Closes the RISK-F-0003 exposure. All 14 ungraded lanes now carry an explicit risk grade with its justification in the entry: 17 high, 10 standard, 0 ungraded. The agent read-boundary now fires (exit 7) on lanes that were silently outside it. Graded on merit rather than defensively. A first pass marked two ordinary internal workload secrets high; test_high_risk_lanes_classified asserted the opposite and was right, so both were regraded down. high means disclosure into a logged context is damaging beyond what rotation recovers. inter-hub-bootstrap-ssh is high conservatively, with the reason in the entry so it is regraded with evidence rather than assumed down. ADR-0007 records the rule the grading rests on: build-stage permissiveness applies to controls that gate work, not to controls that prevent credential disclosure. The test is friction, not severity — the read-boundary blocks nobody, since --out/--exec/--wrap remain available, so relaxing it buys nothing. A blocked operation is recovered by retrying; a credential in a logged transcript is not recovered by rotation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Architecture
Our rules are ADRs — docs/adr/
The decisions that govern this repo live in docs/adr/ as addressable records,
not in wiki prose. Read docs/adr/README.md first; it explains the one
distinction that matters here.
| ADR | Rule |
|---|---|
ADR-0001 |
The routing catalog is a pointer layer, never a second copy of an owner's procedure |
ADR-0002 |
ops-warden is a transparent conduit, never a secret broker |
ADR-0003 |
Cover gaps, but never silently own them |
ADR-0004 |
High-risk lanes refuse raw value streaming to agent sessions |
ADR-0005 |
Implement one lane narrowly, route everything else |
ADR-0006 |
Enforcement is zone-scoped, never a global flag |
ADR-0007 |
Build-stage permissiveness stops at credential disclosure; every lane carries an explicit risk grade |
Owned versus inherited — check owner: before changing anything
Every ADR carries owner: in its frontmatter, and it decides what you are allowed
to do with the rule:
owner: ops-warden— ours. We are bound by it and we may change it. Changing one means writing a superseding ADR, not editing the decision in place.- any other owner — inherited. We follow it; we do not own it. Dispute it through that owner's process; never amend it here.
Everything in docs/adr/ today is owner: ops-warden. Rules we merely follow —
NetKingdom canon, the IAM profile, the credential-management standard — are cited,
never copied in. Copying them would recreate the second-source-of-truth failure
ADR-0001 exists to prevent.
Naming collision, worth knowing. ADR-001 (three digits) in
workplan-convention.md and session-protocol.md is the-custodian's ADR
establishing the workplan convention across the whole estate. It is inherited and
not ours to change. Our records are four-digit — ADR-0001 … ADR-0005 — and live
in this repo. When writing, say "the-custodian's ADR-001" if that is what you mean.
Precedence
If a wiki page, playbook, or .claude/rules/ file disagrees with an ADR, the ADR
is right and the other file is a defect — fix it rather than working around it.
The rule files are agent-facing operational instructions derived from these
decisions; they should cite an ADR rather than restate its reasoning.
Publication
These ADRs are publishable through policy-nexus at policy.coulomb.social, which
requires title, status and owner, renders owner in the page header and in the
index, and records source repo, path and revision digest in its manifest. Ownership
survives the repo boundary. policy-nexus publishes and never writes back: the file
here is the source of truth.
Quick Reference
~/state-hub/mcp_server/TOOLS.md — MCP tool reference