tegwick
57ad4abefc
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-6.1-sol Assistant-Session: 01a11beb-4eef-7fc1-94a7-597130a01ae9
119 lines
7 KiB
Markdown
119 lines
7 KiB
Markdown
# Anonymous forge consumers — ORGREF-WP-0002-T02
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Machine-readable result: `access-consumers-2026-10-08.json`. Reproduce:
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```bash
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python3 tools/runtime_inventory.py --output inventory/runtime-2026-10-08.json
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python3 tools/access_consumers.py --root /home/worsch \
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--runtime inventory/runtime-2026-10-08.json \
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--output inventory/access-consumers-2026-10-08.json
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```
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Read-only: 161 local working trees scanned, plus a fresh runtime capture
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(`runtime-2026-10-08.json`: 135 controllers, 10 Applications, 7 AppProjects).
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Secrets and node registry configuration were not inspected.
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## What breaks when repositories and packages go private
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| Class | Count | Reads | Will need |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| cluster-image-pull | 43 workloads | container images from the Forgejo registry, **none with `imagePullSecrets`** | node-level registry auth (k3s `registries.yaml` has **none for the forge**, founder check below) or pull credentials per namespace. Anonymous pulls confirmed working on 2026-10-08: anonymous registry token issued, tag list 200 |
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| cluster-gitops | 10 ArgoCD applications over 5 repos | Git: railiance-platform (6 apps), activity-core, informed-decision, state-hub, target-revenue | ArgoCD repository credentials: **none exist today** (founder check below) |
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| ci-runner | about 20 repos | own-source tarballs and cross-repo tarballs, anonymously (below) | job token for the own repository, a scoped read token across repositories |
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| package index | kaizen-agentic, vergabe-teilnahme | PyPI `simple/` index without credentials | package-read token |
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| federation | reuse-surface | about 60 capability indexes by raw URL | read identity, or a published index location |
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| code readers | about 8 files, below | clones, API and raw reads without token handling | owner review; re-point to an authenticated path |
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| campaign images | pr-hall-of-helix, fluid-telegram | Telegram fetching post images by raw URL | adapter fetches privately and uploads to Telegram (accepted policy; FT-WP-0001-T14) |
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Lower risk: `repo-gitops` and `repo-image-reference` are the cluster consumers
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seen from their source repos. `doc-link` means links break for the public, not
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consumers. `record-or-test` is evidence and fixtures.
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## Per-entry review, 2026-10-08
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**CI: anonymous source tarballs (breaks).** Workflows download their own source
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with plain `curl`/`wget` from `/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/archive/<sha>.tar.gz`, with no
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credentials: access-engine, activity-core, core-hub, coulomb-social, email-connect,
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glas-harness, hub-core, issue-core, kaizen-agentic, key-cape, net-kingdom,
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railiance-platform, reuse-surface, sbom-nexus, state-hub, tenant-engine,
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the-custodian, user-engine, vergabe-teilnahme. Cross-repo fetches as well:
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core-hub → hub-core, glas-harness → sand-boxer, state-hub → extra repos.
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Work-record workflows (binky-control, repo-seed, runbook-tutorials) call the
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forge base URL too. Fix: send the job token (`Authorization: token
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${{ github.token }}`) for the job's own repository, and a scoped read token for
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cross-repo fetches. Registry pushes in the same workflows are already
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authenticated.
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**Package indexes: anonymous reads (breaks).** PyPI `simple/` used without
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credentials: kaizen-agentic install docs, and vergabe-teilnahme `pyproject.toml` /
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`uv.lock` (issue-core 0.2.1). npm consumers (whynot-design, markitect
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testdrive-jsui) already send `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN`.
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**Federation: reuse-surface (breaks).** `registry/federation/sources.yaml` fetches
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about 60 capability indexes by raw URL, anonymously.
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**Code readers with no token handling found.** activity-core
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`release_transport.py` (https clone of activity-core and railiance-platform),
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`owner_return_eligibility.py` (forge API) and `run_artifacts.py`; sbom-nexus
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`source_fetch.py`; repo-manager `source_ref.py`; frontend-patterns
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`reference_consume.py`; state-hub `scripts/verify_image_pin.py`. Each owner
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confirms and re-points it. Token-aware already: state-hub `forge_projection.py`,
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railiance-platform `forgejo_package_prune.py` and its provisioning scripts.
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activity-core context resolvers are partly token-aware. Smoke probes of `/v2/`
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(core-hub, ops-hub) only check reachability.
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**Not consumers.** Runbooks, docs and evidence that mention URLs;
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`gitea.coulomb.social` references (frozen legacy host); kaizen-agentic project
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URLs and whynot-design's SSH `repository` field.
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## Not anonymous
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All 160 local clones use SSH with the founder's key (`forgejo-remote`). They keep
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working as long as that account can read the repositories.
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## Historical founder checks
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The October 8 results below are preserved as dated owner evidence. The original
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inline Secret template and registry-value-stripping commands are withdrawn:
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the estate forbids standalone go-template/jsonpath against real Secrets, and
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text stripping is not a reliable boundary for registry credentials. Do not
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repeat them. Obtain a current sanitized receipt from the platform/node owner;
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Secret annotation checks use the output-suppressing platform maintenance helper
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specified in the-custodian's agent environment orientation, section 6.
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### Results, 2026-10-08 (run by the founder)
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1. **ArgoCD: no repository credentials.** Empty output: no `repository` or
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`repo-creds` Secrets. All 10 Applications read the forge anonymously.
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2. **k3s: no registry auth for the forge.** `registries.yaml` exists with
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`mirrors` and `configs.auth` (username, password) only for `92.205.130.254:<port>`,
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the frozen legacy Gitea host. The port was cut off by the value-stripping
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command. There is no entry for `forgejo.coulomb.social`, so all 43 image pulls
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are anonymous. One node-level `configs."forgejo.coulomb.social".auth` entry
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with a read-only package identity would cover all of them at once (T06). The
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stale Gitea credential on the node is a cleanup item for railiance-forge or
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railiance-infra.
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## Left to owners (tracked in T06, not T02)
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- Owners confirm the code readers listed under "no token handling found".
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- Consumers outside these working trees (external sites and links, other
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people's clones) cannot be found by scanning; T08's anonymous probe after each
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wave is the backstop.
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## Collector corrections — 2026-10-09
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The retained October 8 JSON uses schema 0.1. Its `anonymous_image_pulls` field
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was an inference from absent pod pull-secret names; only the separate founder
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node-auth check supports the anonymous-access conclusion for that snapshot.
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Do not reuse this inference for another cluster or capture.
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Schema 0.2 reports `image_pulls_without_named_credentials`, with access marked
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unknown until node/service-account credential evidence exists. It preserves
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forge hostnames, so legacy references stay separate, and classifies package
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API indexes as package consumers with null repository targets (package namespace
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is not repository identity). `scan_exclusions` and `scan_error_count` expose
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coverage limits; the coordinator is omitted to avoid self-referential output.
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Sensitive/encrypted, binary and symlinked paths are not read. The source scan is
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deterministic for unchanged inputs, but no claim of full consumer completeness
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or deployment state follows from matching outputs.
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