All three v0.4 findings were acted on — §9.1 split into pending/declared-gap and §5's scope rule adopted as recommended and credited, and §9.6 ruled via the load-bearing/attributive distinction with ops-warden's `# audit must not block signing` named as the estate's live example. Checked the favourable ruling rather than accepting it. §9.6's test is "no control branches on its presence": the only consumer of audit.jsonl is `warden activity`, which displays. Nothing gates on a signing record, so the lane is genuinely attributive. AuditTrail.md now records the ruling instead of the open question, and states that the trade must be revisited if a control ever gates on the trail. CONFORMANCE ACTION. §6.4 obligation 3 requires a stance map "published rather than held in code", and requires every PEP-shaped consumer to publish one so the maps can be inventoried — naming ADR-0009 as the reference shape. ops-warden was not doing it: the map lived in PolicyConfig.failure_modes, a dataclass default. Not a code comment, but not published either. pep-stance.yaml publishes it, and the test asserts the published map EQUALS the shipped default. A published map that may drift from the code is worse than no map, because it invites reliance it cannot support. Two findings sent to gate-house, in history/2026-08-29-layer-model-v06-review.md: §6.4 obligation 1 (no side effect without a decision record) contradicts obligation 3 and §9.3, with ops-warden's blessed fail-open stance as the instance; and §6.4 mandates a stance-map inventory in §13 that §13 does not implement — where ops-warden is currently the only PEP to have published one. 402 tests pass, ruff clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YWBMovyFoy9RRrfL7zKvPJ Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 4014535@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: d0036016-73e8-4da1-8e47-563e3ab39a3c
3.4 KiB
Audit Trail — Unified ops-warden Activity
Date: 2026-07-01
Workplan: WARDEN-WP-0022
ops-warden records metadata only for every action it performs. No token, key, cert body, or other secret value ever lands in the audit log.
What is recorded
| Kind | Source actions | Typical fields |
|---|---|---|
sign |
warden sign, warden issue, cert_command |
actor, backend, TTL, policy_decision_id |
access |
warden access --fetch / --exec |
need id, owner repo, subject, decision id, outcome |
worker |
warden worker tick, approve, full-auto execute |
triage counts, draft id, outcome |
hub |
State Hub progress notes (--hub) |
summary, author, event type |
Storage
- Primary:
{state_dir}/audit.jsonl— append-only JSONL (default~/.local/state/warden/audit.jsonl) - Legacy (merged for back-compat):
signatures.log,access-audit.log
Rotation: when audit.jsonl exceeds 5 MiB it is renamed to audit.jsonl.1 and a
fresh file starts.
Secret-material guard
record_event() rejects fields that look like secret values (known token prefixes,
high-entropy runs). Signing and proxy paths swallow audit failures so gatekeeping
never blocks the primary action — but tests prove values cannot be written.
Absence of a record is not evidence of absence. Because emission never blocks the primary action (
src/warden/ca.py), a failed append loses the event while the action still happens. This trail proves that the records it holds were not altered or truncated; it does not prove that every action produced one. Do not reason from a missing entry. This is the estate-wide bound insecurity-layer-model_v0.4§9.6 — completeness is the source's obligation, and Ruled 2026-08-29 (security-layer-model_v0.6§9.6): this trail is attributive, not load-bearing — no control branches on the presence of a signing record — so the non-atomic trade is legitimate, and the obligations are to declare it (this note) and never to claim completeness. Atomicity is required only where a control's soundness depends on an event being present or absent. Registered in the standard's §13 open-gap table as self-declared. If a future control ever gates on this trail, the trade must be revisited before it ships.
Query
# Human table — last 7 days
warden activity
# Filter and JSON for agents
warden activity --days 3 --kind sign --json
warden activity --days 7 --hub --json
| Flag | Purpose |
|---|---|
--days N |
Look back N days (default 7) |
--kind sign|access|worker|hub |
Filter by event kind |
--json |
Stable JSON array for automation |
--hub |
Include recent State Hub progress notes mentioning ops-warden |
Linger and login independence
The coordination worker can run under a systemd --user timer with linger enabled
(WARDEN-WP-0021). Audit events from worker ticks appear with kind: worker.
Full logged-out operational value still depends on State Hub and tunnels being
reachable without an interactive login (State Hub on railiance01, cust-wp-0011).
The audit trail is local-first; --hub adds narrative context when the hub is up.
See also
wiki/OperatorAccessAssist.md— metadata-only principle for access proxywiki/PolicyGatedSigning.md—policy_decision_idon sign eventswiki/playbooks/scheduled-worker.md— worker timer and review loop