ops-warden/.claude/rules/architecture.md
tegwick ac85259c20
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 0s
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 2s
Grade every catalog lane; record ADR-0007
Closes the RISK-F-0003 exposure. All 14 ungraded lanes now carry an explicit
risk grade with its justification in the entry: 17 high, 10 standard, 0
ungraded. The agent read-boundary now fires (exit 7) on lanes that were silently
outside it.

Graded on merit rather than defensively. A first pass marked two ordinary
internal workload secrets high; test_high_risk_lanes_classified asserted the
opposite and was right, so both were regraded down. high means disclosure into a
logged context is damaging beyond what rotation recovers. inter-hub-bootstrap-ssh
is high conservatively, with the reason in the entry so it is regraded with
evidence rather than assumed down.

ADR-0007 records the rule the grading rests on: build-stage permissiveness
applies to controls that gate work, not to controls that prevent credential
disclosure. The test is friction, not severity — the read-boundary blocks nobody,
since --out/--exec/--wrap remain available, so relaxing it buys nothing. A
blocked operation is recovered by retrying; a credential in a logged transcript
is not recovered by rotation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 23:44:58 +02:00

2.7 KiB

Architecture

Our rules are ADRs — docs/adr/

The decisions that govern this repo live in docs/adr/ as addressable records, not in wiki prose. Read docs/adr/README.md first; it explains the one distinction that matters here.

ADR Rule
ADR-0001 The routing catalog is a pointer layer, never a second copy of an owner's procedure
ADR-0002 ops-warden is a transparent conduit, never a secret broker
ADR-0003 Cover gaps, but never silently own them
ADR-0004 High-risk lanes refuse raw value streaming to agent sessions
ADR-0005 Implement one lane narrowly, route everything else
ADR-0006 Enforcement is zone-scoped, never a global flag
ADR-0007 Build-stage permissiveness stops at credential disclosure; every lane carries an explicit risk grade

Owned versus inherited — check owner: before changing anything

Every ADR carries owner: in its frontmatter, and it decides what you are allowed to do with the rule:

  • owner: ops-warden — ours. We are bound by it and we may change it. Changing one means writing a superseding ADR, not editing the decision in place.
  • any other owner — inherited. We follow it; we do not own it. Dispute it through that owner's process; never amend it here.

Everything in docs/adr/ today is owner: ops-warden. Rules we merely follow — NetKingdom canon, the IAM profile, the credential-management standard — are cited, never copied in. Copying them would recreate the second-source-of-truth failure ADR-0001 exists to prevent.

Naming collision, worth knowing. ADR-001 (three digits) in workplan-convention.md and session-protocol.md is the-custodian's ADR establishing the workplan convention across the whole estate. It is inherited and not ours to change. Our records are four-digit — ADR-0001ADR-0005 — and live in this repo. When writing, say "the-custodian's ADR-001" if that is what you mean.

Precedence

If a wiki page, playbook, or .claude/rules/ file disagrees with an ADR, the ADR is right and the other file is a defect — fix it rather than working around it. The rule files are agent-facing operational instructions derived from these decisions; they should cite an ADR rather than restate its reasoning.

Publication

These ADRs are publishable through policy-nexus at policy.coulomb.social, which requires title, status and owner, renders owner in the page header and in the index, and records source repo, path and revision digest in its manifest. Ownership survives the repo boundary. policy-nexus publishes and never writes back: the file here is the source of truth.

Quick Reference

~/state-hub/mcp_server/TOOLS.md — MCP tool reference