ops-warden/workplans/WARDEN-WP-0030-delegation-register.md
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Classify 5 proxy lanes interim; hold 6 pending secrets-engine
Revised the classification axis after inspecting the entries: sorting by
subsystem was wrong. Nine of eleven lanes are a generic KV read with the
caller's own token, duplicating no owner procedure. Test is now
procedure-or-lifecycle vs generic read.

Interim now: rapp-qonto-keycape-client (key-cape), binky-company-email-imap
and binky-qonto-api (tenant-engine), railiance-backup-offsite-lane and
agent-harness-forgejo-deploy (re-establish procedures).

Held: the six thin-wrapper lanes are permanent only if secrets-engine exec
stays per-lane; asked whether it generalizes (msg 7d55d332).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 01:33:29 +02:00

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---
id: WARDEN-WP-0030
type: workplan
title: "Delegation register — make gap-covering interim, visible, and retirable"
domain: infotech
repo: ops-warden
status: proposed
owner: claude
topic_slug: custodian
planning_priority: high
planning_order: 30
created: "2026-08-11"
updated: "2026-08-11"
state_hub_workstream_id: "29f3fcb3-e3c5-4f9d-bdfd-f76254754e21"
---
# WARDEN-WP-0030 — Delegation register
## Origin
Founder directive 2026-08-11: **ops-warden should work with, but never replace or
duplicate, secrets-engine, tenant-engine, user-engine and other NetKingdom
components.** It is acceptable for ops-warden to cover a gap where needed security
functionality is not yet systematically provided — *provided* the gap is kept in
mind, filled, and given proper governance, after which ops-warden delegates to the
improved component.
The directive is already half-lived and nowhere written. Survey of
`registry/routing/catalog.yaml` on 2026-08-11 (24 entries):
| Execution mode | Count | Meaning |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `warden_executes: true` | 1 | ops-warden's own lane (`ssh-cert-host-access`) |
| `exec_owner:` set | 2 | Delegated — route-primary, proxy-fallback |
| `exec_capable` proxy, no `exec_owner` | 11 | **ops-warden is the de facto front door** |
| route-only | 10 | Pointer, nothing to delegate |
The delegation primitive already exists and works: `exec_owner` / `exec_command` /
`pointer_command` (`whynot-design-npm-publish` → secrets-engine, WP-0019;
`ops-warden-warden-sign-token` → railiance-platform credential broker,
RAILIANCE-WP-0005 T08). It is used by 2 of 24 lanes.
Nothing distinguishes the other eleven — "ops-warden proxies because that is the
right end state" reads identically to "ops-warden proxies because no owner front
door was ever built." Supporting evidence of the doctrine gap:
- `wiki/AccessRouting.md` does not mention secrets-engine at all and has no section
on interim positions.
- `wiki/playbooks/catalog-lane-promotion.md` gates draft→active on the lane
*working*, never on whether ops-warden should be the one running it.
## Goal
Make every ops-warden execution position **explicitly interim or explicitly
permanent**, with the intended owner and blocking condition recorded in the
machine-readable layer — so gap-covering is a tracked, retirable state rather than
silent ownership drift.
Success is not removing proxies. Success is that no proxy exists without an answer
to *"who should own this front door, and what is missing?"*
## Non-goals
- Removing or degrading any working lane. Proxies keep working until the owner's
front door exists and is proven.
- Building the missing front doors. That work belongs to secrets-engine,
tenant-engine, user-engine, and railiance-platform — this workplan produces the
register they need, not their implementations.
- A second catalog or a parallel schema. `delegation:` extends the existing entry
shape; `warden route gaps` composes the existing loader.
## Design constraints
- **Interim is the default.** A lane without a `delegation:` block is treated as
`interim` with an unknown owner, not as settled. Absence must read as a question.
- **Founder classifies, agent drafts.** Which of the eleven are legitimately
permanent is an architecture judgement (`key-cape-oidc-login` plausibly is; the
tenant/workload secret lanes plausibly are not). T02 lands a *drafted*
classification for review; the founder's answer is authoritative.
- **No restating owner procedure.** The register names the intended owner and the
blocker; it does not describe how that owner will implement their front door.
Same pointer-layer discipline as the rest of the catalog.
## Tasks
### T01 — Interim custodianship doctrine
```task
id: WARDEN-WP-0030-T01
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "3d76f6c2-5007-4ad5-8d6f-360f9303c929"
```
Add a doctrine section to `wiki/AccessRouting.md` stating the boundary: the only
lane ops-warden executes with its own authority is SSH issuance; every other
execution position is interim, held because the owning component does not yet cover
the need, and retired to that owner once it does. Name secrets-engine,
tenant-engine, user-engine, railiance-platform and flex-auth as the delegation
targets. Cross-link INTENT.md §9.
### T02 — `delegation:` metadata + backfill
```task
id: WARDEN-WP-0030-T02
status: todo
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "8013020b-d0a5-4e89-8e0b-bc418a761c84"
```
Extend the catalog entry schema with:
```yaml
delegation:
mode: native | interim | permanent # native = owner already fronts it
intended_owner: <repo> # required unless mode: permanent
blocked_on: <what is missing> # required when mode: interim
reviewed: "YYYY-MM-DD"
```
Backfill all 24 entries. `exec_owner` lanes become `mode: native`.
`ssh-cert-host-access` becomes `mode: permanent` (ops-warden's own lane). The
eleven undelegated proxies are classified per the founder review below — five
`interim` now, six held pending secrets-engine's answer.
### T03 — `warden route gaps` + conformance test
```task
id: WARDEN-WP-0030-T03
status: todo
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "e7755708-e1bf-4d42-999c-4a60330cf154"
```
`warden route gaps [--json]` lists interim lanes with intended owner, blocker, and
age since review — the queryable register. Add a routing test asserting every
`exec_capable` non-`warden_executes` entry declares `delegation`, so a new proxy
cannot be added without answering the ownership question. Surface stale interim
entries in the existing drift/stale review cadence.
### T04 — Promotion gate
```task
id: WARDEN-WP-0030-T04
status: todo
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "ddc0268b-1279-4875-b223-0627c97d657a"
```
Update `wiki/playbooks/catalog-lane-promotion.md`: draft→active requires a
`delegation` block. If `mode: interim`, the promotion note must state the intended
owner and the retirement condition. Add the matching question to the lane-review
checklist.
### T05 — Publish the register to the owners
```task
id: WARDEN-WP-0030-T05
status: todo
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "d8796e25-e896-463d-9476-f002e38b6897"
```
Once T02 is reviewed, send the interim register to secrets-engine, tenant-engine,
user-engine, railiance-platform and net-kingdom as a coordination message: here is
what ops-warden currently fronts on your behalf, here is what would let us step
back. This is the artefact that converts a private ops-warden position into a
fleet-visible capability gap.
## Acceptance
- [ ] `wiki/AccessRouting.md` states the interim-custodianship boundary and names
the delegation targets
- [ ] All 24 catalog entries carry `delegation`; `warden route gaps` returns the
interim set with owner + blocker
- [ ] Routing test fails when a proxy lane omits `delegation`
- [ ] Promotion playbook gates draft→active on the ownership question
- [ ] Founder has reviewed the interim/permanent classification of the eleven
- [ ] Register delivered to the named owner repos
## Classification of the eleven (founder review, 2026-08-11)
### The test
An initial draft sorted by *subsystem* (tenant lanes → tenant-engine, workload lanes →
secrets-engine). Inspecting the entries showed that is the wrong axis. Nine of the
eleven share one `auth_method` — "caller's own OpenBao token" (operator OIDC via
key-cape, or a `workload-kv-read-*` policy) — and one `fetch_command` shape,
`bao kv get -field=X <path>`. No owner procedure is duplicated there. Contrast
`whynot-design-npm-publish`, which needs npm config and token injection into a specific
tool; that is a *procedure*, which is why WP-0019 handed it to secrets-engine.
**Test: owner-specific procedure or lifecycle → `interim`. Generic KV read →
ops-warden's thin wrapper is arguably `permanent`.**
### Interim — classify now (5)
| Lane | `intended_owner` | `blocked_on` |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `rapp-qonto-keycape-client` | key-cape | `client_secret_basic` exchange is a key-cape protocol procedure, not a KV read; rotation already `automatable: true`, so key-cape could front it today |
| `binky-company-email-imap` | tenant-engine | Custody at `tenants/binky/...` but rotation owner is `binky-control` — split lifecycle, no front door reconciling it |
| `binky-qonto-api` | tenant-engine | Same split, same tenant |
| `railiance-backup-offsite-lane` | railiance-platform | Rotation is `re-establish`, a multi-step procedure ops-warden only describes |
| `agent-harness-forgejo-deploy` | railiance-platform / agent-harness | `re-establish` plus an alternative host-local key path; two ways in, neither owner-fronted |
### Held pending secrets-engine (6)
`openbao-api-key`, `key-cape-oidc-login`, `issue-core-ingestion-api-key`,
`reuse-surface-hub-write-token`, `openrouter-llm-connect`, `forgejo-admin-api-token`.
These pass the test as `permanent` **only if `secrets-engine exec` stays per-lane and
provisioned.** If secrets-engine intends `exec --catalog <id>` to generalize over
arbitrary OpenBao lanes, the thin-wrapper argument collapses and all six become
`interim` with `intended_owner: secrets-engine` — ops-warden would then be duplicating
a front door the owner provides.
Asked directly (msg `7d55d332`, 2026-08-11): generic or per-lane; if generic, is it
near-term enough to mark now; and are there lanes they would decline, so those can be
marked permanent with the owner's position on record rather than ops-warden's inference.
Supporting detail: for `issue-core-ingestion-api-key`, `reuse-surface-hub-write-token`
and `openrouter-llm-connect`, **production never touches the proxy** — External Secrets
syncs the value into the cluster and the proxy exists for operator verification and
debugging. That weakens the case that they represent a missing front door at all.
**Do not backfill these six until the answer arrives.** A lane wrongly marked
`permanent` bakes in exactly the ownership drift this register exists to catch.
### user-engine
No lane names **user-engine** as owner — it appears only as a consumer inside
`coulomb-social-runtime-env` (`USER_ENGINE_PROXY_SECRET`, rotated at
`user-engine/user-engine-runtime`). Whether user-engine should front that lane itself
is worth confirming.
## See also
- INTENT.md §9 (cover gaps, never silently own them)
- WARDEN-WP-0019 (route to secrets-engine — the pattern this generalizes)
- WARDEN-WP-0028 (tenant secret custody pattern; front door still ops-warden's proxy)
- `history/2026-08-11-delegation-surface-assessment.md`
- `registry/routing/catalog.yaml`, `wiki/playbooks/catalog-lane-promotion.md`