tegwick
4ebd241d88
Pointer-only catalog entry so warden route find "state hub read private repository" resolves. ops-warden routes and does not execute. MASON-WP-0003-T03. Assistant: grok Assistant-Session: 01a09dc1-b21e-77e1-919e-fcad2f82b267
120 lines
5 KiB
Markdown
120 lines
5 KiB
Markdown
# State Hub Forge Derivation Read Token
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Date: 2026-08-26 (policy and auth role built and verified 2026-08-27; catalog active 2026-09-14)
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Catalog: `state-hub-forge-derivation-read` (status `active`)
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Owner: `ops-mason` (built under `ops-mason/plans/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md`, approved 2026-08-26)
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Read-only Forgejo token so the State Hub can clone **private** repositories and
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derive their work records. `CUST-ADR-012` makes the forge the projection source;
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that premise held only for repositories central could read, and nine private
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repositories were invisible to derivation entirely (`STATE-WP-0083-T04`,
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2026-08-26).
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**This lane is a pointer.** ops-warden routes it and executes nothing: it issues
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SSH certificates only and owns no secret store. The Kubernetes auth role, policy,
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and KV path are ops-mason's build; the token value is minted by the forge owner
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and delivered through `paste_once_provision`. The credential was delivered
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2026-08-27; `STATE-WP-0084` mounted it into State Hub.
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**Ask first:** `warden plan "state hub read private repository" --json`.
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---
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## OpenBao pointers
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| Field | Value |
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| --- | --- |
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| Mount | `platform` |
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| Path | `platform/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation` |
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| Secret field | `FORGE_READ_TOKEN` |
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| Policy | `workload-kv-read-state-hub-forge-derivation` (read on that path alone) |
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| Auth | Kubernetes auth role `state-hub-forge-derivation`, bound to ServiceAccount `state-hub/state-hub` (`token_ttl=15m`, `token_max_ttl=30m`) |
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**Forgejo token scope:** repository **read**, organisation-wide. No push, no
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administration, no other Forgejo resource. Approved at that breadth on
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2026-08-26 — the maintenance cost of per-repository grants lands on whoever adds
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a private repository later, and the leak radius (every private repository,
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read-only) was accepted knowingly. Reasoning in the construction plan §6.
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**Not the admin PAT.** `forgejo-admin-api-token` is a site-admin credential
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owned by `railiance-platform`. Reusing it here was considered and rejected: a
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projection that only reads must not hold an identity that can write.
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---
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## Worker checklist
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1. **Plan** (agents — always):
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```bash
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warden plan "state hub read private repository" --json
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# expect lane=state-hub-forge-derivation-read
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```
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2. **In-cluster consumers do nothing here.** The `state-hub` deployment receives
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the credential as a Kubernetes Secret; `derive_from_forge()` picks it up on
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its own. If derivation reports a repository as unreadable, the lane is the
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thing to check — not the repository.
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3. **Never put the token in a clone URL.** Embedded userinfo lands in logs and
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process listings. Use a credential helper or an HTTP header.
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4. **Reading the value directly** (operators, rare — verification only):
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```bash
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bao kv get -field=FORGE_READ_TOKEN platform/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation
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```
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---
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## Verify the lane (capabilities-safe — never read the value)
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```bash
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# Positive: the lane identity can read the data path
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bao token capabilities <lane-token> platform/data/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation
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# → expect: read
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# Negative: it can read nothing else, including the admin lane
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bao token capabilities <lane-token> platform/data/workloads/forgejo/forgejo-admin
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# → expect: deny
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```
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Verified 2026-08-27 through a 2-minute test token, revoked after use: `read` on
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its own path; `deny` on `forgejo-admin`, on the shared `llm-connect` provider
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secrets, and on the parent metadata path (no listing).
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**Why Kubernetes auth and not an AppRole.** The construction plan proposed an
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AppRole; the phase-4 live survey found `kubernetes/` auth already enabled on
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this cluster, and the founder ruled for it on 2026-08-27. The pod authenticates
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with its own projected ServiceAccount token, so this lane has no `role_id`
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/`secret_id` pair to deliver, store, or rotate. The role binds to
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`state-hub/state-hub` and deliberately **not** to `default`, which would grant
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the lane to every pod in the namespace.
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The negative check is the one that matters. The whole argument for building this
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lane instead of reusing `forgejo-admin-api-token` is that it cannot do what that
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one can.
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---
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## Rotation
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Re-mint in Forgejo, then overwrite the KV field. Rotation must not require a
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chart change or a redeploy — if it does, the delivery in
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`STATE-WP-0084-T02` is wrong and should be fixed rather than worked around.
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1. Mint a replacement read-only token in Forgejo (same scope: repository read,
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organisation-wide).
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2. Deliver it to `platform/workloads/state-hub/forge-derivation`, field
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`FORGE_READ_TOKEN`, via `paste_once_provision`.
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3. Revoke the previous token in Forgejo.
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4. Confirm a derivation pass still reads a known private repository.
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---
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## See also
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- `ops-mason/plans/state-hub-forge-derivation-read.md` — the construction plan
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- `ops-mason/workplans/MASON-WP-0003-state-hub-forge-read-lane.md` — the build
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- `state-hub/workplans/STATE-WP-0084-forge-read-for-private-repositories.md` — the consumer
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- `wiki/playbooks/forgejo-admin-api-token.md` — the lane this one is deliberately not
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