> (§6.4). ops-warden renders no authorization decision and never will; it consumes
> them from `access-engine`.
>
> **The estate's front door for paths.** The companion routes the whole estate here:
> *"For how to get something done — which lane, which credential, which route — ask
> `ops-warden`. This document says what the rules are; ops-warden stewards the paths
> through them."* That is a standing obligation, not a compliment: every rule
> gate-house writes needs a path someone can actually walk, and ops-warden owes the
> estate that path.
>
> **The declarations are files, not this note** — prose cannot distinguish a
> declaration from a transcribed review (§11):
>
> | File | Declares | Enforced by |
> | --- | --- | --- |
> | `layer.yaml` | every Tooling contact, mapped to a §5.1/§5.2/§5.3 shape, plus the non-Tooling clients so the check is total | `scripts/check_layer_conformance.py`, `tests/test_layer_conformance.py` |
> | `pep-stance.yaml` | the unreachable-engine stance map (§6.4 obl. 3), total per zone | test asserts the published map **equals** the shipped default |
> | `tenancy.yaml` | tenancy posture, and `z1-operational` zone membership | `ADR-0009` |
>
> Both are cited in the standard as the estate's reference forms (§11, §6.4, §13.1).
>
> **Two declared engine gaps (§5.3), tracked non-conformance and not conformance.**
> `VaultCA` signs over a direct OpenBao client and `warden desk` shells `bao kv put`.
> Intended owner **secrets-engine**; blocked on no engine exposing an SSH-CA or
> attended-provisioning surface; reviewed quarterly; registered in statute §13.
> ops-warden keeps signing while the gap is open — refusing would remove production
> host access to close a documentation gap.
>
> **The agent principal (§3.4).** ops-warden is operated by agents as well as people,
> and they share the layer but not the blast radius. No standing credential; tool use
> is a conduit or an engine API and there is no third route; **tool availability is
> not permission**, which is exactly what `ADR-0004`'s read-boundary enforces; agent
> memory is not a state plane. Session semantics belong to `glas-harness`, not here.
>
> **Evidence (§9.6).** ops-warden's audit trail is **attributive**, not load-bearing:
> no control branches on the presence of a signing record. Emission is deliberately
> non-atomic so an audit-store failure cannot remove production host access — a trade
> the standard sanctions, declared in `wiki/AuditTrail.md`, registered in §13. If any
> future control ever gates on this trail, that trade must be revisited before it
> ships.

> This file captures **why this repository exists**, the **direction it is
> moving toward**, and the **kind of system it is meant to become**.
> It is intentionally **aspirational and stable**, not a description of
> current implementation. See `SCOPE.md` for what is implemented today.

---

## One-liner

**Operational access steward for the NetKingdom security model — knows the platform
credential lanes, keeps workload posture conformance aligned, and issues short-lived
SSH certificates where that lane belongs to ops-warden.**

---

## Why This Exists

Development workers — human operators, kaizen agents, CI automations, and
custodian tooling — need **safe, attributable access** across an increasingly
complex NetKingdom stack: identity, MFA, authorization, runtime secrets, SSH
reachability, and tunnel transport.

That stack is easy to misuse:

- static SSH keys and pasted API tokens in chat or Git
- wrong subsystem chosen for a credential need (OpenBao vs warden vs key-cape)
- drift between NetKingdom architecture canon and what operators actually run
- ad hoc rediscovery of bootstrap and custody rules every time a worker needs access
- unclear security blockers because dev/test/prod posture and workload maturity are
  not named before someone asks for real credentials

**ops-warden exists so operational access has a custodian-domain home** that
understands NetKingdom security infrastructure, routes workers to the right
subsystem, keeps local guidance current, and **directly operates only the SSH
short-lived certificate lane** it owns.

---

## The Mission

> *Where we are going.*

ops-warden **issues short-lived SSH certificates and routes every other credential
need to the subsystem that owns it.** It is not a desk that wraps the platform; it
owns one lane and points at the rest:

1. **Know** the NetKingdom security model — identity, authorization, secrets,
   SSH access, tunnels, bootstrap custody, and tenant/platform boundaries.
2. **Route, and assist.** Point workers to the correct subsystem for each credential
   type instead of becoming a universal secret vending machine — through the wiki and
   a machine-readable routing catalog that *points at* the owner's docs rather than
   restating them. Beyond pointing, **assist**: the `warden access` front door renders
   the exact auth method, path, and command for any need and — for `exec_capable`
   lanes — proxies the fetch *as the caller* (a transparent, policy-gated, audited
   conduit that holds, caches, and logs **nothing**). For **owner-native exec** lanes
   (secrets-engine `exec`, railiance-platform `credential exec`) ops-warden routes to
   the owner's front door — it does not mint tokens or run the owner's tool itself.
   This is the assist layer, not a universal broker: custody stays in OpenBao /
   secrets-engine / the platform broker; authorization in flex-auth.
3. **Steward workload security posture conformance.** Author the ops-security slice
   for environment posture (`dev/test/prod`) and workload maturity (`M0-M3`), then
   ship descriptors and read-only checks that identify whether a secret-flow blocker
   is real, owner-routed, or removable with a contract double. Runtime enforcement
   remains flex-auth; custody remains OpenBao.
4. **Align** runbooks, wiki, inventory patterns, and scorecard checks with
   NetKingdom canon as the platform evolves (OpenBao-first, flex-auth policy,
   key-cape IAM Profile, railiance deployment layers).
5. **Issue** short-lived SSH certificates for `adm` / `agt` / `atm` actors when
   host or ops reachability requires the SSH lane — via `warden sign`,
   `cert_command`, and `ops-ssh-wrapper`. This is the **only** lane ops-warden
   executes with its own authority.
6. **Audit** every ops-warden action — SSH signs, access proxy handoffs, worker
   coordination ticks — in one metadata-only trail (`warden activity`) so
   gatekeeping is observable, not tribal knowledge.

---

## Lane routing — who owns which need

**This is a runbook, not doctrine.** Security doctrine, the authority model, and the
security curriculum are **gate-house's** (`security-layer-model_v0.7` §8).
ops-warden references them and does not restate them. What follows is lane
stewardship: which subsystem owns which need, and what ops-warden does about it.

The machine-readable form is `registry/routing/catalog.yaml`, and the executable form
is `warden plan "<need>"` / `warden route find`. Prefer either over this table — it is
orientation, and the catalog is the source of truth (`ADR-0001`).

| Component | Layer | Owns | ops-warden relationship |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **gate-house** | Staff | Security doctrine, invariants, authority ceilings, authority context, conformance review, curriculum | **Route doctrine and authority-model questions here.** Not policy decisions — those go to access-engine |
| **access-engine** (`flex-auth`) | Engine | **The policy decision** — whether an actor may act. The only decision point in NetKingdom | Consume decisions; caller-side pre-sign gate. ops-warden never renders or caches one |
| **key-cape / Keycloak** | Tooling | Identity — who the actor is, MFA, IAM Profile claims | Instruct the identity path; do not re-implement OIDC |
| **OpenBao** | Tooling | Runtime secrets — API keys, dynamic creds, leases, audit | Instruct custody paths; proxy reads as the caller when `exec_capable`. Direct client use is the declared exception above |
| **secrets-engine** | Engine | Credential abstraction, custody, lifecycle; owner-native exec | Route provisioned exec lanes (e.g. npm publish). **Intended owner of the SSH-CA surface** |
| **tenant-engine** | Engine | Tenant/client secret custody and front door | Route tenant lanes once fronted; current tenant proxies are interim (section 9) |
| **user-engine** | Engine | Users, accounts, memberships | No ops-warden lane today; route rather than absorb |
| **zone-engine** | Engine | Zone identity and membership | Consume compiled membership; ops-warden declares `z1-operational` (`ADR-0009`) |
| **railiance-platform** (broker) | — | Scoped lease grants (`credential exec`) | Route `warden-sign` token needs; ops-warden does not mint OpenBao tokens |
| **ops-mason** | Staff | Building and tearing down access routes and perimeters | Peer lane owner; same lane/rule demarcation applies |
| **ops-warden** | Staff | **Operational access lanes** — short-lived SSH certificates, routing, stewardship, runbooks | **Own and issue** the SSH lane |
| **ops-bridge** | Staff | Tunnel transport — consumes certs via `cert_command` | Primary consumer; document integration |
| **railiance-infra** | — | Host principals, force-command, SSH hardening | Instruct host-side deployment; do not own Ansible |
| **kings-guard** | Staff | Adaptive defence, observation, containment; publishes posture | Posture may reduce authority, never manufacture it |

### Access lane versus access rule

Normative, per `security-layer-model_v0.7` §8 and assented to in `ADR-0010`:

- **access lane** — ops-warden and ops-mason. *How* a worker reaches a host.
- **access rule** — access-engine. *Whether* they may.

ops-warden owns the route and never the decision. A question about whether an actor
may do something is not an ops-warden question, however it arrives.

Canonical references:

- `net-kingdom/SECURITY-COMPANION.md` — the operative form; start here
- `net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md` (accepted; §5 shapes, §6.4 PEP, §8 vocabulary)
- `net-kingdom/docs/platform-identity-security-architecture.md`
- `net-kingdom/docs/responsibility-map.md`
- `wiki/AccessManagementDirective.md` (ops SSH actor model)
- `.claude/rules/credential-routing.md` (agent-facing runbook — stays inline by design)

---

## Responsibility Boundary

### ops-warden owns

- NetKingdom-aligned **operational SSH access** guidance and stewardship
- **SSH certificate issuance** for registered `adm` / `agt` / `atm` actors
- Actor inventory, TTL/principal policy, cert-side scorecard, unified audit trail
- `cert_command` contract and `ops-ssh-wrapper` automation surface
- Keeping ops-warden docs and patterns aligned with NetKingdom security evolution
- Workload Security Posture standard, conformance descriptors/checks, and dev-tier
  contract-double guidance for secret-flow readiness
- Coordination worker stewardship — triage ops-warden's State Hub inbox with
  conservative defaults (draft-only unless `--full-auto`)

### ops-warden instructs but does not own

| Need | Route to |
| --- | --- |
| OIDC login, MFA, human identity claims | key-cape / Keycloak (NetKingdom IAM Profile) |
| Security doctrine, invariants, authority model | gate-house |
| Policy decision — may actor X access resource Y | access-engine (`flex-auth`) |
| API keys, provider secrets, DB creds, object-storage STS | OpenBao (+ flex-auth policy where required) |
| Inter-Hub operator keys, LLM provider credentials | OpenBao or approved operator secret store |
| Tunnel lifecycle, port forwarding | ops-bridge |
| `/etc/ssh/auth_principals/`, host hardening | railiance-infra |
| OpenBao cluster init/unseal, platform deploy | railiance-platform |

**ops-warden is not a general secrets manager.** It may document *how* workers
obtain non-SSH credentials; it must not store long-lived secrets in Git, State
Hub, workplans, logs, or chat.

---

## Design Principles

### 1. Right lane, right subsystem

Every credential request should land in the subsystem NetKingdom designed for it.
ops-warden optimizes for **correct routing** as much as for **fast issuance**.

### 2. Short-lived by default (SSH lane)

Operational SSH access uses CA-signed certificates with TTL and principals —
never unbounded static keys in worker workflows.

### 3. Align with canon, reduce drift

When NetKingdom security architecture changes (e.g. OpenBao standardization,
new bootstrap lanes), ops-warden updates its wiki, SCOPE, and runbooks so dev
workers do not reconstruct decisions from stale chat history.

### 4. Attributable actors

Humans, agents, and automations are distinct actor types (`adm` / `agt` / `atm`)
with naming, TTL, and principal conventions — matching the Access Management
Directive and NetKingdom agent-operating model.

### 5. Implement narrowly, guide broadly

**Implement** only what belongs in the SSH certificate lane.
**Guide** across the full NetKingdom security surface through documentation,
scorecard checks, inventory patterns, and future policy-integration hooks.

### 6. Observable gatekeeping

Every ops-warden action appends metadata-only audit events; `warden activity`
answers *what happened recently* in one command. Compliance checks (scorecard) make
cert-side policy violations visible before they become incidents.

### 7. The founder is escalated to, never tasked with mechanics

*(added 2026-07-18, founder directive — see WARDEN-WP-0029)*

Workers and agents ask **ops-warden** what a credential need requires — never
the founder directly. ops-warden answers three questions, in policy terms:

1. Can this be done autonomously under current policy and posture? → do it /
   route it, unattended.
2. Does policy require a founder *decision or identity act* (OIDC login,
   Red-lane approval)? → escalate exactly that act, nothing more.
3. Is the need unroutable? → name the missing lane and propose it (CCR),
   instead of improvising file drops or UI instructions.

Raw mechanics — "paste this PAT into /tmp", "click through the forgejo admin
UI" — are **anti-patterns**: they leak credentials into CLI history and file
artefacts and burn founder attention on work a lane should do. When founder
interaction *is* required, prefer a purpose-built interaction surface (local
web approval page rendering the exact action) over CLI/file handoffs.

### 8. Posture-aware: the organization is in build phase

Policy answers depend on lifecycle posture. The organization currently runs in
**build phase**: one founder-operator, pre-revenue, velocity prioritized —
pragmatic provisioning (workstation OIDC, per-repo deploy keys, advisory
policy gates) is deliberately acceptable where audit and custody invariants
hold (values only in OpenBao/process env; metadata-only trails). ops-warden
must know the current posture, state it in its answers, and tighten defaults
when the posture graduates (first customer data, first non-founder operator,
production tier). Posture is declared configuration, not tribal knowledge.

### 9. Cover gaps, but never silently own them

*(added 2026-08-11, founder directive — see WARDEN-WP-0030)*

ops-warden **works with, and never replaces or duplicates**, secrets-engine,
tenant-engine, user-engine and the other NetKingdom security components.

It may nonetheless *cover* a need that no component systematically provides yet —
that is a legitimate service, and the `warden access` proxy makes it cheap. The
danger is precisely that cheapness: an absorbed need looks permanent, stops
registering as a missing capability, and quietly turns a routing layer into a
second secrets broker.

So every execution position other than SSH issuance is **interim by default**:

- record the component that *should* own the front door, and what is missing
- treat the cover as a tracked gap, not as ownership
- delegate the moment that component ships its front door, keeping the proxy
  only as a fallback (`exec_owner` / `exec_command` — the WP-0019 pattern)

A gap ops-warden covers silently is worse than a gap it refuses, because the
refusal is visible and the cover is not. Filling the gap properly — with the
owner's governance, custody, and policy — is the goal; ops-warden holding the
lane is the temporary means.

---

## Credential flow (target mental model)

```text
Development worker needs access
        |
        v
ops-warden (issue SSH; route / assist the rest)
        |
        +-- SSH host / ops reachability? --------> warden sign / cert_command
        |       (OpenBao SSH engine; scoped token via credential broker)
        |
        +-- Owner-native secret exec? -----------> secrets-engine exec
        |       (e.g. npm publish) or railiance-platform credential exec
        |
        +-- Generic API / DB / provider secret? -> OpenBao path
        |       (warden access proxies as caller when exec_capable)
        |
        +-- Authorization required? ------------> flex-auth decision
        |       (caller-side gate on sign + access when policy.enabled)
        |
        +-- Identity / MFA required? -------------> key-cape / Keycloak path
        |
        +-- Tunnel only? ------------------------> ops-bridge + cert_command
```

The steward role spans documentation, runbooks, the SSH CLI, the machine-readable
routing catalog with `warden route` lookup, policy-gated issuance, workload posture
conformance, the coordination worker, unified audit (`warden activity`), and — since
WARDEN-WP-0014 — the `warden access` assist layer that advises, routes owner-native
exec lanes, and (for generic `exec_capable` lanes) proxies fetches as the caller
without holding the value.

---

## Relationship to NetKingdom

NetKingdom owns the **canonical security architecture** and meta-orchestration
across orchestrated repos. ops-warden is a **custodian-domain execution repo**
for one security lane plus operational guidance.

- NetKingdom defines *what the platform security model is*
- ops-warden keeps *operational SSH access and worker routing* aligned with it
- Railiance repos *deploy* what NetKingdom and component repos specify

ops-warden should appear in NetKingdom responsibility and pattern material as
the **operational SSH credential authority**, not as a replacement for
OpenBao or flex-auth.

---

## Success criteria

ops-warden is succeeding when:

1. A dev worker can determine **which subsystem** to use for a credential need
   without guessing or pasting secrets into agent sessions.
2. SSH access for agents and operators is **short-lived, inventoried, and audited**.
3. ops-bridge and other consumers integrate via **stable cert_command** without
   backend-specific branching.
4. NetKingdom security evolution (OpenBao, IAM Profile, bootstrap lanes) is
   reflected in ops-warden docs within the same maintenance cycle.
5. Non-SSH secrets remain **out of ops-warden storage** — only documented paths.
6. Security blockers can be classified by environment posture, workload maturity,
   owner route, and non-secret evidence instead of by vague credential risk.
7. Every ops-warden execution position is explicitly **permanent** (SSH issuance) or
   explicitly **interim** with a named intended owner and blocker — so gaps ops-warden
   covers stay visible as gaps and can be handed back.

---

## Non-goals

- Universal credential broker for all secret types
- Runtime enforcement of the workload secret-flow lattice (flex-auth owns that)
- Replacing OpenBao, flex-auth, key-cape, or railiance deployment ownership
- Storing Inter-Hub, LLM provider, or other long-lived API keys
- Host-side SSH configuration deployment
- **Duplicating or restating another subsystem's procedure** — routing material
  points at the owner's docs; it does not fork them
- **Permanently owning a lane that belongs to another component** — covering an
  unfilled gap is acceptable and expected; keeping it after the owner can front it,
  or holding it without recording that it is interim, is not (§9)
- SSO / Teleport at scale (trigger per Access Management Directive §6.2)

---

## Evolution notes

The repository shipped the SSH CA CLI first (WARDEN-WP-0001–0003). The
stewardship and NetKingdom-alignment mission is the **next stratum** — docs,
routing canon, inventory standards, production OpenBao SSH engine alignment,
flex-auth integration design, and NetKingdom cross-links — without collapsing
platform boundaries.

See `wiki/CredentialRouting.md` for worker-facing routing,
`wiki/WorkloadSecurityPosture.md` for the posture/maturity conformance model,
`wiki/NetKingdomSecurityMap.md` for component literacy,
`wiki/AuditTrail.md` for the unified activity log,
`history/2026-07-01-intent-scope-gap-analysis.md` for the latest gap analysis,
`history/2026-06-18-post-wp0008-intent-scope-reassessment.md` for the SSH lane
reassessment, and archived workplans WP-0006–0008 for stewardship and production
closeout execution.