ops-warden/.claude/rules/credential-routing.md
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WARDEN-WP-0026 T02: safe access transports (no secret values on stdout)
- proxy.py: proxy_fetch_to_file (mode-0600 file), build_wrapped_fetch +
  proxy_fetch_wrapped (single-use OpenBao response-wrapping token), _capture_value
  helper, is_bao_kv_fetch.
- warden access: --out FILE, --wrap [--wrap-ttl], --unsafe-stdout. Raw --fetch to a
  non-TTY stdout is refused (exit 6) — captured/piped output is the disclosure risk;
  sanctioned transports are --out / --exec / --wrap.
- canon: anti-pattern (secret value onto captured stdout) + transport table in
  .claude/rules/credential-routing.md; OperatorAccessAssist.md examples + G2 updated.
- tests: file/wrap/build + stdout-guard in tests/test_proxy.py. 293 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-16 14:51:56 +02:00

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# Credential and access routing
**Audience:** Codex, Claude Code, Grok, and custodian agents that call **llm-connect**
for inference. Run this check **before** requesting secrets, API keys, SSH access,
login tokens, or database passwords — in any repo, not only `ops-warden`.
ops-warden **issues SSH certificates only** (`warden sign`, `cert_command`). Every
other credential need belongs to another subsystem. **Do not** message
`ops-warden` on State Hub expecting a secret value; the reply is a pointer, not a key.
### Lookup (do this first)
```bash
warden route find "<describe your need>" --json
warden route show <catalog-id> --json
```
Requires the `warden` CLI from `~/ops-warden` (`uv tool install .` or `uv run warden`).
| Agent runtime | How to orient |
| --- | --- |
| **Codex / Grok** (shell, HTTP State Hub) | `warden route` commands above; inbox `to_agent=ops-warden` is for coordination, not secret vending |
| **Claude Code** (MCP when available) | `get_domain_summary("custodian")` for workplans; **still** use `warden route` for credential ownership |
| **llm-connect** (inference service) | Never put secret retrieval in prompts; route custody to OpenBao/operator paths surfaced by `warden route` |
### Quick routing table
| I need… | Owner | ops-warden executes? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| SSH cert (`adm`/`agt`/`atm`) | ops-warden | **Yes**`warden sign` |
| API key, DB password, provider token | OpenBao (`railiance-platform`) | No — route only |
| Login / OIDC / MFA | key-cape / Keycloak | No — route only |
| Authorization decision | flex-auth | No — route only |
| activity-core → issue-core emission | activity-core + issue-core | No — `warden route show activity-core-issue-sink` |
| SSH tunnel | ops-bridge (+ `cert_command` from warden) | No — route only |
### Anti-patterns (do not do these)
- `POST /messages/` to `ops-warden` asking for `ISSUE_CORE_API_KEY`, `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, etc.
- Inventing `warden secret`, `warden login`, `warden bao`, `warden tunnel` — they do not exist
- Pasting secrets into Git, State Hub, workplans, logs, or chat
- **Reading a secret value onto a captured stdout.** `bao kv get <path>` (full table)
or `bao kv get -field=X` piped/redirected/run in an agent session dumps the value
into a logged context — the 2026-07-16 disclosure. To *verify* a lane use
`bao token capabilities` (allow/deny), never a read (WP-0026 T01).
### Safe fetch transports (WP-0026 T02)
When a value must actually move, use a sanctioned transport that keeps it off
stdout. `warden access <need> --fetch` refuses to stream a value to a non-terminal
stdout unless you pass `--unsafe-stdout` (interactive human sessions only):
| Transport | Command | Result |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **File** | `warden access <need> --out FILE` | value written to a mode-0600 file, never shown |
| **Env (exec)** | `warden access <need> --exec -- <cmd>` | value injected into the child process env only |
| **Wrapping token** | `warden access <need> --wrap` | a single-use, short-TTL OpenBao wrapping token to `bao unwrap` in your own context |
### Other capabilities (reuse-surface)
Non-credential capabilities are usually discovered through **reuse-surface** federation
(`reuse-surface` registry / `capability.*` indexes). Credential routing is inlined in
every repo's agent instructions because it is high-frequency, high-risk, and easy to
get wrong.
**Canon:** `~/ops-warden/wiki/CredentialRouting.md` · catalog `~/ops-warden/registry/routing/catalog.yaml`