prj-forgejo-org-refactor/inventory/access-consumers.md

# Anonymous forge consumers — ORGREF-WP-0002-T02

Machine-readable result: `access-consumers-2026-10-08.json`. Reproduce:

```bash
python3 tools/runtime_inventory.py --output inventory/runtime-2026-10-08.json
python3 tools/access_consumers.py --root /home/worsch \
  --runtime inventory/runtime-2026-10-08.json \
  --output inventory/access-consumers-2026-10-08.json
```

Read-only: 161 local working trees scanned, plus a fresh runtime capture
(`runtime-2026-10-08.json`: 135 controllers, 10 Applications, 7 AppProjects).
Secrets and node registry configuration were not inspected.

## What breaks when repositories and packages go private

| Class | Count | Reads | Will need |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| cluster-image-pull | 43 workloads | container images from the Forgejo registry, **none with `imagePullSecrets`** | pull credentials per namespace, or node-level registry auth (k3s `registries.yaml`, unverified). Anonymous pulls confirmed working on 2026-10-08: anonymous registry token issued, tag list 200 |
| cluster-gitops | 10 ArgoCD applications over 5 repos | Git: railiance-platform (6 apps), activity-core, informed-decision, state-hub, target-revenue | ArgoCD repository credentials. `argocd-cm` defines none; Secret-based credentials unverified |
| ci-runner | about 20 repos | own-source tarballs and cross-repo tarballs, anonymously (below) | job token for the own repository, a scoped read token across repositories |
| package index | kaizen-agentic, vergabe-teilnahme | PyPI `simple/` index without credentials | package-read token |
| federation | reuse-surface | about 60 capability indexes by raw URL | read identity, or a published index location |
| code readers | about 8 files, below | clones, API and raw reads without token handling | owner review; re-point to an authenticated path |
| campaign images | pr-hall-of-helix, fluid-telegram | Telegram fetching post images by raw URL | a deliberate public asset location (ORGREF-WP-0002-T01 point 4) |

Lower risk: `repo-gitops` and `repo-image-reference` are the cluster consumers
seen from their source repos. `doc-link` means links break for the public, not
consumers. `record-or-test` is evidence and fixtures.

## Per-entry review, 2026-10-08

**CI: anonymous source tarballs (breaks).** Workflows download their own source
with plain `curl`/`wget` from `/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/archive/<sha>.tar.gz`, with no
credentials: access-engine, activity-core, core-hub, coulomb-social, email-connect,
glas-harness, hub-core, issue-core, kaizen-agentic, key-cape, net-kingdom,
railiance-platform, reuse-surface, sbom-nexus, state-hub, tenant-engine,
the-custodian, user-engine, vergabe-teilnahme. Cross-repo fetches as well:
core-hub → hub-core, glas-harness → sand-boxer, state-hub → extra repos.
Work-record workflows (binky-control, repo-seed, runbook-tutorials) call the
forge base URL too. Fix: send the job token (`Authorization: token
${{ github.token }}`) for the job's own repository, and a scoped read token for
cross-repo fetches. Registry pushes in the same workflows are already
authenticated.

**Package indexes: anonymous reads (breaks).** PyPI `simple/` used without
credentials: kaizen-agentic install docs, and vergabe-teilnahme `pyproject.toml` /
`uv.lock` (issue-core 0.2.1). npm consumers (whynot-design, markitect
testdrive-jsui) already send `NPM_AUTH_TOKEN`.

**Federation: reuse-surface (breaks).** `registry/federation/sources.yaml` fetches
about 60 capability indexes by raw URL, anonymously.

**Code readers with no token handling found.** activity-core
`release_transport.py` (https clone of activity-core and railiance-platform),
`owner_return_eligibility.py` (forge API) and `run_artifacts.py`; sbom-nexus
`source_fetch.py`; repo-manager `source_ref.py`; frontend-patterns
`reference_consume.py`; state-hub `scripts/verify_image_pin.py`. Each owner
confirms and re-points it. Token-aware already: state-hub `forge_projection.py`,
railiance-platform `forgejo_package_prune.py` and its provisioning scripts.
activity-core context resolvers are partly token-aware. Smoke probes of `/v2/`
(core-hub, ops-hub) only check reachability.

**Not consumers.** Runbooks, docs and evidence that mention URLs;
`gitea.coulomb.social` references (frozen legacy host); kaizen-agentic project
URLs and whynot-design's SSH `repository` field.

## Not anonymous

All 160 local clones use SSH with the founder's key (`forgejo-remote`). They keep
working as long as that account can read the repositories.

## Founder checks (presence only, no secret values)

Agents do not read Secrets, so run these in your own terminal and paste the output.

1. ArgoCD repository credentials, by name, type and URL only:

   ```bash
   kubectl -n argocd get secrets \
     -l 'argocd.argoproj.io/secret-type in (repository,repo-creds)' \
     -o go-template='{{range .items}}{{.metadata.name}} {{index .metadata.labels "argocd.argoproj.io/secret-type"}} {{if .data.url}}{{.data.url | base64decode}}{{end}}{{"\n"}}{{end}}'
   ```

2. k3s registry configuration on railiance01, as key names with every value
   stripped:

   ```bash
   ssh railiance01 'sudo test -f /etc/rancher/k3s/registries.yaml \
     && sudo sed -nE "s/^([[:space:]]*[A-Za-z0-9_.\"-]+:).*/\1/p" /etc/rancher/k3s/registries.yaml \
     || echo absent'
   ```

   `absent`, or no `auth:` under the forge host, means all 43 pulls depend on
   anonymous registry access today.

## Still open for T02

- The two founder checks above.
- Owners confirm the code readers listed under "no token handling found".
- Consumers outside these working trees (external sites and links, other
  people's clones) cannot be found by scanning; T08's anonymous probe after each
  wave is the backstop.