| capability.security.ssh-certificate-issuance |
Decision-bound SSH certificates |
warden sign with local and OpenBao backends and adm/agt/atm actors. |
ops-warden |
draft |
helix_forge |
| ssh |
| certificate |
| ca |
| ops-warden |
| openbao |
| security |
| netkingdom |
| framework-reuse |
|
| discovery |
availability |
| current |
target |
confidence |
rationale |
| D4 |
D5 |
medium |
SCOPE, AccessManagementDirective alignment, config runbooks, and cert_command contract are documented; production OpenBao integration is documented but engine deployment lives in railiance-platform. A machine-readable routing catalog (registry/routing/catalog.yaml) and wiki/AccessRouting.md make the "issue SSH, route the rest" boundary discoverable.
|
|
| current |
target |
confidence |
rationale |
| A3 |
A5 |
medium |
Source interface assessed 2026-10-14: warden sign with local and OpenBao backends and adm/agt/atm actors. Availability describes the delivery form, not production acceptance. Direct Tooling contact is a declared gap; certificate reachability is not target authorization. |
|
|
| completeness |
reliability |
| level |
name |
confidence |
basis |
satisfied_expectations |
broken_expectations |
out_of_scope_expectations |
| C3 |
Functional Core |
medium |
scope_vs_intent_and_consumer_expectations |
| local and OpenBao/Vault-compatible signing backends |
| TTL policy enforcement per actor type |
| principals inventory and cert-side scorecard |
| signatures audit log and stale-cert cleanup |
| cert_command stdout contract for ops-bridge |
| per-actor extension allow-list and max_ttl_hours ceiling (WARDEN-WP-0045) |
|
| host-side principal deployment not owned here |
| OpenBao SSH engine mount not deployed from this repo |
|
| long-lived API key custody |
| tunnel lifecycle management |
| Vault/OpenBao cluster operations |
|
|
| level |
name |
confidence |
basis |
known_reliability_risks |
| R2 |
Tolerable |
medium |
consumer_quality_signals |
| production signing depends on OpenBao availability and token policy |
| local backend requires protected CA key handling by operators |
|
|
|
| intent |
includes |
excludes |
assumptions |
use_cases |
research_memos |
| warden sign with local and OpenBao backends and adm/agt/atm actors |
| warden sign with local and OpenBao backends and adm/agt/atm actors |
|
| Direct Tooling contact is a declared gap; certificate reachability is not target authorization |
|
| callers supply actor public keys; humans self-issue admin keys |
| production platform uses OpenBao with Vault-compatible SSH engine API |
|
| ops-bridge tunnel cert_command |
| Inter-Hub bootstrap short-lived agent access |
| U06: Operator or automation obtains a bounded SSH certificate and maintains private connectivity |
|
| ops-warden/SCOPE.md |
| ops-warden/wiki/CertCommandInterface.md |
| ops-warden/wiki/OpsWardenConfig.md |
| ops-warden/wiki/AccessRouting.md |
|
|
| current_level |
target_level |
current_artifacts |
target_artifacts |
consumption_modes |
| A3 |
A5 |
|
| packaged ops-warden release with documented OpenBao role bootstrap |
| `warden route` lookup CLI over the pointer catalog (WARDEN-WP-0011) |
|
|
|
| depends_on |
supports |
related_to |
|
|
|
| capability.security.credential-lifecycle |
| capability.authorization.policy-evaluate |
| capability.ops.tunnel-bridge |
| capability.security.structure-construction |
|
|
| recommended_for |
not_recommended_for |
known_limitations |
| Operator or automation obtains a bounded SSH certificate and maintains private connectivity |
|
| Direct Tooling contact is a declared gap; certificate reachability is not target authorization |
|
| Direct Tooling contact is a declared gap; certificate reachability is not target authorization |
| 2026-10-14 architecture review estimates operational maturity separately; a registry entry does not authorize execution or establish deployment. |
|
|
|