Gate /mcp with a shared-secret bearer token (QONTO_ASSISTANT_MCP_TOKEN,
mcp_auth.py::BearerTokenAuthMiddleware, constant-time compare, REST
untouched) since no OIDC issuer exists in this fleet yet -- pointing
FastMCP's OAuth Protected Resource flow at a non-existent issuer would be
worse than not having it. This token is a service credential, never a bank
credential; per-actor identity stays the existing X-Actor-* convention.
Add docs/mcp-integration.md: tool catalog, the two-layer auth model (workload
auth today vs. deferred OIDC target), and one shared {"mcpServers": {...}}
client config snippet (url + headers) usable across Claude Code, Claude
Desktop, Cursor, and Codex/Grok-style harnesses.
Verified live using only that snippet: unauthenticated and wrong-token
requests get 401 before reaching any tool; a request built from the
snippet's URL + headers lists tools and calls qonto_org_summary
successfully against the fixture-backed server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.3 KiB
qonto-assistant
Policy-governed Qonto domain API and MCP assistant for Binky (and later multi-tenant dogfood).
One choke point for bank access across every coding agent and harness. Clients never hold the Qonto API key. v1 policy: read for awareness only — no spend, no volume-cost actions.
Start here
| Doc | What |
|---|---|
INTENT.md |
Why this exists; boundaries |
specs/ArchitectureBlueprint.md |
Architecture, phases, policy model |
research/2026-07-21-mcp-gateway-and-governed-domain-assistant.md |
External + internal research |
docs/operator-runbook.md |
How to run and verify Phase 1 |
Status
Phase 1 runtime is implemented:
- Python 3.12 service under
src/qonto_assistant/ - default-deny YAML policy
- Qonto read-only client (
organization,transactions) - REST endpoints:
/v1/health,/v1/accounts,/v1/transactions,/v1/snapshot - audit metadata, rate limiting, concurrency bounds, tests
Phase 2 (MCP surface, workplans/QONTO-WP-0003-mcp-surface.md) is in
progress: a streamable-HTTP MCP adapter is mounted at /mcp on the same
capability core and policy kernel as REST, with tools qonto_org_summary,
qonto_list_transactions, and qonto_cost_run_rate_hints. The endpoint is
gated by a shared-secret bearer token (QONTO_ASSISTANT_MCP_TOKEN) — see
docs/mcp-integration.md for the auth model, its gap vs. the OIDC/workload
target, and the shared multi-harness client config snippet. The
finance-qonto-read tool profile is not yet implemented.
Current verification:
PYTHONPATH=src ../state-hub/.venv/bin/python -m pytest→16 passedpython3 -m compileall src tests scripts../state-hub/.venv/bin/python scripts/smoke_rest_api.py --python ../state-hub/.venv/bin/python
Local fixture-backed smoke mode is available through QONTO_FIXTURE_DIR, so the
service can be exercised without real Qonto credentials. The smoke path checks
both a 31-day recent snapshot and a 90-day recurring-cost snapshot.
Normal local workflow, when toolchain support exists:
make install-dev
make test
make run
Related
- OpenBao lane:
tenants/binky/qonto-api(ops-wardenbinky-qonto-api) - First pull / CostRunRate:
binky-controlBINKY-WP-0005