Set flavor on open workplans from origin/prose/status. Copy existing depends_on aliases only. Do not promote residuals. Assistant: grok Assistant-Session: 01a09dc1-b21e-77e1-919e-fcad2f82b267
108 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
108 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: WARDEN-WP-0039
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type: workplan
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title: "Preserve explicit policy caller refusals before credential and CA effects"
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domain: infotech
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repo: ops-warden
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status: blocked
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flavor: residual
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owner: codex
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topic_slug: custodian
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created: "2026-09-08"
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updated: "2026-09-08"
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origin: residual
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origin_ref: HFACT-WP-0001
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state_hub_workstream_id: "ae44a935-6fca-514c-a385-4550dd2b1fe8"
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---
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The factory critical-path review reproduced a live HTTP 403 from the reachable
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PDP for the configured ops-warden caller and a railiance-platform secret read.
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`check_fetch_policy` treated it as evaluator unavailability and used unknown-zone
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fail-open. Caller-auth rejection is an explicit refusal, not a transport outage.
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## Preserve explicit authentication and binding refusals
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0039-T01
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status: done
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flavor: residual
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priority: high
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assignee: the-custodian
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state_hub_task_id: "eaad08d9-ae47-5f50-8278-ea402a0e2869"
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```
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HTTP 401 and 403 stop signing and credential fetch irrespective of the outage
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profile. Do not expose response bodies or alter system identity to bypass the
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refusal. Preserve configured behavior for genuine evaluator failures. Prove
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both permissive and closed outage profiles and refusal before child execution.
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## Verify and publish the correction
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0039-T02
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status: done
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flavor: residual
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priority: high
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assignee: the-custodian
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state_hub_task_id: "ac85cf00-391c-5c63-b8f4-ed5bd57684e5"
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```
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Run the policy and proxy suites, retain a value-free live refusal receipt,
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publish the reviewed source, and verify the installed CLI refuses before any
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credential transport. A refusal is not a successful credential-read admission.
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The owner installer initially reused a cached wheel despite `--force`, leaving
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the pre-fix policy code installed. Both Makefile installation targets now use
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`--reinstall-package ops-warden` to refresh this package from the reviewed source.
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Verify the installed module as well as the checkout before the live refusal test.
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## Resolve the credential proxy's admitted policy binding
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```task
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id: WARDEN-WP-0039-T03
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status: wait
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flavor: residual
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priority: high
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assignee: the-custodian
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blocking_reason: "The configured ops-warden caller represents ops-warden; credential requests name their owner as resource.system. Need the flex-auth/credential-owner contract for that exact delegated read, without broadening caller bindings or relabelling resource ownership."
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state_hub_task_id: "8ca28b63-2e04-5333-b635-011b124c1806"
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```
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Consume the existing native-lane handoff (WARDEN-WP-0033 / SECRETS-WP-0006)
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and flex-auth caller contract. Establish whether this interim transport needs an
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admitted dedicated policy route or must finish its native handoff. Retain the
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refusal until that contract yields positive and wrong-caller/owner/tenant
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negative evidence. No credential read, secret generation, or policy grant is
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authorized by this workplan alone. HFACT-WP-0001-T03 consumes this return.
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Validation: 429 tests passed (4 integration tests deselected by the repository default); Ruff passed for changed Python files. Full tests used the declared phase-memory source and an isolated temporary memory store. The focused policy/proxy suite passed 69 tests. The existing authenticated SSH policy probe still returns HTTP 200/ALLOW, decision:f3f7c88f9585582a; the credential-owner request returns 403. No CA issue or credential read was performed by these probes.
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Installed verification: source guard present after refreshed owner installation (`19bb75c`). `warden access forgejo-admin-api-token --exec --field API_TOKEN -- true` exits 4 with explicit HTTP 403 before credential transport or child execution. The previous fail-open warning is absent. The probe requested no output value; no credential was fetched. T01/T02 are complete; T03 owns the remaining exact policy-binding admission.
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**T03 routed 2026-09-09.** Asked `flex-auth` whether an admitted contract exists
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for a delegated credential read where the caller (ops-warden) and the resource
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owner differ, since that is exactly the shape drawing the live 403. Three outcomes
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were named as equally acceptable answers, with no preference stated between the
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first two: an existing contract to conform to; no contract yet, making this a
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design question they should raise rather than one ops-warden invents a shape for;
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or that there should be **no** such contract — the interim proxy transport is
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itself the defect and the answer is to finish the native handoff
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(`WARDEN-WP-0033` / `SECRETS-WP-0006`).
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The third is a real possibility and was not argued against. Eleven catalog lanes
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are ops-warden proxies with a named intended owner precisely because no owner
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front door exists; if delegated reads should not be made policy-admissible, that
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shortens WP-0033 rather than blocking it.
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Two fixes were explicitly ruled out in the message rather than left unmentioned:
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broadening the ops-warden caller binding so it may read other systems' resources,
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and relabelling `resource.system` as ops-warden so the existing binding matches.
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The second is worse — it would make the audit trail assert ops-warden owns
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credentials it deliberately does not, which is the claim `ADR-0002` exists to
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prevent, achieved by editing a field instead of making an argument.
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The refusal stays in place until an answer yields positive evidence plus
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wrong-caller, wrong-owner and wrong-tenant negatives. No grant was requested.
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`secrets-engine` was told this bears on SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 and on how many lanes
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stay proxied; `gate-house` was told it may reach how the signing lane's
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approval-consume is built (GH-DEC-2026-005).
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