194 lines
7.9 KiB
Markdown
194 lines
7.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: QONTO-WP-0004
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type: workplan
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title: "Security hardening and scale-to-zero facade for internet exposure"
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domain: infotech
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repo: qonto-assistant
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status: active
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owner: claude
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topic_slug: the-custodian
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created: "2026-07-23"
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updated: "2026-07-23"
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state_hub_workstream_id: "81a476ac-06d5-4e98-a2ed-1518b16863aa"
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---
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# Security hardening and scale-to-zero facade for internet exposure
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Implements `docs/SecurityPractice.md`, written ahead of deploying
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`qonto-assistant` to `railiance01`. This is the first fleet service that
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must be reachable by clients outside the cluster (laptop-based agent
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harness sessions) while holding a real company bank credential — a risk
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class above every other agent-facing service shipped so far.
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Some of this workplan's scope depends on systems this repo does not own
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(`key-cape`, `flex-auth`, `tenant-engine`, Railiance placement). Those
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dependencies are tracked explicitly per task rather than assumed away; the
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`kings-guard`-owned portion is tracked as a separate intake against
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`KG-WP-0002`, not duplicated here.
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## Task: Security Genome record and audit-stream review
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```task
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id: QONTO-WP-0004-T01
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "e93b2027-dd28-464b-8ea3-f7540f91caad"
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```
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**2026-07-23:** `specs/security-genome.yaml` written per
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`kings-guard/specs/NetKingdomImmuneArchitecture.md` §9.1's schema —
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capabilities provided/consumed, expected egress (OpenBao + Qonto API only),
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data classification, recovery expectations, and explicit tolerances for
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today's known-temporary gaps (shared-secret bearer auth, self-asserted actor
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claims). Confirmed `AuditLogger`'s existing event shape (actor, capability,
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decision, deny_reason, latency, upstream status, policy version) already
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matches the Immune Observation contract closely enough that no schema
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rework is anticipated once a real consumer exists.
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Done when: genome record exists and is reviewed against the blueprint
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schema; no code changes required for this task.
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## Task: Deny-escalation lockout
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```task
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id: QONTO-WP-0004-T02
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status: done
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "3b10dd59-b03f-4d2b-8164-aa2a1c8c06c4"
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```
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**2026-07-23:** `src/qonto_assistant/security_watch.py::DenyEscalationTracker`
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locks out an actor who triggers `arg_constraint`/`credential_exfil` policy
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denials `QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_THRESHOLD` times (default 3) within
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`QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_WINDOW_SECONDS` (default 60s), for
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`QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_LOCKOUT_SECONDS` (default 300s). Wired into
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`CapabilityService._execute` ahead of the policy kernel call; on by default
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via `QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_ENABLED`. Ordinary denies (`authz_denied`,
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`tenant_scope`, `unknown_capability`) never count. This needed no external
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dependency — it closes a real gap using only what already exists (the audit
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stream and rate limiter).
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Verified: `tests/test_deny_escalation.py` (8 new tests: tracker unit tests
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+ service integration for both the escalating and non-escalating paths);
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full suite `pytest` → 39 passed; REST and MCP smoke scripts both pass
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against fixtures; `compileall` clean.
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Done when: threshold/window/lockout are configurable, on by default, and
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proven not to affect ordinary policy-deny traffic.
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## Task: Replace shared-secret bearer token with key-cape identity
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```task
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id: QONTO-WP-0004-T03
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status: todo
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "f02b1cc0-4afc-44e5-b71d-545a13a3e12b"
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```
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Verify `key-cape`-issued IAM Profile tokens at the request boundary (facade
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or assistant, depending on where T05 lands the auth check) in place of
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`QONTO_ASSISTANT_MCP_TOKEN`. Derive `X-Actor-*`-equivalent claims from the
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verified token instead of trusting self-asserted headers — closing the gap
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`docs/mcp-integration.md`'s auth-model section calls out explicitly.
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**Depends on:** `key-cape` exposing a client-verifiable token/JWKS surface
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this service can validate against — needs coordination with `key-cape`, not
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something this repo can complete alone.
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Done when: a request bearing a valid key-cape token is accepted with
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claims derived from the token; the shared-secret bearer path is
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demoted to fixture/local-dev-only, matching what `docs/mcp-integration.md`
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already documents as the intended boundary.
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## Task: Register and enforce `finance.qonto.read` in flex-auth
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```task
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id: QONTO-WP-0004-T04
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status: todo
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "fce7bf0e-674a-461f-8f2f-42d7dde3a722"
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```
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Register `finance.qonto.read` as a `flex-auth` resource. Call `flex-auth`
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for a live decision on this resource rather than relying on
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`QONTO_ASSISTANT_ENFORCE_SCOPE`'s current cached-claim check — mirroring
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`tenant-engine`'s own reasoning that a stale grant is not an acceptable risk
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for money-adjacent actions, applied here to read access. Replace the
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hardcoded `default_tenant_id="binky"` assumption in `config.py` with a live
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`tenant-engine` capability-role + plan lookup (`VEN`/`CUS`) so a lapsed
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tenant loses read access on the next request, not whenever a cache expires.
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**Depends on:** `flex-auth` resource registration and a `tenant-engine`
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lookup/cache API this repo can call — both external, not something this
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repo can complete alone.
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Done when: an unauthorized tenant/role is denied by a live `flex-auth`
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decision, not a locally cached scope check; policy tests cover both the
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allow and the newly-live-checked deny path.
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## Task: Facade / scale-to-zero activator — design and reference implementation
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```task
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id: QONTO-WP-0004-T05
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status: todo
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priority: high
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state_hub_task_id: "e8a87292-488d-4871-be3e-59a5b6a38694"
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```
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Per `docs/SecurityPractice.md` §2/§6: a thin, always-on facade is the only
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internet-facing component. It authenticates (key-cape) and authorizes
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(flex-auth pre-check) *before* waking the real service, then scales the
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backend `Deployment` 0→1, waits on `/v1/health`, proxies through, and scales
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back to 0 after an idle timeout. `qonto-assistant`'s raw REST/MCP port must
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never be bound to a publicly-reachable address in any deployment.
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Check whether the target `railiance01` cluster already runs Knative Serving
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before building a custom activator — if it does, this task becomes
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integration (Knative Service manifest + autoscaling annotations) rather
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than new code. If not, scope a minimal reference implementation (one
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Service, one Deployment, one wake/idle controller) sized to this repo's
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narrow surface, not a general-purpose PaaS.
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**Depends on:** a decision on where this component lives (this repo,
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Railiance, or a new dedicated repo) and Railiance cluster capabilities
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(Knative or not) — flag both as open questions rather than assuming.
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Done when: an unauthenticated request never triggers a backend wake; an
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authenticated+authorized request gets proxied through after a bounded
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cold-start; the backend scales back to 0 after the configured idle window.
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## Task: Isolation placement request to Railiance
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```task
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id: QONTO-WP-0004-T06
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status: todo
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priority: medium
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state_hub_task_id: "7cd52269-ca0a-4b09-ab51-f02ed71604f2"
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```
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Per `docs/SecurityPractice.md` §7: request I1 "Reinforced" (dedicated node
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pool / sandboxed runtime) at minimum for the `qonto-assistant` deployment on
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`railiance01`, given tenant-confidential financial-data classification,
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internet reachability via the facade, and sole custody of the bank
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credential. I2 "Dedicated" (own namespace/keys) is worth considering; the
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placement decision belongs to whoever owns Railiance scheduling for this
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workload, not this repo.
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**Depends on:** a Railiance-side placement decision — this task's job is to
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make the request concrete and reviewable, not to implement scheduling.
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Done when: a placement decision is recorded (even if the decision is "I0 for
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now, revisit before going live") and referenced back into this workplan.
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## Task: Closure review
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```task
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id: QONTO-WP-0004-T07
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status: todo
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priority: low
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state_hub_task_id: "2a2da206-d182-4a72-aea4-56e58ae74c76"
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```
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Close when T03–T06 land or are explicitly deferred with a recorded reason.
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T01/T02 already shipped without waiting on external dependencies. Run
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`statehub fix-consistency`.
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