qonto-assistant/docs/operator-runbook.md
tegwick 3faf1fed71 Add SecurityPractice.md, Security Genome record, and deny-escalation lockout
Design doc for hardening qonto-assistant before deployment to
railiance01: this is the first fleet service that must be
internet-reachable (external harness clients, not just in-cluster
jobs) while holding a real bank credential. Covers identity (key-cape
in place of the interim bearer token), authorization (finance.qonto.read
in flex-auth + tenant-engine capability roles instead of the
hardcoded default_tenant_id), network exposure (facade-only internet
address), isolation profile, and a Kings Guard mapping (the existing
audit stream is already Immune-Observation-shaped; nothing to rebuild
later).

Ships one concrete, dependency-free piece of that design now:
DenyEscalationTracker locks out an actor who repeatedly triggers
arg_constraint/credential_exfil denies within a short window, closing
the gap where a probing client could retry indefinitely at whatever
rate the existing rate limiter otherwise allows. Wired through
CapabilityService, on by default, configurable via
QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_* env vars. Ordinary denies (authz_denied,
tenant_scope) never count toward it.

Also adds specs/security-genome.yaml (kings-guard's genome-record
shape, populated now so no rework is needed once a consumer exists).

Verified: pytest -> 39 passed (8 new); REST and MCP smoke scripts both
pass against fixtures; compileall clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 22:59:06 +02:00

6 KiB

Qonto Assistant Operator Runbook

What this Phase 1 service does

qonto-assistant is the read-only REST surface for governed Qonto access. Phase 1 ships:

  • policy-gated GET /v1/accounts
  • policy-gated GET /v1/transactions
  • policy-gated GET /v1/snapshot
  • structured audit events without secrets
  • env-backed or OpenBao-CLI-backed credential loading

Spend, transfer, card, invoicing, payment-link, and other volume-cost actions remain denied by policy.

Preferred local workflow

If make and python3 -m venv are available:

make install-dev
make test
make run

The API then listens on http://127.0.0.1:8080.

Verified fallback on this workstation

This workstation currently lacks:

  • make
  • python3 -m venv support (ensurepip missing)
  • python3 -m pip

Use an existing fleet virtualenv that already contains FastAPI/httpx/pytest:

PYTHONPATH=src ../state-hub/.venv/bin/python -m pytest
python3 -m compileall src tests

This fallback was used to verify the current implementation.

Credential sources

Option A: env-injected credentials

Provide either:

  • API_USER + API_KEY
  • or QONTO_ORGANIZATION_ID + QONTO_API_KEY

Example:

export API_USER='...'
export API_KEY='...'

Option B: OpenBao CLI fetch inside the service

Set:

export QONTO_CREDENTIAL_SOURCE=bao-cli
export QONTO_OPENBAO_PATH=tenants/binky/qonto-api
export QONTO_OPENBAO_COMMAND=bao

The service then shells out to bao kv get -field=... and caches the credentials in memory for a short TTL.

Start the API

Preferred:

make run

Fallback:

PYTHONPATH=src ../state-hub/.venv/bin/python -m qonto_assistant.main

Fixture-backed local mode

For local smoke work without real bank credentials:

export QONTO_FIXTURE_DIR=tests/fixtures/qonto
PYTHONPATH=src ../state-hub/.venv/bin/python -m qonto_assistant.main

In this mode the service serves canned Qonto organization and transaction payloads from tests/fixtures/qonto/.

One-command HTTP smoke

../state-hub/.venv/bin/python scripts/smoke_rest_api.py \
  --python ../state-hub/.venv/bin/python

This starts the service on a random local port against the fixture payloads, checks /v1/health, /v1/accounts, a recent 31-day snapshot, and a wider 90-day cost-review snapshot, then shuts the process down.

One-command MCP smoke

../state-hub/.venv/bin/python scripts/smoke_mcp.py \
  --python ../state-hub/.venv/bin/python

Same shape as the REST smoke: starts the service on a random local port against the fixture payloads, this time with QONTO_ASSISTANT_MCP_TOKEN set to a freshly generated token so the auth layer (docs/mcp-integration.md) is exercised too, not bypassed. Connects with the mcp SDK's streamablehttp_client, lists tools, calls qonto_ping, qonto_org_summary, qonto_list_transactions, and qonto_cost_run_rate_hints, then confirms an out-of-catalog tool name (qonto_transfer_funds, never registered) comes back as a normal isError result rather than a crash or a policy bypass. No real Qonto credentials involved.

Example calls

Minimal local call:

python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import urllib.request

req = urllib.request.Request(
    "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/accounts",
    headers={"X-Actor-ID": "local-operator", "X-Tenant-ID": "binky"},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:
    print(json.dumps(json.load(resp), indent=2))
PY

Transactions view:

python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import urllib.request

req = urllib.request.Request(
    "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/transactions?page_size=50&window_days=31",
    headers={"X-Actor-ID": "finance-steward", "X-Tenant-ID": "binky"},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:
    print(json.dumps(json.load(resp), indent=2))
PY

Snapshot for CostRunRate refresh:

python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import urllib.request

req = urllib.request.Request(
    "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/snapshot?window_days=90&page_size=50",
    headers={"X-Actor-ID": "finance-steward", "X-Tenant-ID": "binky"},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:
    print(json.dumps(json.load(resp), indent=2))
PY

Use window_days=31 for a recent-activity view. Use window_days=90 or 93 when recurring fixed-cost hints are required.

MCP surface

Phase 2 mounts a streamable-HTTP MCP adapter at /mcp on this same process, sharing the policy kernel and audit layer above. See docs/mcp-integration.md for the tool catalog, the auth model (QONTO_ASSISTANT_MCP_TOKEN), and the shared client config snippet.

CostRunRate refresh path

binky-control should consume GET /v1/snapshot and extract:

  • redacted organization/account summary
  • recent transactions
  • recurring debit hints for fixed-cost review

The repo does not write directly into binky-control/finance/CostRunRate.md. That consumer-side write remains outside this repo.

Safety notes

  • Never print or commit API_KEY.
  • Prefer X-Tenant-ID: binky explicitly even in single-tenant dogfood.
  • Audit output is metadata-only; account identifiers stay redacted by default.
  • The service supports a bearer auth mode for future upstream evolution, but the current dogfood path remains legacy_api_key because that is the proven BINKY-WP-0005 header mode.

Deny-escalation lockout

On by default (QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_ENABLED=true). An actor who triggers arg_constraint or credential_exfil policy denials QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_THRESHOLD times (default 3) within QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_WINDOW_SECONDS (default 60s) is locked out for QONTO_DENY_ESCALATION_LOCKOUT_SECONDS (default 300s) — every request from that actor is rejected with actor_locked_out before the policy kernel is even consulted, regardless of which capability they call next. Ordinary denies (authz_denied, tenant_scope, unknown_capability) never count toward this — only the two reason classes that indicate probing/exfiltration rather than a client mistake. See docs/SecurityPractice.md §9.3 and src/qonto_assistant/security_watch.py.