tegwick
5149946a4c
Ship posture-aware access planning: organization_posture=build (axis C), catalog freshness warnings, warden plan verdicts, localhost founder desk, and playbook/agent guidance that retire /tmp file-drop patterns. Compose route catalog + handoff rather than a second routing layer.
91 lines
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4.5 KiB
Markdown
91 lines
No EOL
4.5 KiB
Markdown
# Credential and access routing
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**Audience:** Codex, Claude Code, Grok, and custodian agents that call **llm-connect**
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for inference. Run this check **before** requesting secrets, API keys, SSH access,
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login tokens, or database passwords — in any repo, not only `ops-warden`.
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ops-warden **issues SSH certificates only** (`warden sign`, `cert_command`). Every
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other credential need belongs to another subsystem. **Do not** message
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`ops-warden` on State Hub expecting a secret value; the reply is a pointer, not a key.
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### Lookup (do this first)
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**Always plan before drafting any founder credential step** (WARDEN-WP-0029):
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```bash
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warden plan "<describe your need>" --json
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# verdict: autonomous | founder_required | unroutable
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```
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```bash
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warden route find "<describe your need>" --json
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warden route show <catalog-id> --json
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```
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Requires the `warden` CLI from `~/ops-warden` (`uv tool install .` or `uv run warden`).
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If a known lane is missing, reinstall from checkout (stale bundled catalog).
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| Agent runtime | How to orient |
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| --- | --- |
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| **Codex / Grok** (shell, HTTP State Hub) | `warden plan` first; inbox `to_agent=ops-warden` is for coordination, not secret vending |
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| **Claude Code** (MCP when available) | `get_domain_summary("custodian")` for workplans; **still** use `warden plan` / `warden route` for credential ownership |
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| **llm-connect** (inference service) | Never put secret retrieval in prompts; route custody via `warden plan` |
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### Quick routing table
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| I need… | Owner | ops-warden executes? |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| SSH cert (`adm`/`agt`/`atm`) | ops-warden | **Yes** — `warden sign` |
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| API key, DB password, provider token | OpenBao (`railiance-platform`) | No — route only |
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| Login / OIDC / MFA | key-cape / Keycloak | No — route only |
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| Authorization decision | flex-auth | No — route only |
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| activity-core → issue-core emission | activity-core + issue-core | No — `warden route show activity-core-issue-sink` |
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| SSH tunnel | ops-bridge (+ `cert_command` from warden) | No — route only |
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### Anti-patterns (do not do these)
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- Drafting founder steps ("paste PAT to `/tmp`", "click admin UI") without `warden plan`
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- `POST /messages/` to `ops-warden` asking for `ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY`, `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, etc.
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- Inventing `warden secret`, `warden login`, `warden bao`, `warden tunnel` — they do not exist
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- Pasting secrets into Git, State Hub, workplans, logs, or chat
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- Steady-state **file drops** of credentials under `/tmp` (use `warden desk` paste-once
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or `warden access --out/--exec/--wrap`)
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- **Reading a secret value onto a captured stdout.** `bao kv get <path>` (full table)
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or `bao kv get -field=X` piped/redirected/run in an agent session dumps the value
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into a logged context — the 2026-07-16 disclosure. To *verify* a lane use
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`bao token capabilities` (allow/deny), never a read (WP-0026 T01).
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### Safe fetch transports (WP-0026 T02)
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When a value must actually move, use a sanctioned transport that keeps it off
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stdout. `warden access <need> --fetch` refuses to stream a value to a non-terminal
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stdout unless you pass `--unsafe-stdout` (interactive human sessions only):
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| Transport | Command | Result |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| **File** | `warden access <need> --out FILE` | value written to a mode-0600 file, never shown |
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| **Env (exec)** | `warden access <need> --exec -- <cmd>` | value injected into the child process env only |
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| **Wrapping token** | `warden access <need> --wrap` | a single-use, short-TTL OpenBao wrapping token to `bao unwrap` in your own context |
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### Agent read-boundary on high-risk lanes (WP-0026 T04)
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When `WARDEN_AGENT_ID` is set and the catalog lane is `risk: high`, raw value
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streaming is refused (exit 7). Use `--out` / `--exec` / `--wrap` / `--fingerprint`
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only. OpenBao policy `agent-high-risk-boundary` denies data-read on those paths
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for agent tokens (metadata/capabilities only). See
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`wiki/playbooks/agent-read-boundary.md`.
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### EXPOSED taint (WP-0026 T05)
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`warden taint <catalog-id>` reports KV v2 `custom_metadata` (`exposed_at`,
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`exposed_version`, …) without reading secret data. Convention:
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`wiki/playbooks/exposed-taint.md`.
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### Other capabilities (reuse-surface)
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Non-credential capabilities are usually discovered through **reuse-surface** federation
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(`reuse-surface` registry / `capability.*` indexes). Credential routing is inlined in
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every repo's agent instructions because it is high-frequency, high-risk, and easy to
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get wrong.
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**Canon:** `~/ops-warden/wiki/CredentialRouting.md` · catalog `~/ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml` |